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2. 
ABSTRACT 
Recent approaches to morel education have tended to 
emphasise the development of morel reasoning rather than the 
performance of morel actions. The logical relationship between 
the formation of morel judgments end their translation into 
action, however, cannot be ignored within the context of moral 
education; but equally it cannot be fully and properly explored 
in isolation from wider, philosophical issues. Akresia, or 
"weakness of will", has generated a cluster of classic, philo—
sophical problems concerning whether it is possible fora men 
to fail to do whet he sincerely believes he ought to do (given 
the ability end opportunity), end how apparent examples of this 
phenomenon should be interpreted end explained. 
The denial of the logical possibility of ekresie, as 
represented by the arguments of Socrates and Here, is considered 
in Chapter II end found to be unconvincing. The concepts of 
"ought" end of "conscience" are analysed in Chapter III and 
shown to possess features which provide sufficient grounds for 
believing that akresia both can end does occur. More precise 
criteria for akrasie are proposed in Chapter IV, end a number 
of common explanations are examined in the light of these 
criteria. A particular interpretation of ekresia is developed 
in Chapter V as a special case of doing x rather then y because 
one wants to do x rather then y, end three central, explanatory 
features of ekrasia are picked out, involving dishonesty, 
language end immediacy. 
Finally this analysis and interpretation is applied to 
the particular concerns of moral education. Children as well 
as adults are shown to be capable of ekresie; various general 
approaches to end specific methods of "teaching morality" are 
reviewed as possible means of combatting ekrasia in children; 
and the three explanatory factors are used to suggest ways in 
which children may be encouraged to act upon their moral 
judgments. 
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CHAPTER I — INTRODUCTION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL 
EDUCATION AND AKRASIA  
This introductory chapter will attempt to identify the 
particular educational problem to be investigated in this study, 
end to indicate the broader philosophical context within which 
it is located. The conceptual distinction between morel training 
end morel education will first be used to illustrate the judg—
mental end behavioural aspects of morality end of moral 
education (1 — 3), end Wilson's analysis of these aspects will 
be briefly considered (4). Failure to act upon one's moral 
judgments end beliefs (ekresia) will then be shown to con— 
stitute, prime facie, a necessary concern of morel education 
(5). Finally, the differing degrees of importance which moral 
educationists appear to attach to the problem of akrasia will 
be taken to suggest that the relationship between judgment end 
action within morel education cannot be discussed in isolation 
from the wider philosophical issues which akrasie raises (6). 
1. Training end Education 
The reasons why certain concepts at certain times 
come into fashion or go out of it present an interesting field 
of study. The concepts of "training" and"education" are a case 
in point, end a recent analysis has examined the apparent trend 
away from the former and towards the latter.1 Teacher training 
colleges have become colleges of education, physical training 
(P.T.) has become physical education, and morel (or "character") 
training has become morel education; a similar emphasis upon 
11. 
education rather than training, instructing or informing can be 
noted in the fields of religion, art and sex. 
Peters has argued that "'trained' suggests the 
development of competence in a limited skill or mode of thought 
whereas 'educated' suggests a linkage with a wider system of 
beliefs", end he floes on to apply this distinction to some of 
the examples just mentioned, e.g. "'Physical training' suggests 
merely disciplining the body in relation to a narrowly conceived 
end such as physical fitness; 'physical education' suggests 
the cultivation of physical fitness as a necessary foundation 
for a balanced way of life."2 
A thorough examination of the distinction and all its 
implications would be lengthy and at this stage unnecessary. 
It will suffice to note that "training" certainly seems to be 
directed towards more "limited" ends than does "education', but 
this raises further questions as to just how "limited" an end 
has to be, end in what way, for it to suggest "training" rather 
than "education". Peters proposes at various points that 
"limited" could imply "specific ends", "specialised skills" and 
"circumscribed moves". 
An important feature of such "limited ends", not 
directly mentioned by Peters, is that they are quantifiable; 
they can be tested and evaluated with e fair degree of pre—
cision. The success or failure of "training" can thus be 
determined much more easily than the success or failure of 
"education"; it is much easier to test whether or not a child 
can do a forward roll than to test whether or not he conceives 
"the cultivation of physical fitness as a necessary foundation 
12. 
for a balanced way of life". 
The conceptual swing from "training" to "education" 
therefore suggests, among other things, a greeter degree of 
difficulty in evaluating the achievement or non—achievement of 
aims end objectives, and consequently also in identifying 
particular factors that may determine that achievement or non—
achievement. This is a major problem in the area of moral 
education. 
2. Morel Training and Morel Education 
The significance of the swing from "training" to 
"education" and the reasons for it will vary according to the 
particular area of learning, although some general factors may 
also be involved. The conceptual swing from moral training to 
morel educations however, reflects current thinking about the 
transmission of morality to the young, and should be viewed in 
the light of work by developmental psychologists on how children 
develop morally. Some of this work will be examined in some 
detail later, but its main emphases must be outlined at this 
point. 
The principles of developmental psychology have been 
found to have applications in many areas of learning, including 
morality. Pieget's pioneer work in 19323 
 has been built upon 
by Kohlberg in recent years,4 and developmental questions are 
now generally considered to be of central importance in moral 
learning. 
Studies of moral development have tended to concentrate 
upon children's moral judgments rather than their actions. The 
13. 
level of thinking displayed in a moral—conflict situation, the 
degree of "moral maturity" achieved and the type of reason 
given to justify a decision supply the main criteria for moral 
development. These criteria are "judgmental" rather than 
"behavioural"; they refer to leyels of cognitive functioning 
rather than to such factors vr conforli.ty to rules, resistance 
to temptation or the feeling of guilt. 
JJevelopmentalists therefore see moral development 
(and consequently moral education) to be concerned primarily 
with the form or structure of moral thinking, rather then with 
specific content of belief or action; it is not what the child 
does or believes that matters so much asituv 	 he thinks he ought 
to do it. Further support for this view was supplied by the 
work of Hartshorne and Mey who apparently demonstrated the 
unreliability of behavioural criteria, which they claimed showed 
little consistency and were largely determined by particular 
"situational" pressures.5  
The developmentelists' emphasis upon reasoning and 
judgment rather than overt behaviour can also claim some philo—
sophical support. For an action to count as "morel", it is not 
normally thought sufficient that it should merely conform to 
some overt, behavioural norm, for bodily movements are open to 
differing interpretations; handing over money may be an act of 
generosity or charity, or of bribery end corruption, depending 
upon the reasons, intentions and judgments underlying the 
behaviour. "Judgmental" rather than "behavioural" criteria can 
therefore be argued to be the more useful in distinguishing 
between what is "morel", "non—moral" and "immort.1"; and even 
14. 
within the "judgmental" zone, the developmentalists' concern 
for the form rather then the particular content of moral 
thinking finds support from those philosophers who wish to 
characterise morel reasoning and judgments in purely "formal" 
N 6 
terms (e.g. that they are "prescriptive" end "universelizeble"). 
These brief references to psychological end philo—
sophical accounts of moral behaviour will be expended end dis—
cussed at greater length later, but they have been mentioned at 
this point because of their connection with the conceptual swing 
from morel training to moral education. The developmental 
emphasis upon levels of thinking, forms of reasoning end the 
making of judgments, when considered alongside the philosophical 
emphasis upon the agent's reasons end intentions end upon the 
formal characteristics of moral reasoning, suggests that 
morality is a more suitable subject for education than for 
training. Training is directed towards relatively stereo—typed 
responses, but to act morally (as outlined above) cannot be 
defined in terms of such responses, for it is to act for 
reasons which imply Peters' "linkage with a wider system of 
beliefs". 
The conceptual swing from moral training to morel 
education has also been associated with changes in the aims end 
methods of moral teaching, particularly in schools. Methodo—
logical questions will be examined in depth in Chapter VI, end 
at this point it merely needs to be noted that traditional con—
ceptions of moral training, aimed et the "limited end" of 
inculcating e specific code of moral conduct (e.g. telling the 
truth, being polite, playing one's hardest for the school, etc.) 
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have largely given way to an approach which focusses upon 
developing ("educationally") an understanding of moral 
reasoning. This letter approach considers that morel education 
is concerned with teaching the form of morel thinking rather 
then a particular content of morel beliefs end behaviour; 
indeed the child's overt behaviour gives little indication as 
to whether or not he is "morally educated". 
1‘ good example of the influence exerted by the psycho—
logical (and to a lesser extent the philosophical) accounts 
outlined above upon programmes end recommendations for practical 
teaching is provided by the Canadian Mackay Report on "Religious 
Information and Morel Development",7 which leans heavily upon 
Kohlberg's developmental framework for its theoretical backing. 
The following extracts clearly illustrate the "judgmental", 
"nonrbehevioural" emphases of the Report: 
(i) "... we equate ... character development ... with develop—
ment of the ability to reason morally ..." (p.42) 
(ii) "... a person's morality is primarily a measure of his 
ability to make morel judgments ... In our opinion, then, 
it is the formal character or morel point of view of e 
particular judgment which is important rather than its 
content. It is not the decision reached in a given 
situation that matters so much as the process of arriving 
at that decision." (pp. 44-45) 
(iii) "... he (Kohlberg) is wisely focussing our attention on 
how young people think rather than on how they behave." 
(1). 46) 
(iv) "Ilnother great fault in seeking to influence behaviour 
rather then the underlying process of morel reasoning is 
that it leads to the establishment of absolute values ..." 
(p. 47) 
(v) "It is not the donclusion arrived at that should concern 
us; it is the method of reesoninp that leads to it." 
(p. 67)8 
16. 
The Report, then, clearly illustrates an approach to 
moral learning end morel education, the psychological history 
of which can be traced beck at least to Pieget, who in 1932 
stated unequivocally in his influential study, "The Morel 
Judgment of the Child": 
"Readers will find in this book no direct analysis of 
child morality as it is practised in home end school 
life, or in children's societies. It is the moral 
judgment that we propose to investigate, not morel 
behaviour or sentiments." 9 
3. Objections to the "Judgmental" Account of Moral Education 
The implications of the conceptual swing from moral 
training to morel education, and in particular the emphasis now 
pieced upon developing the form of morel reasoning rather than 
teaching specific beliefs or training specific modes of 
behaviour, are open to criticism at both a theoretical end e 
practical level. 
(a) 
	
The theoretical framework which developmental psycho— 
logists have provided for moral education has little in common 
with the models of morality end of morel learning proposed by 
behaviourists such as Skinner, who seek to deny the importance 
of "mentalistic phenomena", like beliefs end intentions, in all 
areas of human life including that of morality. 
Skinner's "scientific conception of man", for example, 
minimises "men's vaunted creative powers, his original accom—
plishments in art, science end morals, his capacity to choose, 
and our right to hold him responsible for the consequences of 
his choice,"10 for the behaviourist approach "carries us beyond 
awkward or inaccessible 'principles', 'factors', and so on, to 
17. 
variables which can be directly manipulated.,11 
"Judgmental" accounts of morality and moral education 
are thus both irrelevant and unhelpful: "concepts of choice, 
responsibility, justice and so on ... carry a heavy semantic 
cargo ... which obscures any attempt to clarify controlling 
practices or to improve techniques."12 A person acts morally, 
according to Skinner, not "because he knows or feels that his 
behaviour is right, (but) because of the contingencies which 
have shaped his behaviour end created the conditions he feels."13 
On this view, therefore, both the study and the 
encouragement of morel behaviour should concentrate upon the 
behaviour itself, the "contingencies" which have produced it, 
and the techniques by which it can be further modified, rather 
than upon levels of principled reasoning, choosing, judging and 
deciding end other "inaccessible", mentalistic furniture of the 
"inner man". 
(b) 	 The theoretical objections of behaviourism are 
reinforced to some extent by certain, practical, "common sense" 
beliefs about morality, to the effect that it is action that 
counts in moral matters, not the levels of reasoning and justi—
fication that may or may not lie behind it. Such beliefs find 
expression in the sayings, "Actions speak louder then words", 
and "Practise what you preach:" and also in the advice offered 
in the Sermon on the Mount — "By their fruits ye shall know 
them."14  They are also often associated with a mistrust of 
intellectualism and ethical disputation on the one hand, and 
with a dislike of hypocrisy and insincerity on the other. 
18. 
Where morel education or training is concerned, what 
matters on this view is that children should be taught or made 
to "behave properly". Levels of judgment and quality of 
reasoning are all very well, but it is whet the child does that 
ultimately counts. New courses may be introduced in schools, 
aimed et getting children to discuss moral questions, but it is 
standards of behaviour (in and out of school) which signify the 
success or failure of moral teaching. 
The relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
"judgmental" and "behavioural" accounts of morality need not be 
examined in detail at this point, as the relationship between 
judgment and behaviour in morality end morel learning will be a 
constantly recurring theme throughout this study. For the 
moment it will suffice to note that the "behavioural" account 
does make, by implication at least, en important logical point. 
Granted that a child has learned to satisfy certain 
"judgmental" criteria for moral reasoning, this is not sufficient 
to demonstrate the success of moral teaching with that child, Sor 
he may fail to act upon the judgment which he has formed. "The 
capacity to make morel judgments is not at all the same thing as 
morel behaviour," maintains Williams. "It has yet to be shown 
that there is a high correlation between the two things."15 In 
other words, there is (prima facie) no reason to suppose that a 
child or adult may not at times judge and believe that he ought 
to do x, thereby revealing perhaps considerable "moral maturity" 
in arriving at this judgment and belief, yet then deliberately 
fail to do x. Such a person could hardly claim to have acted 
morally or to be morally educated. 
19. 
It appears, then, that both "judgmental" and 
"behavioural" criteria must be met before e person can be said 
to have acted morally and before morel education can be said to 
have succeeded. Any account of morality or of morel education 
must consider both types of criteria, and one recent account 
which attempts to do this will now be looked at in order to 
Illustrate further the issues with which this study will be 
concerned. 
4. Wilson's Account of the Morally Educated Person 
In his contribution to the first publication of the 
Farmington Trust Research Unit, "Introduction to Morel Education", 
Wilson echoes several of the points mentioned in 2. Moral 
behaviour, he argues, is not a matter of "going through the 
motions"; it is concerned with particular types of intention, 
reason, motive, disposition end procedural principle. These 
provide the tests of a morally educated person: "We wished to 
avoid giving an account of the morally educated person in terms 
of content, and hence began with the questions, 'What is it to 
be "good et" morality?', 'What counts as being reasonable ... in 
the moral sphere?' etc. We hoped to find certain skills, 
abilities or other characteristics which defined the morally 
educated person."16 
Wilson goes on to attempt "something like a phenomeno—
logical description of morality, which can be broken down into 
e number of components, each of which has some chance of being 
assessed in neutral terms." The components suggested are as 
follows:— 
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"a) PHIL refers to the degree to which one can identify with 
other people, in the sense of being such that other 
people's feelings end interests actually count or weigh 
with one, or are accepted as of equal validity to one's 
own ... 
b) E P refers to awareness or insight into one's own and other 
people's feelings: i.e. the ability to know whet those 
feelings are end describe them correctly. A distinction 
might be drawn between self—awareness (AUTEEP) end aware—
ness of others (ALLEMP) 
c) GIG refers to the mastery of factual knowledge ... 
d) DIK refers to the rational formulation of EMP end GIG, on 
the basis of PHIL, into a set of rules or morel principles 
to which the individual commits himself, by the use of 
such universalising words as 'good', 'right', etc. where 
these rules relate to other people's interests ... 
e) PHRON refers to the rational formulation of rules and 
principles (whether we call them morel or not) relating to 
one's own life end interests ... 
f) KRAT refers to the ability to translate DIK or PHRON 
principles into action: to live up to one's moral or 
prudential principles. (One could distinguish between 
DIKRAT end. PHRONKRAT if required. A person might be very 
conscientious towards other people but show a good deal 
of 'akresia' or weakness of will about himself.)"17 
These components are to be understood "in the sense 
of logical components, one might say, a set of attributes of the 
morally educated person. They are not psychological components, 
or specific psychological skills or abilities."18 
In his more recent work Wilson has refined and 
elaborated his list of components, subdividing them into more 
specific categories while retaining his original, basic analytic 
structure. Thus, KRAT (which is of particular relevance to this 
study) is broken down into:— 
"KRAT (1) (RA): Being, in practice, 'relevantly alert' to 
(noticing) moral situations, and seeing them as such 
(describing them in terms of PHIL, etc.) 
KRAT (1) (TT): Thinking thoroughly about such situations, 
end bringing to bear whatever PHIL, EMP and GIG one has. 
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KRAT (1) (OPU): As a result of the foregoing, making an 
overriding, prescriptive end universalised decision to act 
in others' interests. 
KRAT (2): Being sufficiently whole—hearted, free from 
unconscious counter—motivation, etc. to carry out (when 
able) the above decision in prectice."19 
Wilson's later work also removes certain difficulties 
implicit in his earlier account. In particular, despite his 
insistence that he is attempting to list logical, not psycho—
logical, components, he still refers to KRAT in his original 
analysis as the ebility to translate principles into action, 
influenced perhaps by his emphasis upon "moral skills" which 
enable one to become "good at" morality. But if KRAT,the 
function of which is to close the "gap between decision and 
action" 20 is describable as an "ability", there can be no 
certainty that the gap will be closed, for a person with this 
"ability" may not wish or choose or decide to use it; a further 
component would be needed to ensure that the "ability" is 
utilised, and this could not be described as a further "ability" 
without involving an infinite regress. However, in his later 
analyses Wilson enters an explicit caveat against "ambiguously 
specify (ing) this component as en 'attainment', or that as en 
'ability' 
	 "
21 
 and describes the various types of KRAT (above) 
in terms of things which the morally educated person does (e.g. 
noticing, thinking thoroughly, making a 'proper' decision, and 
taking action.) 22 
Wilson's components will be referred to at various 
points in this study, and his analysis of KRAT will be accorded 
particular attention. His work has been mentioned at this 
point to exemplify en account of morality and of morel education 
22. 
which pays regard to both "judgmental" end "behavioural" 
criteria, and which acknowledges the possibility of failing to 
act upon one's moral judgments end decisions: 	 ... it is both 
logically and empirically possible for S to make a sincere and 
genuine decision and not to carry it out even though he could 
do so."23 
5. KIWI and Akrasia  
So far it has been argued that the conceptual swing 
from morel training to morel education has been associated with 
en emphasis upon the "judgmental" aspects of morality, though 
Wilson by including KRAT in his list of moral components has 
drawn attention to the truism that both morality and moral 
education require principles end judgments to be translated 
into action. A closer examination of KRAT end of the relation—
ship between moral judgment and moral action therefore appears 
to be needed in order on the one hand to clarify the logical 
framework of moral behaviour end on the other to suggest some 
possible answers to practical problems concerning moral education. 
Such an investigation offers a promising area for philosophical 
research on at least two grounds. 
Firstly, the analysis which Wilson offers "as a 
reasonable basis for future reseerch"24 needs more detailed and 
concentrated work on the individual components. There may well 
turn out to be important links of various kinds between some of 
the components which he describes, but that does not minimise 
the value of attempting en examination in depth of any one of 
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them. It is moreover at least arguable that KRAT is both 
logically end empirically central to morality and morel edu—
cation (in so far as it brings together both the "judgmental" 
end "behavioural" aspects) in e way in which the other components 
are not, end that it accordingly merits particular attention, 
including that of the philosopher. 
Secondly, any examination of the logical status end 
nature of KRAT cannot avoid reference to the philosophical pro—
blem of akresie, or weakness of will, which has been the subject 
of philosophical debate from Socrates to the present day. The 
implications of this problem for moral teaching and moral 
education, however, have been largely ignored and thus present 
a field of study that is both unexplored end also of considerable 
educational and philosophical importance. Educationally/ 
akresia (i.e. lack of KRT) appears to signify some kind of 
failure in moral education, and by examining the nature of this 
failure moral educators may be able to discover ways of com—
betting it. Philosophically, the relationship between ekrasie 
and moral education has recently been noted by Mortimore in his 
introduction to a collection of papers on "Weakness of Will"; 
pinpointing various areas in which further work needs to be don.9, 
he concludes: 
"Finally, how would (various) ways of conceiving of 
weakness of will affect our ways of teaching morality? ire our 
current ways of teaching strength of will misguided, or do they 
just need to be redescribed?"25 
It is with these and similar questions that this study 
will be mainly concerned, but it cannot be safely assumed at the 
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outset that ekrasie, or weakness of will, does constitute a 
genuine problem of some kind for morel philosophers and for 
morel educators. The following chapter will therefore consider 
some attempts by philosophers to deny the logical possibility 
of akresie l while the final section of this introductory chapter 
will illustrate the conflicting views within morel education on 
the importance of ekresie. 
6. Moral Education and Akrasia  
It has already been shown how Wilson, by including 
KRAT among his "moral components", acknowledges that weakness 
of will or a failure to translate one's principles, beliefs or 
decisions into action can constitute a problem for moral edu—
cation. Not all writers on moral education, however, assign 
this degree of importance to akresia l while some do not con—
sider it to be a problem at all. 
The Schools Council Project in Morel Education, under 
the leadership of McPhail, for example, presents a different 
picture of morality end of moral education from that of the 
Farmington Trust. The Project members in their book, "Moral 
Education in the Secondary School", maintain throughout that 
"en individual's considerate style of life is productive of 
happiness and health for that individual because it earns 
acceptance end supporting feedback, because it reduces stress."26  
Virtue may be its own reward, but in addition "When boys end 
girls adopt a considerate style of life, not only do others 
benefit but they themselves gain in a number of important ways."27  
An alternative view of morality is described as "perverted":— 
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"A particularly destructive feature of some German rationalist 
and western protestant thinking has been the notion that to 
be morel it must hurt; that the more bitter the medicine 
the more beneficial the draught; that no decision qualifies 
as morel unless I am not disposed to make it or carry it 
out." 28  
Important practical implications stem from the Pro—
ject's belief that "the mein motive for treating others with 
consideration is ... because such behaviour is pleasant in 
itself and can be rewarding."
29 
In particular, the possible 
gap between judgment and action and the possible conflict 
between obligation end inclination are minimised, at times 
almost to vanishing point. The "Lifeline" materials, produced 
by the Project, concentrate exclusively upon presenting pupils 
with hypothetical situations of varying degrees of complexity 
for the purposes of discussion and decision—making. Yet, as I 
have argued elsewhere,30 the Project fails to acknowledge any 
possible discrepancy between the pupil's hypothetical "decision" 
and an inclination to act otherwise when faced with a similar 
situation in real life. An excellent example of this tendency 
to blur the dividing line between judgment end action, and 
between hypothetical and real—life situations, is to be found 
in the Project's comments on the "Sensitivity" unit of the 
"Lifeline" material, designed "to encourage suggestions abdut 
what to do which will in turn be considered and rejected, 
modified or adopted by others so that they and the proposer 
learn to be more sensitive to individuals' needs, interests and 
feelings."31 A warning is given to guard against:— 
” ... the feeling of euphoria which came over the Loral 
Education Curriculum Project team when they found that, 
after a three—month trial period in 1969, 300 boys and 
girls who had been using 'Sensitivity' showed a 50 per 
cent increase in the number of points relevant to others' 
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needs, interests and feelings in ten situations which they 
recorded in a written test when compared with the members 
of a control group which had not used the material." 32  
(my italics) 
Yet the very next sentence draws the following 
unergued conclusion:— "Without doubt work of this kind can 
produce improvements in behaviour as well as in attitude ..."33 
(my italics). Unless "improvements in behaviour" are meant to 
refer to higher scoring in written tests, the Project seems to 
have no justification for this extravagant claim and to have 
fallen prey to its own euphoria. 
The question of which teaching methods are likely to 
prove most effective in countering ekrasia will be considered 
in detail in the final chapter, following a full examination of 
the philosophical problems surrounding akrasia. The Schools 
Council Project has been mentioned at this early stage in order 
to demonstrate how a discussion of moral education and its 
teaching methodology cannot help but reflect a particular view 
of morality end of the nature and relative importance of the 
distinction between moral judgment and moral action. 
It would be historically and philosophically short—
sighted to gloss over these differing views, attributing them 
wholly to the individual idiosyncracies of particular education—
ists who have participated in the relatively recent debate 
about "moral education"; questions about the relationship 
between judgment and action in moral education cannot be treated 
in isolation from the much wider network of philosophical issues 
which surrounds the problem of akrasia l or weakness of will. 
It may well be, therefore, that the differences between the 
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"moral educationists", Wilson and McPhail, represent funda—
mentally different ways in which separate traditions of moral 
philosophy have conceived of akrasie. The following chapter 
will examine these differing conceptions, including two 
accounts which seem to result in a complete denial of the 
logical possibility of akresia. 
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CHAPTER II — IS AKRA SIA A PROBLEM? 
It was stated in the last chapter that we generally 
accept it to be possible for a person to fail deliberately to 
do (or not do) whet he judges ought (or ought not) to be done; 
this is one, but by no means the only, possible formulation of 
what "akrasia" consists in. (Other formulations will be con—
sidered in Chapter IV). 
Philosophers, however, have differed in the degree of 
emphasis placed upon the possible conflict between what a person 
feels he ought, to do and what he feels inclined to do, and upon 
the possible resulting gap between judgment and action. Some 
indeed have gone so far as to maintain that if a person really 
believes that he ought to do xl he cannot (logically) fail to 
do x or attempt to do x. These arguments must be examined in 
detail, for clearly if akrasia cannot occur, it will present no 
problems for moral education or for anything else. 
The strategy of this chapter, therefore, will be 
firstly to outline two philosophical traditions which disagree 
over the importance end extent of akrasia as an ethical problem, 
and secondly to explore in greater depth the accounts of two 
particular philosophers, Socrates and Here, who have in different 
ways both attempted to deny the logical possibility of akrasia. 
1. Two Philosophical Traditions 
The two conflicting philosophical traditions may be 
labelled, for convenience, the "competitive" and the "conformist" 
viewpoints. The following review will attempt to pick out the 
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mein features of these two traditions, but a full—scale, 
historical genealogy is not necessary to the development of the 
argument. Furthermore, even where en individual philosopher is 
referred to, the purpose will be to illustrate a particular 
characteristic of one or other tradition rather than to catego—
rise that philosopher as a typical representative of that 
tradition; indeed, in the case of a number of philosophers 
(e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Kant) traces of both traditions can be 
detected, suggesting that the dividing line is not always clear—
cut. 
A. The Competitive Tradition 
This tradition has already been implicitly invoked in 
Chapter I by references to "failure to translate one's prin—
ciples into action" and to "conflict between obligation and 
inclination". The label "competitive" has been chosen to 
emphasise the central feature of this tradition: morel behaviour 
is seen essentially as a struggle, en effort, en arena of con—
flict; moral duties, obligations end ideals represent standards 
end goals which are, because of the nature of morality and of 
men, difficult to attain. 
The competing or conflicting elements may be variously 
described. The scene of the struggle, for instance, is fre—
quently set within the nature of men itself. Plato has been 
responsible for initiating en influential strand of the tradition 
which portrays man's "soul" as being radically divided into 
separate end opposed elements. In most versions of this account 
"reason", representing moral awareness, confronts "inclination", 
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"emotion", or "appetite". The outcome of the ensuing struggle 
is determined either by the respective strengths of the indi—
vidual elements, or in some versions by the intervention or 
non—intervention of e further contestant (or perhaps referee) — 
the "will". The person who fails to do whet he believes he 
ought to do is thus lacking or defective in certain natural 
components of his make—up: either his "reason" is too weak to 
overrule his "inclination" etc. or his "will" is too week. to 
ensure that the dictates of reason prevail. Such accounts, 
couched in the language of strife end contest, attempt to pro—
vide not merely evidence for the existence of ekresie but also 
en explanation for its existence. Their explanatory validity 
will be assessed later in Chapter IV, but for the moment it is 
sufficient to note the close logical connection between ekresie 
end the conception of the divided nature of men. 
Other strands of the competitive tradition, while still 
stressing that men is inevitably subject to conflicting pressures 
in his morel life, tend to present the conflict as being between 
man's "nature" on the one hand (seen as a more cohesive unity) 
end the external demands of en objective and authoritative code 
of moral behaviour on the other. 
Christian ethics provide one obvious example of this 
strand. Men's nature is fundamentally sinful, and without divine 
aid he is unable to know or to do whet is right. An external 
morel authority (God) thus stands opposed to the deviant nature 
of men, offering both insight into whet is right and the power 
to act upon that knowledge. Despite this external element, 
however, the notion of a "divided soul" is not wholly abandoned 
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for there still has to be some "higher" pert of man's nature 
that is capable of seeking, apprehending end acknowledging the 
goodness of God's will. This somewhat paradoxical picture of 
human nature as totally debased yet able to respond to divine 
goodness is evident in Paul's famous description of skrasia: 
"... I know that nothing good lodges in me ... for though 
the will to do good is there, the deed is not. The good 
which I went to do I fail to do ... (and) when I want to 
do the right, only the wrong is within my reach ..."1 
Paul here sees a wide gulf between morel judgment end 
action, or in his words between "the good will" end "the deed", 
which cannot be bridged by human efforts alone. His account of 
ekresie again contains a built—in explanation of the phenomenon, 
which will be considered in Chapter IV. 
second example of a predominantly "internal versus 
external" type of conflict is supplied by what might be celled 
the "principle" strand of the competitive tradition. Here 
morality is seen as a set of given principles which have to be 
applied interpretatively to particular situations and then acted 
upon. Morel behaviour thus becomes a two—stage process in which 
failure can occur at either stage — the "intellectual" stage, 
at which the principles are grasped in general terms and then 
seen to have application to a specific situation, end the 
"emotive" or "collative" stage, at which the agent makes the effort 
to act upon the interpreted principle. 
The sharpness of the dichotomy which this model has 
created can be questioned on several grounds. It is difficult 
to see, for example, how the first stage of graspinga principle 
end seeing its application can have no "emotive" component; 
some form of moral "feeling" or "sensitivity" or "concern" must 
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be required fora person to acquire the principle that steeling 
is in general wrong, and to see that principle as applicable to 
a particular situation in which en opportunity is offered for 
shop—lifting. Also the sequential implications of the model — 
i.e. that morel behaviour consists in first acauiring principles 
end then putting them into practice — could suggest a misleading 
end over—simplified pattern of morel learning and development, 
e point which will be expended in the finel. chapter. Neverthe—
less, the two—stage model has had a considerable influence upon 
views of morality both at the theoretical and the "common—sense" 
levels; it is, for example, detectable in Wilson's "moral 
components", of which KRAT seems to represent the secondary, 
"conative" stage, end the other components the primary, 
"intellectual" one. 
The "external" element in this strand of the com—
petitive tradition is provided by the "given principles". These 
principles inform us of what duty requires of us, end these 
requirements are frequently in opposition to our "internal" 
inclinations. Kent has been one of the most influential figures 
within this strand of the tradition, with his emphasis upon the 
conflict between duty end inclination. Duty presents itself as 
obedience to the Moral Law, which as formulated in the categorical 
imperative is binding upon all rational beings. Inclinations on 
the other hand are determined and so cannot be commanded, even 
if they are "morel" inclinations': 
"For love out of inclination cannot be commended; but 
kindness done from duty — although no inclination impels 
us, end even although natural and unconquerable disinclination 
Otands in our way — is practical, end not pathological love, 
residing in the will and not in the propensions of feeling, 
in principles of action and not of melting compassion; and 
it is this practical love alone which can be an object of 
command." 2 (author's italics) 
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The problems raised by Kent's apparent denial of all 
morel value to inclinations, even when these are not in conflict 
with the demands of duty, will not be pursued here. The main 
significance of his account for this brief review lies in the 
framework of moral concepts which his theory uses end pre—
supposes — e.g. duty, inclination, law, binding, obligation, 
imperative, etc. Such concepts form much of the fabric of the 
competitive tradition, evoking as they do en image of en 
authoritative legislator issuinp commends to a possibly recal—
citrant subject. Two further concepts within the same frame—
work end with similar implications are those of "ought" end of 
"conscience", which will be examined in detail in Chapter III. 
This review has merely outlined the main strands of 
the competitive tradition. Many of the points mentioned will 
be taken up later in the study, particularly in Chapter III 
where en account of "ought" end of "conscience" will be developed 
in support of certain features of the competitive tradition. 
The main purpose of this outline has been to indicate the sort 
of theoretical morel framework into which akresia most naturally 
fits. An alternative framework, however, can be described which 
accords akrasie far less prominence. 
B. The Conformist Tradition 
This, like the competitive tradition, consists of 
various strands, but the central charactOristic in this case is 
that acting in conformity with moral requirements is seen 
essentially not as a struggle but as a natural and normal feature 
of human behaviour. 
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Certain versions of this tradition, if pushed to the 
extreme, may result (implicitly or explicitly) in e complete 
denial of the very existence of akresie — for example, the 
accounts of Socrates (to the effect that no man ever willingly 
and knowingly does what is wrong) end of Hare (to the effect 
that the logic of morel language commits a man to doing whet he 
sincerely believes he ought to do.) These two accounts will be 
the subject of the following two main sections, end so need not 
be commented upon here. A belief in the "original virtue" of 
human nature underlies a third version, wherein man and his first 
instincts are naturally good with the result that there is no 
inherent conflict between morality end human nature. Rousseau 
exemplifies this version well with his claim: "Let us lay it 
down es en incontestable principle that the first impulses of 
nature are always right. There is no original perversity in the 
human heerteg  
The most obvious objection to such accounts as these 
is the straightforward, empirical one that it appears to be a 
fact of life that we do at times act against our morel beliefs, 
judgments and principles. being tempted to do what we believe 
we ought not to do end at times succumbing to the temptation are 
not uncommon human experiences, and moral language has developed 
e number of concepts which reflect these experiences. These end 
other objections will be fully developed in the following 
sections on Socrates end Here, and in Chapter III. 
Less extreme versions of the conformist tradition, 
while not denying the possibility of akrasia end of moral 
struggle, seek to minimise in various ways the "competitive" 
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aspect of morel behaviour. One favoured line of approach hes 
been to build into the notion of human nature a moral element, 
without going so far es to maintain that man's nature is wholly 
and innately virtuous. 
Thus, Hume sees sympathy as e principle which operates 
universally in human nature and which "produces our sentiment of 
morals".4 Nen is therefore predisposed in favour of morel 
action, particularly that directed towards the "public good":— 
"It appears that e tendency to public good, ehd to the 
promoting of peace, harmony end order in society does 
always, by effecting the benevolent principles of our 
frame, engage us on the side of the social virtues." 5 
Why then do we ever fail to act virtuously? Because 
sympathy is but one element in human nature, end a fluctuating 
one et that: "We sympethise more with persons contiguous to 
us, than with persons remote from us; with our acquaintances 
then with strangers; with our countrymen, then with foreigners."6 
The significance for ekresie of this "contiguity" factor will be 
examined in Chapters V end VI. 
Schopenheuer also exemplifies this strand of the con—
formist tradition with his account of the three basic motives in 
human nature — egoism, malice end compassion. Neturelcompession, 
a "wholly direct and even instinctive participation in another's 
suffering,"7 is said to be "inborn end indestructible in every—
one, end ... the sole source of non—egoistic actions, to (which) 
morel worth exclusively belongs."8 Morel actions then are 
necessarily those "sprung from compassion",9 end the foundation 
of morality must reside in human nature itself, i.e. in its 
compassionate element. However, compassion is only one of the 
three basic motives, which "are present in everyone in different 
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end incredibly unequal proportions ... (and) in consequence 
of this incredibly great, inborn and original difference, 
everyone will be powerfully stirred by those motives to which 
he is predominantly susceptible."10 (author's italics)  
Both Hume end Schopenhauer, then, represent a strand 
of the conformist tradition which attributes to human nature e 
moral element which is universal and innate, but which does not 
necessarily dominate the other elements and thereby rule out 
the possibility of ekrasia. Man's disposition nevertheless is 
seen as being basically towards rather than against moral 
behaviour, as is indicated by the universal approval which, it 
is claimed, is accorded to such behaviour. 
This emphasis upon the "spectator appeal" of moral 
behaviour is en important feature of the conformist tradition, 
noted by several writers. According to Schopenhauer, for 
example, "Such (charitable) actions also stir within the spec—
tator that characteristic assent, esteem, admiration, and even 
a humiliating glance at himself; this is an undeniable fact."11  
Similarly Kent, though in most respects more representative of 
the competitive tradition, claims in a footnote on moral 
instruction:— 
... when a righteous act is represented as being done with 
a steadfast mind in complete disregard of any advantage in 
this or in another world, and even under the greatest 
temptations of affliction or allurement, ... it uplifts 
the soul and rouses a wish that we too could act in this 
way. Even children of moderate age feel this impression ..."12 
The versions of the conformist tradition so far 
described attempt to lessen or abolish the conflict between duty 
and inclination by ascribing a universal, intrinsically moral 
element to human nature itself. (Hare's account does not fit 
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into this pattern, but will be analysed in detail later in this 
chapter.) Another strand of the tradition tries to avoid the 
obvious problems of empirical demonstration end verification 
inherent in such theories by concentrating upon the instrumental 
attractions of morality; if moral behaviour in some way brings 
its own reward, man will be inclined rather than disinclined 
to do whet he believes he ought to do, and thus to acquire moral 
habits. 
Aristotle's account of the temperate man and of moral 
learning is a locus classicus within this strand. The temperate 
man "does not find pleasure in the wrong things"
13
; he is one 
who "abstaining from bodily pleasures finds this abstinence 
pleesent."
14 
The good man, then, gains his pleasure from good 
behaviour, and experiences no conflict between what is right and 
whet is enjoyable. How does a man reach this enviable position? 
Not, according to Aristotle, as a result of innate virtue, for 
"none of the morel virtues is implanted in us by Nature,"15 
 but 
es a result of habit. 4e acquire moral virtues by exercising 
them — "we become just by performing just actions."16 Thus, 
"like ectivites produce like dispositions ... so it is a matter 
of real importance whether our early education confirms us in 
one set of habits or another."17 Aristotle's remarks are clearly 
of considerable significance for moral education and will be 
examined in that context later, but it must also be noted at 
this point that as man, with his leek of innate virtue, still 
hes somehow to be "confirmed" in the right habits, akrasie 
remains a problem at the early stages of moral development at 
least. (Aristotle's account of ekresie will be considered at 
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greater length in Chapter IV.) 
Aristotle is at pains, then, to describe the pleasure 
which accrues directly, and individually to the good man from 
acting morally, a point which is repeated by Schopenhauer who 
has affinities with this strand of the tradition also; chari—
table actions, he claims, "awaken in us that inward contentment 
celled the good, satisfied, approving conscience,"
18 
thus 
indicating that the notion of conscience is not the sole preserve 
of the competitive tradition. 
Another instrumental view of moral behaviour has been 
advanced within the conformist tradition, this time based upon 
the social utility of morality rather than upon its direct rewards 
to the individual agent. Hume, for example, in the passage 
already quoted, refers to "a tendency to public good, and to the 
promoting of peace, harmony end order in society," though else—
where he seems to deny that there is any "such passion in human 
minds as the love of menkind;"18 instead man has created the 
"artificial" virtue of justice because of the overall, long—term 
benefits which result from e.g. respecting the property of others. 
Despite this apparent conflict, Hume illustrates in both of his 
accounts the mein features of this "social utility" strand. Man 
benefits in various ways from living as a member of society, but 
that society can only be sustained if certain types of behaviour 
are adopted and others rejected. Truth—telling, promise—keeping, 
honesty and non—violence, for example, thus become not tedious 
morel duties with which individuals are reluctantly faced, but 
necessary conditions for the existence and survival of a form of 
social life whose advantages these individuals wish to enjoy. 
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Logically, therefore, man should be pre—disposed in favour of 
behaving in such e way (i.e. morally) es will help to secure 
his long—term wants (i.e. to live in e tolerable society). 
Again this argument does not completely deny the existence of 
Pkrasia in practice, for short—term end long—term 'wants may 
conflict; this problem will be considered in Chapter V. 
Finally one further strand of the conformist tradition 
must be mentioned, which attempts to combine the individual and 
social consequences of morel behaviour. The individual's aim 
is here seen as "self—realisation", which is attainable only 
within e social framework of rules end relationships; morel 
behaviour thereby becomes not only individually self—fulfilling 
but also inextricably entwined with social requirements. 
Bradley hes produced en elaborate exposition of this 
theory, which also echoes other themes of the conformist tra—
dition already noted. The intrinsic end of morality is the 
reelisetion of the whole self, which consists of two elements: 
" ... these ere myself es the will of this or thet self, end 
again the universal will es the will for good; and this 
letter I feel to be my true self, and desire my other self 
to be subordinated to and so identified with it; in which 
case I feel the satisfaction of en inward reelisetion." 20 
The content of morality is however, for Bradley, 
socially prescribed by the demands of "my station end its 
duties:" 
" To be morel, I must will my station and its duties ... 
There I realise myself morally, so that not only whet 
ought to be in the world is, but I am whet I ought to be, 
end find so my contentment end satisfaction." 21  
Thus, "in the community is the individual realised,"22 
 end the 
community is "the reel morel organism."23 
Bradley's metaphysical end obscure account of the self 
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end society cannot be further investigated here; nor can his 
questionable premise that en individual's social role can 
sufficiently specify his moral duties. What can be noted, 
however, is his interlinking of the individual and social 
elements of the conformist tradition, and also his affinity to 
Aristotle in applying his morel theory to the question of moral 
learning end education, and in underlining the importance of 
habit in these processes: 
"The child is teught to will e content which is universal 
end good, end he learns to identify his will with it, so 
that he feels pleasure when he feels himself in accord 
with it, uneasiness or pain when his will is contrary 
thereto, end he feels that it is contrary. This is the 
beginning of personal morality 	 24 
"Or, to repeat it, in education my self by habituation hes 
been growing into one with the good self around me, and by 
my free acceptance of my lot hereafter I consciously make 
myself one with the good, so that, though bed habits cling 
to end even arise in me, yet I cannot but be aware of 
myself es the reality of the good will." 25 
The educational implications of both Aristotle's end 
Bredley's eccounts will be reviewed in the final chapter. 
The conformist tradition, therefore, es outlined in 
this section, appears to be more diverse then the contrasting, 
competitive tradition. It attempts to lessen the possible 
conflict between duty end inclination (and thereby the pro—
minence of ekresie es e theoretical and practical problem), 
either by assigning en inbuilt "morel" element to human nature, 
or by laying weight upon the individual and/or social benefits 
of morel behaviour. 
This brief survey of the two traditions should serve 
to broaden our perspective when considering differences of 
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approach in the modern debate on morel education. It is 
logically impossible to discuss moral education without at the 
same time reisinn, directly or indirectly, questions about the 
nature of morality itself. Writers on moral education cannot 
then avoid identifying themselves to some extent with particular 
standpoints within ethical theory, end the work of Wilson and 
McPhail already cited clearly reflects the disagreement between 
two ethical traditions over the relationship between morel 
judgment end action. Differences in ethical theory must there—
fore exercise en influence over recommendations for moral 
education. 
This study will not attempt to establish the supremacy 
of one of the above traditions over the other. Various elements 
from both traditions will be drawn upon throughout the study, 
end it will in feet be argued that each makes a significant con—
tribution to an understanding of morel education, the competitive 
tradition providing the more accurate description of the logic 
end language of morality while the conformist tradition perhaps 
offers more suggestive insights into the processes of moral 
leerninn end development. 
It would, however, be both premature end arbitrary to 
proceed further without peyinn due consideration to certain 
important philosophical arguments which maintain that akresie 
does not end cannot occur, end so constitutes neither a theoretical 
nor a practical problem. Accordingly, the arguments of Socrates 
end Here will now be presented and analysed in some detail, the 
aim being not merely to counter these particular arguments, but 
also to drew from the analyses points which will later be 
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developed, firstly into a more general defence of the logical 
possibility of ekresia (Chapter III), end secondly into an 
account of the explanatory problems which surround the 
phenomenon (Chapters IV and V). 
2. The Socratic Argument 
A. Summary of the ArAument 
 
The question of akresie is raised in a number of the 
Platonic dialogues, but the fullest statement of the problem 
occurs in the Protagores;26 this will now be summarised. The 
contributions of other dialogues and also some views of Aristotle 
will be mentioned in connection with the main issues raised by 
the Protagores argument. To whet extent the arguments in these 
dialogues should be attributed to Socrates or to Plato is a 
question which will need some consideration later, but for the 
moment it will be assumed that they emanate from Socrates. 
In the Protagoras Socrates describes the common view 
of ekresie:— 
"(Most men)norIntein that there are many who recognise the 
best but are unwilling to act upon it. It may be open to 
them, but they do otherwise. Whenever I ask what can be 
the reason for this, they answer that those who act in 
this way are overcome by pleasure or pain or some other of the 
things I mentioned just now (i.e. passion, pain, love and 
fear) 	 " (352 C—D) 
He goes on to consider whet might be meant by "being 
overcome by pleasure:— 
"We take it that you say this happens to you when, for 
example, you are overcome by the desire of food or drink 
or sex — which are pleasant things — and though you recog—
nise them as evil, nevertheless indulge in them ... In 
whet respect do you call them evil? 	 Can we expect any 
answer other than this, that they are not evil on account 
of the actual momentary pleasure which they produce, but 
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on account of their consequences, disease and the rest? 
... So the only reason why these pleasures seem to you 
to be evil is, we suggest, that they result in pains and 
deprive us of future pleasures." (353C — 354A) 
Socrates then considers the converse proposition that 
pains may be good:— 
"Are they good for any other reason then that their outcome 
is pleasure and the cessation or prevention of pain? Can 
you say that you have any other end in mind, when you call 
them good, than pleasures or pain?" (354 B — C) 
The conclusion then is that evil can be identified with 
Pain, end good with pleasure:— 
"Then your idea of evil is pain, and of good is pleasure. 
even enjoying yourself you cell evil whenever it leads to 
the loss of a pleasure greater than its own, or lays up 
pains that outweighs its pleasures ... Isn't it the same 
when we turn to pain? To suffer pain you cell good when 
it either rids us of greater pains than its own or leads 
to pleasures that outweigh them ..." (354 C — D) 
Socrates then refers back to the common view of 
akresie :— 
"This position makes your argument ridiculous. You say 
that a men often recognises evil actions as evil, yet 
commits them, under no compulsion, because he is led on 
end distracted by pleasure, end on the other hand that, 
recognising the good, he refrains from following it because 
he is overcome by the pleasures of the moment. The 
absurdity of this will become evident if we stop using all 
these names together — pleasant, painful, good end evil —
end since they have turned out to be only two, cell them 
by only two names — first of all good end evil, and only 
at a different stage pleasure and pain. Having agreed on 
this, suppose we now say that a man does evil though he 
recognises it as evil. Why? Because he is overcome. By 
what? We can no longer say by pleasure, because it has 
changed its name to good. Overcome, we say. By whet, we 
are asked. By the good, I suppose we shall say. I fear 
that if our questioner is ill—mannered, he will laugh end 
retort, What ridiculous nonsense, for a man to do evil, 
knowing it is evil end that he ought not to do it, because 
he is overcome by good." (355 A — D) 
It follows then that practical decisions require a 
correct estimation of the pleasures and pains that are likely to 
result:— 
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"So like an expert in weighing, put the pleasures and pains 
together, set both the near and distant in the balance, 
and say which is the greater quantity." (356 B) 
Socrates then considers how we are able to make this 
kind of estimation:— 
"Since our salvation in life has turned out to lie in the 
correct choice of pleasure and pain — more or less, greater 
or smaller, nearer or more distant — is it not in the first 
place a question of measurement, consisting as it does in 
a consideration of relative excess, defect or equality? ... 
And if so, it must be a special skill or branch of know—
ledge." (357 A — B) 
It is then agreed that:— 
... when people make a wrong choice of pleasures and pains —
that is of good and evil — the cause of their mistake is 
lack of knowledge ... So that is what 'being mastered by 
pleasure' really is — ignorance." (357 D — E) 
The argument is then summed up as follows:— 
"All actions aimed at this end, namely a pleasant and pain—
less life, must be fine actions, that is good end beneficial 
... Then if the pleasant is the good, no one who either 
knows or believes that there is another possible course 
of action, better than the one he is following, will ever 
continue on his present course when he might choose the 
better ... Then it must follow that no one willingly goes 
to meet evil or what he thinks to be evil. To make for 
whet one believes to be evil, instead of making for the 
good, is not, it seems, in human nature, and when faced 
with the choice of two evils no one will choose the greeter 
when he might choose the less." (358 B—D) 
B. Critique of the Argument  
Any examination of the Socratic argument that "no one 
willingly goes to meet evil" needs to consider two basic elements 
in that argument, firstly Socrates' attempted identification of 
"good" with "pleasant" end of "evil" with "painful", and 
secondly his view of "ignorance" end "knowledge". These two 
elements will now be reviewed in turn. 
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(i) The attempted identification of "good" with "pleasant" and 
of "evil" with "painful" 
It is clear that Socrates' argument against "the 
common view of akrasia" (that there are many who recognise the 
good but are unwilling to pursue it because they are overcome 
by pleasure) is wholly dependent upon this identification. But 
what exactly is Socrates arguing against when he makes the 
identification? Initially at least, he is arguing not against 
the possibility that there are many who recognise the good but 
are unwilling to pursue it, but against the explanation that is 
commonly offered for this phenomenon, namely that they are over—
come by pleasure. If Socrates' identification is accepted, this 
particular explanation (though not the others also mentioned, 
i.e. being overcome by pain or passion or love or fear) becomes 
self—contradictory and absurd. 
Santas argues this point convincingly in en important 
paper on the Protagoras:— "... it is the statement, 'Sometimes 
men do what they know (or believe) is bed, when they can avoid 
it, because they are overcome by pleasure' that Socrates argues 
is absurd." (author's italics) He also stresses "the complete 
dependence on hedonism in which Socrates places his argument 
against the explanation 'overcome by pleasure'."27 
Possible explanations of akrasia are not, however, ttE 
subject of this chapter. The question at present under dis—
cussion is whether or not akrasia logically can occur, and 
Socrates' attack on one common explanation of akrasia is not 
therefore relevant. The explanation "overcome by pleasure" and 
Socrates' arguments against it will be considered in Chapter III, 
along with other possible explanations. 
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Socrates' argument is not limited to this narrow line 
of attack, however. Having illustrated the alleged absurdity 
of the explanation "overcome by pleasure", (355 A — E), he con—
cludes by broadening his account considerably (358 B — D). He 
here goes far beyond en attack on one explanation of ekrasie, 
by denying the possibility of akresie occurring at all:— 
"Then if the pleasant is the good, no one who either knows 
or believes that there is another possible course of action, 
better than the one he is following, will ever continue on 
his present course when he might choose the better ... 
Then it must follow that no one willingly goes to meet 
evil or what he thinks to be evil." 
This much brooder argument clearly merits attention. 
It appears to contain references to both of the basic elements 
mentioned above, the "identification" element and the "knowledge" 
element. The "knowledge" element will be discussed later, but 
the "identification" element must be examined first, as the 
argument is dependent upon it — "Then if the pleasant is the 
good ..." 
The hedonistic argument in the Protegoras is summed 
up by Socrates' statement, "All actions aimed at this end, namely 
a pleasant and painless life, must be fine actions, that is good 
and beneficial." (358 D) It should be noted that Socrates here 
does not completely identify goodness with pleasantness. He says 
that all that is pleasant is good and all that is painful is bad, 
but not that all that is good is pleasant and all that is bad is 
painful. However, Socrates does not make anything of this possible 
distinction or appear to think it important. Indeed in the 
earlier passage quoted (355 B) he seems to suggest that the 
identification can be complete:— 
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"The absurdity of this will become evident if we stop 
using all these names together — pleasant, painful, good 
and evil — and since they have turned out to be only 
two, call them by only two names, first of all good and 
evil, and only at a different stage pleasure and pain." 
It seems legitimate, therefore, to talk of Socrates' "identi—
fication of 'good' with 'pleasant' and of 'evil' with 'painful'." 
Whether or not Socrates (or Plato) in fact accepted 
this argument treninmquestien, as apparently contradictory 
arguments can be found in the Gorgias and the Phaedo. A dis—
cussion of hedonism, as presented in the Platonic dialogues as 
a whole, is however beyond the scope of this enquiry, the object 
of which is to examine the validity of the Protegoras' argument 
against akresia. 
It is clear that this argument attempts to equate what 
is good with what is good for a man. What is good is what is 
desirable, and whet is desirable is what will give a man ulti—
mate satisfaction; pleasure in the long run is the criterion 
of what is good, end however "pleasure" is construed in this 
context, Socrates must be interpreted here as meaning that the 
goodness of an action must be judged in terms of the consequences 
of that action for the agent. The best course of action is that 
which seems likely to yield the greatest ultimate pleasure or 
satisfaction for a men, and as we all desire pleasure, we must 
therefore always desire to do that which will produce it. We 
cannot then fail to want to do what is good, though we may at 
times through intellectual error fail to recognise what the godd 
is (i.e. what will lead to our ultimate pleasure). 
It is not necessary to attempt to identify the parti—
cular brand of hedonism that Socrates is suggesting here, nor to 
49- 
compare it with views presented in other dialogues, in order 
to note one important weakness in the Protagoras' argument. 
Although the problem of akresia was, as far as we know, first 
formulated by the Greeks, it has since been recognised as both 
a philosophical end a practical question of universal application. 
Socrates' answer to the question would not have sounded odd to 
Greek ears, but it does sound decidedly odd to post—Christian 
and post—Kantian ears. If morel decisions are simply concerned 
with what is best for ourselves, what will lead to our ultimate 
satisfaction, then morel weakness is perhaps better described as 
intellectual miscalculation. But part of what we mean by a 
moral decision is that it is not concerned wholly (or perhaps 
at ell) with whet is best for ourselves. A morel dilemma is not 
solved (morally, at least) by consulting one's own self—interest. 
As Hare argues, "... to think morally is, at least, to subject 
one's own interests, where they conflict with those of other 
people, to a principle which one can accept as governing anyone's 
conduct in like circumstances." 28 
There are certainly important cases of apparent ekrasie 
where the conflict is between what seem to be our short—term 
end our long—term interests end wants, between what will yield 
immediate satisfaction end whet will yield future satisfaction 
(e.g. if I continue to smoke forty cigarettes a day, which I 
enjoy but believe to be foolish end wrong, and thus increase my 
chances of an early death from lung cancer, which I shell not 
enjoy.) These cases of "prudential" ekrasie should not be over—
looked, for they are perhaps even more puzzling then "morel" 
cases; it is m welfare that I am ignoring, so my ekresie can 
hardly be attributed to selfish motives. If any unitary 
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explanation of akrasia is to be attempted, prudential cases 
must also be considered, and may indeed provide clues to that 
explanation, as will be suggested in Chapter V. The weakness 
of the Socratic account, however, is that it reduces all cases 
of akrasia to prudential ones as a result of its underlying 
hedonism, end so fails to distinguish between a conflict of 
self—interest versus the interests of others on the one hand, 
and one of present self—interest versus future self—interest on 
the other. Even if it is acknowledged that Socrates (together 
with other Greek philosophers) was primarily concerned with 
whet was good for man, and not just for oneself, and that man 
can often be said to have a moral duty to consider his own wel—
fare (as in the above example), he has still failed to give any 
account of cases of akrasia in which the agent feels the force 
of "other—regarding" obligations, yet acts against them in 
pursuit of his own wants end interests. In this respect Socrates 
is to be identified with the conformist tradition rather than 
the competitive one. 
This attack on the apparently limited view of akrasia 
held by Socrates needs qualification in two respects. Firstly, 
it is admittedly difficult in many oases to draw a sharp dis—
tinction between what is in my interests and what is in other 
people's interests. The dilemma mentioned above, for instance, 
could be reformulated as "Do I continue to smoke forty cigarettes, 
which I enjoy, but which costs money which I could give to 
Oxfam, or do I increase my chances of an early death from lung 
cancer, which I shall not enjoy and which will leave my family 
destitute?" In other words, prudential end altruistic con—
siderations can become closely entwined, and it is difficult to 
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think of a dilemma or decision in which the relevant considera— 
tions could be described as wholly prudential or wholly 
altruistic. 
Secondly, it could be argued that Socrates' emphasis 
upon pleasure and ultimate satisfaction in moral decision— 
making is simply a way of illustrating that the alleged dis— 
tinction between prudential and altruistic motives is in fact 
a false one. We are not happy when doing what we know to be 
wrong; ultimate pleasure and satisfaction result only from our 
doing what we think we ought, morally, to do, i.e. considering 
the interests of others as well as ourselves. If I continue to 
buy my cigarettes, rather than make donations to Oxfam, I am not 
in fact likely to achieve ultimate satisfaction, because I shall 
feel guilty, selfish, unfulfilled and so on. I have thus made 
en intellectual error in miscalculating the relative amounts of 
satisfaction that I em likely to receive from being selfish on 
the one hand or unselfish on the other. Consideration of one's 
own ultimate satisfaction, therefore, is by no means irrecon— 
cilable with consideration of other people's interests, according 
to this argument. 
In answer to these two qualifications two further 
points need to be made, however. Firstly, although it may often 
be difficult to draw a sharp distinction between what is in my 
interests end whet is in other people's interests, the Socratic 
argument fails to admit the possibility of a conflict between 
what is predominantly in my own interests and what is predominantly 
in other people's interests. Cases of akrasia often appear to 
occur when the conflict is basically between self—interest end 
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concern for others' interests — where a man wants to do x (e.g. 
have en affair with e women he finds attractive) but feels 
that there are also good reasons why he ought not to do x (e.g. 
both he end the women are already married, end the cffeir might 
cause pain to their respective partners). Prudential and 
altruistic considerations are clearly intermingled in such 
deses, but the issue is still predominantly one of desires for 
self versus consideration for others. Socrates' view of the 
range of contexts in which ekresie is thought to occur remains 
then unduly narrow. 
Secondly, the argument that ultimate satisfaction can 
only result from doing what one believes is right is presumably 
en empirical argument based on certain metaphysical assumptions 
about the nature of men — "man's nature is such that in actual 
fact he can only gain satisfaction in this way". Such an 
argument would require considerable justification and empirical 
support, which Socrates does not offer. In any case, even if 
the argument is accepted, it can only be valid for the men who 
is already virtuous. Feelings of remorse, selfishness and non—
fulfilment will only afflict the men who feels that he should 
not have acted as he did, i.e. the men with morel sentiments. 
The argument cannot therefore say anything about "man in general" 
but only about a particular class of men. As Crombie puts it, 
"There are men who do not mind being wicked, who think it is 
foolish to do otherwise."29 And again, "... while it may be true 
that virtue is more pleasurable than vice, it may also be true 
that I am unable to enjoy its pleasures. If I could be 
reformed, I should find myself a much happier man than I was in 
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my previous state; but so long as I em unregenerate, vice is 
pleasanter to me then virtue."30 
Socrates could reply to this objection that the pro—
blem of ekresia does not arise with the wholly wicked end 
unregenerate man; it is only the man of sufficient moral 
sensibility to believe that he ought to do x who is commonly 
thought to be morally week when he fails to act in accordance 
with his beliefs; whereas the wholly wicked and unregenerate 
man comes into a completely different category. This reply is 
not wholly adequate, however, for whet then constitutes the 
virtuous men? In whetssense can he be called virtuous and be 
said to have morel sentiments if he does not do what he believes 
he ought to do? If he is the sort of person (i.e. "moral" and 
"virtuous") who is not happy when doing what he believes to be 
wrong, end who gains ultimate satisfaction from doing whet he 
believes he morally ought to do, whet account can Socrates give 
of that man's "temptation", "feelings of conscience" and "self—
control" or lack of it, when he is deciding what to do? To 
describe such phenomena in such a situation in terms of 
intellectual calculation or miscalculation is highly uncon—
vincing. Furthermore, if the Socratic account leaves no room 
for the concepts of temptation and conscience, blame and punish—
ment also become inapplicable. A man may be held to be 
intellectually at fault in failing to calculate correctly whet 
will lead to his ultimate pleasure and satisfaction, but if his 
"wrong—doing" is by definition done in ignorance he can hardly 
be considered to be morally blameworthy or deserving of punish— 
ment for a moral lapse. Some possible reasons why the phenomena 
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of conscience are ignored in the Socratic account will be 
suggested in Chapter III, when the concept of conscience is 
explored in some detail. 
Socrates' attempted identification, then, of "good" 
with "pleasant" end of "evil" with "painful", upon which his 
broader argument that "no one goes willingly to meet evil" is 
based, has been shown to impose serious limitations on that 
argument. In the first piece, moral conflicts between what is, 
predominantly, concern for one's own interests and whet is, 
predominantly, concern for other people's interests are not 
considered as contexts in which situations of akrasia could 
oecur'i despite the fact that such conflicts are probably central 
to our common view of akrasia. In the second place, Socrates' 
account of whet is happening in apparent cases of akrasia 
ignores the psychological features that are etident in cases of 
moral conflict, and fails to give en adequate description of the 
man who is susceptible to morel considerations but who succumbs 
on occasion to what he recognises as temptation. 
This examination of the first basic element in Socrates' 
argument has already cast serious doubt, therefore, upon the 
scope and validity of that argument. 
(ii) "Ignorance" end "knowledge"  
Socrates' argument against the common view of akrasia 
is heavily dependent also upon a particular view of knowledge, 
ignorance end belief, end this element must now be examined. 
The description of the common view of akrasia is in 
fact prefaced by a discussion about the nature of knowledge:— 
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"Now uncover another part of your mind, Protagoras. Whet 
is your attitude to knowledge? Do you share the common 
view about that also? Most people think, in general 
terms, that it is nothing strong, no leading or ruling 
element. They don't see it like that. They hold that 
it is not the knowledge that a man possesses which governs 
him, but something else — now passion, now pleasure, now 
pain, sometimes love end frequently fear. They just think 
of knowledge as e sieve, pushed around by all the other 
affections. Is this your view too, or would you rather 
say that knowledge is e fine thing, quite capable of ruling 
a men, end that if he can distinguish good from evil, 
nothing will force him to act otherwise then as knowledge 
dictates, since wisdom is ell the reinforcement he needs?" 
"Not only is this my view, replied Protagores, but I above 
all men should think it shame to speak of wisdom end know—
ledge as anything but the most powerful elements in hymen 
life." 
"Well end truly answered, said I. But I expect you know that 
most men don't believe us. They maintain that there are 
many who recognise the best but are unwilling to act upon 
it." (352 A — D) 
A little later the estimation that is involved in 
"the correct choice of pleasure and pain" is said to be "a 
special skill or branch of knowledge":.— 
... when people make a wrong choice of pleasures end pains — 
that is, of good end evil — the cause of their mistake is 
lack of knowledge. We can go further, end call it, as you 
have already agreed, a science of measurement, and you 
know yourselves that a wrong action which is done without 
knowledge is done in ignorance. So that is whet being 
mastered by pleasure really is — ignorance." (357 A — B) 
And finally:— 
"Then if the pleasant is the goody no one who either knows 
or believes that there is another possible course of action 
better then the one he is following will ever continue on 
his present course when he might choose the better. To 
'act beneath yourself' is the result of pure ignorance; to 
'be your own master' is wisdom." 
All agreed. 
".And may we define ignorance as having a false opinion and 
being mistaken on matters of great moment?" 
Thwapproved this too. 
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"Then it must follow that no one willingly goes to meet 
evil or Aiethethinks to be evil." (358 B — D) 
It can be seen from these extracts how closely the 
"knowledge" element of the ergument is interwoven with the 
"good/pleesent identification" element. Ninny of the points 
that have been made against the letter, therefore, are also 
relevant in evaluating the letter, end need not be repeated 
here. 
The "knowledge" element, however, must also be con—
sidered on its own merits, for in Socretes' view it is et the 
centre of the problem of ekresie. How can e men who knows what 
is right do whet he knows to be wrong? Socretes seems to be 
saying that this is impossible if e men "really knows", end 
that the common view of ekresie is consequently mistaken. 
In order to examine this ergument more closely, it 
will be necessary to look beyond the Protegores to other 
dialogues for e fuller account of Socrates' view of knowledge. 
In doing this we immediately meet the problem of whether 
Socrates' view of knowledge was the same as Plato's; and if 
not, which are we reeding in any particular dialogue? The 
Socratic question as such lies outside the scope of this study, 
but some sort of conclusion must be ?greed if a coherent account 
of "Socretes'" view of knowledge is to be presented, in so far 
as it is relevant to the problem of ekresie. For the purposes 
of this discussion then, en attempt will be made to identify 
two strands in the "Socratic" view of knowledge, both of which 
are detectable in the Protegores ergument. These two strands 
may be labelled the "self—knowledge" strand and the "ideal 
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knowledge" strend, but this distinction implies neither that 
one strend should be escribed to the historical Socrates end 
one to Plato, nor that both strends should be escribed to both 
persons, nor indeed that these two ere the only strends that 
could be identified. lie can now proceed to examine the two 
strends end their implications for ekresie, without becoming 
embroiled in the intricacies of the Socretic question. 
i) The "self—knowledge" strend can be dealt with quite briefly 
es it is closely connected with the "good/pleasant identi—
fication" — "... when people make e wrong choice of pleasures 
end peins, thet is, of good end evil, the cause of their mistake 
is lack of knowledge." (357 D) Morel knowledge thereby becomes 
self—knowledge, i.e. knowledge of what is likely to produce 
pleasure end satisfaction for one's self. A component of skill 
is also involved in "weighing pleasures egeinst pleesures 
peins egeinst pains 
	
(end) pleesures egeinst peins." (356 B) 
The mein prectical difficulties concerning the exercise of this 
knowledge end skill ere presumably 
(e) trying to predict the future consequences of present actions 
end to determine whet will leed to ultimate pleasure end 
whet to ultimate pain; end 
(b) achieving e balanced evaluation of present and future 
pleesures end pains, without "exaggerating the size of e 
pleasure (or pain) which is close to us in time," as Crombie 
puts it.  
This type of empirical knowledge is clearly necessary 
in morel decision—making. Wilson's components of GIG end AUTEMP,32 
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for example, refer to the two aspects which Socretes is here 
describing, i.e. prediction of likely consequences and self—
awareness. But to claim that such knowledge is sufficient, end 
that it is whet "morel knowledge" consists in, is to fell prey 
to the naturalistic fallacy. Knowledge of whet is good end 
right is epperently being deduced from knowledge of whet will 
yield personal satisfaction. Self—knowledge can thus only be 
accorded the importance thet Socretes claims for it in morel 
decision—making on the assumption of the hedonistic premise 
already examined, i.e. if whatever is pleasant is good, we have 
only to determine (empirically) whet actually is pleasant in 
order to know whet is good. The "self—knowledge" strand of 
Socretes' argument then takes him no further than did the "good/ 
pleasant identification", end is open to the same objections. 
ii) The "ideal knowledge" strand is hinted et in the Protegores 
by references to knowledge being "e fine thing quite capable of 
ruling e men", (352 C), to wisdom end knowledge being "the most 
powerful elements in human life", (352 D), end to there being 
"nothing more powerful then knowledge" (357 C). Even in these 
brief references it is implied that knowledge is en ideal, rarely 
perhaps retched in practice but still worth trying to attain. 
Once it is attained it cannot but effect a man's conduct; indeed 
it must become the most powerful influence upon him, presumably 
because of the insight end understanding which it affords him. 
These points about "knowledge" are by no means at 
variance with the familiar distinction that is made in several 
of the dialogues between "knowledge" and "belief" or "opinion", 
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nor indeed with the epistemological aspects of the Theory of 
Ideas; both of these areas must be briefly examined. 
The distinction between "knowledge" (episteme) end 
"right opinion" (orthe doxe) is introduced in the"Meno",33 
where it is argued that "right opinion is as good a guide as 
knowledge for the purpose of acting rightly" and is therefore 
"no less useful than knowledge". (97 B — C) There is, however, 
en important difference between the two, namely that "right 
opinions" are impermenent:— 
... they will not stay long. They run away from e men's 
mind, so that they are not worth much until you tether 
them by working out the reason (cities logismos). That 
process ... is recollection, as we agreed earlier. Once 
they ere tied down, they become knowledge, end are stable. 
That is why knowledge is something more valuable than 
right opinion. What distinguishes one from the other is 
the tether." (98 A) 
This distinction is developed further in later dialogues, 
notably the "Pheedo", "Symposium" end "Republic", where the 
Theory of Ideas is expounded. The sensible world of parti—
culars in which we live can yield at best only "right opinion", 
whereas the world of Ideas alone con provide full "knowledge". 
Thus, in the "Republic", the true philosopher, or lover of 
wisdom, "whose passion it is to see the truth" (475 E), is said 
to be able to apprehend the world of Ideas, while the lover of 
belief or opinion is concerned only with the world of particulars:— 
"Those, then, who are able to see visible beauty — or justice 
or the like — in their many manifestations, but ere 
incapable, even with another's help, of reaching absolute 
Beauty, may be said to believe, but cannot be said to know 
whet they believe ... And whet about those who see the 
eternal, unchanging absolute realities? They surely have 
knowledge end not opinion ... and they set their hearts on 
the objects of knowledge, while those of the other type 
ere set on the objects of belief." (479) 
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The philosopher's search for "knowledge" is illustrated 
in the "Republic" and the "Symposium" in the form of a pro—
gression or ascent from the lower levels of "belief" and sense 
perceptions of material objects to the apprehension of the Ideas 
themselves, which alone constitutes real "knowledge". In the 
"Republic",34 the final stage of the ascent is the apprehension 
of the Idea of the Good, which is described as "giving reality 
end being to the other Ideas". (509 B) So the philosopher is 
pictured as rising from the lower regions of illusion (eikasia) 
and belief (pistis) to the sphere of "semi—ideal" mathematical 
concepts (dienoie), and thence to the Ideas themselves and the 
supreme Idea of the Good. Only then will the philosopher have 
"knowledge" and be able to say, "I know that x is good, beauti—
ful, just etc." Apprehension of the Ideas is therefore both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition of "knowledge", moral or 
otherwise; end once this "knowledge" is acquired, it will 
become the object of reverence and awe — "the most powerful 
element in human life ... quite capable of ruling a men," as 
was stated in the Protagoras argument. To apprehend the Ideas 
of the Good or the Just or the Truth, and then not to act upon 
that insight is logically impossible, which means that akrasia 
has again been shown implicitly to be likewise impossible — one 
cannot "know the good" end yet fail to pursue it. The Theory 
of Ideas is not explicitly put forward as an argument against 
ekrasie, as the hedonistic argument is, but it can be seen from 
this account that it does constitute a further argument, the 
validity of which must be considered. 
The first point to note about this argument is that it 
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uses the verb "to know" in a highly technical end restricted 
sense. We have first to accept the metaphysical theory of 
the two worlds and then to allow thet it is only the world of 
Ideas that can yield "knowledge", before the argument can stand 
up. A highly stipuletive and unusual definition of "knowledge" 
is thus being offered. 
Furthermore, this definition of knowledge is given in 
terms of the objects of knowledge, end likewise with belief; 
the world of Ideas furnishes the objects of knowledge, while the 
world of particulars furnishes the objects of belief. Such an 
account of knowledge and belief cannot however be easily applied 
to propositional knowledge and belief. If I claim that I know 
London, London could be called the object of my knowledge, but 
whet is the object of my claim that I know that London is a hot—
bed of vice? If the reply is that the object is the proposition, 
"London is a hotbed of vice", the further objection arises that 
one could claim both to believe and to know that proposition — 
the belief might well precede the knowledge; alternatively, one 
person might claim to know the proposition, while another might 
only declare his belief-. It appears then quite possible for 
the same proposition to be the "object" of both knowledge end 
belief, according to our normal uses of these concepts. This is 
a serious objection to the implicit argument against akresie, as 
it seems to be propositional knowledge (and belief) rather than 
knowledge by acquaintance that is mainly involved in situations 
of apparent ekrasia — when I know or believe that I ought to do 
x, but decide not to do it. A fuller analysis of the nature of 
"moral knowledge" will however be needed later. 
62 
Iristotle brings two further relevant objections 
against the view that one cannot act contrary to what one knows 
(es opposed to believes) to be best. Firstly, that if doubt 
End hesitation are present, the situation is not what is commonly 
thought of as Ekresia:— 
"But if it is opinion and not knowledge, if it is not a 
strong conviction that resists but a week one, as in men 
who hesitate, we sympathise with their failure to stand 
by such convictions against strong appetites; but we do 
not sympathise with wickedness, nor with any of the other 
blameworthy states." 35 
And secondly that it is possible to hold knowledge 
end true opinion with equal conviction:— 
... for some people when in a state of opinion do not 
hesitate, but think they know exactly. If then, the 
notion is that owing to their week conviction, those who 
have opinion are more likely to act against their judgment 
then those who know, we answer that there need be no 
difference between knowledge end opinion in this respect; 
for some men are no less convinced of what they think than 
others of whet they know." 36 
(The issue of "week conviction" and Aristotle's own 
suggestions as to the type of knowledge involved in situations 
of apparent ekresia will be examined in Chapter IV, along with 
other possible explanations of ekresia.) 
One final objection to the "ideal knowledge" argument 
against ekresia must be considered. The Theory of Ideas, whether 
it is applied to whet might be celled "is" or "ought" Ideas, 
ignores the question of motivation. The philosopher can appre—
hend the Idea of Yellow or Square, for example, ("is" Ideas), 
end also the Idea of the Good or the Just("ought"Ideas). Having 
done so, he cannot then, according to the theory, make a perceptual 
or cognitive mistake about the yellowness or squareness of e 
physical object, or the goodness or justice of a course of action. 
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But this apprehension or recognition can have no necessary 
implications of resulting action. A draughtsmen might apprehend 
the Idea of Square, end yet fail to construct an adequate square 
in the course of his work, through lack of care, effort or 
interest. In the same way one might recognise just actions or 
good intentions, and yet fail to do anything about them; the 
act of recognition might be aesthetically pleasing, but there 
seems no logical reason why the motivation to form such inten—
tions and pursue such actions oneself must be present. Indeed, 
doubt is cast, by implication at least, in the "Republic" upon 
the logical necessity of "right action" following upon "know—
ledge of the Good" by the institution of social safeguards 
(e.g. the abolition of family life and of private property), 
designed to prevent the Philosopher Kings from being distracted 
from their duties to the community despite their acquisition of 
the highest forms of "knowledge". The Theory of Ideas, then, 
fails to dispose of the logical gap between knowledge and 
action, which allows for the possibility of akrasia. The most 
that the theory could claim would be that it is psychologically 
impossible for a man to apprehend and "know" the Idea of the 
Good and then to fail to act upon it, but this is an empirical 
claim, the validation of which bristles with difficulties. 
Furthermore, even if the claim is intended to be a 
psychological rather than a logical one, it still suggests en 
over—optimistic view of what might be achieved by means of 
teaching and instruction; for if wrong—doing is the result of 
ignorance, the elimination of ignorance (by the kind of 
educational programme described in the "Republic") should lead 
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to the eliminetion of wrong—doing. The inadequacies of verious 
educe tionel methods es means of ensuring morel behaviour end 
preventing ekresie will be discussed et length in Chanter VI, 
but et this point it mey merely be noted thet the Socratic 
account implies e highly simplistic view of "morel education" 
by eppeering to assume thet to teach e person thet x is richt, 
good or just is the equivelent of teaching him to do x. 
The "knowledge" element of the Socretic ergument 
egeinst ekresie, therefore, is reduced to e totel dependence 
upon linguistic stipulations, which ere in turn derived from e 
specUletive, metephysicel theory. As Lukes puts it, "What Plato 
end Secretes were doing wes to offer e tacit persuasive defi—
nition of 'knowledge' so that e men cannot, by definition, know 
whet is right end good if his Potions are wrong end bed."37 
Such e procedure is of course always open to e philosopher, but 
for it to be productive it is necessery that the proposed 
definition should not do undue violence to common usage. In 
this cese it eppeers that it does, and the result is en argu—
ment which cleims, by means of erbitrary, linguistic legislation, 
to show that e problem, commonly thought to be importent, is in 
fret non—existent. 
C. Conclusions 
This examination of the two elements in the Socratic 
ergument that "no one willingly goes to meet evil" has revealed 
F number of weeknesses and limitetions in thet argument. 
The "identificetion" element ignored the type of morel 
conflict thet is commonly thought to be centrel to situations 
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of apparent ekresie, i.e. conflict between what is pre—
dominantly concern for one's own interests and what is 
predominantly concern for the interests of others. It also 
failed to give en adequate account of psychological phenomena 
such es temptation, remorse end conscience. 
The "ignorance" end "knowledge" element was con—
sidered under two headings. The "self—knowledge" strand of the 
argument was seen to be based upon the same hedonistic pre—
mises es was the "identification" element and was accordingly 
open to the same objections es was that element. The "ideal 
knowledge" strand required the acceptance of the highly specu—
lative, metaphysical Theory of Ideas, end of the linguistic 
stipulations concerning knowledge and belief which followed 
from it end which bore little resemblance to our normal use of 
these concepts. Without these stipulations the logical impossi—
bility of ekresie did not follow, es the question of motivation 
remained unensweredJ. 
Whet the purpose of Socrates (end Plato) WFS in 
presenting this paradox is en interesting question,38 but one 
that is not strictly relevant to this study. Likewise the 
question of whether Plato's view of ekresie changed es his ideas 
developed (Laws 734 and 863 suggest that it did) need not con—
cern us here, as the object of this section hes been to examine 
in their various aspects the strongest arguments that we find 
in the dialogues against the logical possibility of akrasie. 
These arguments have been shown to be unconvincing, and have 
failed to refute the view that we et times do what we know we 
ought not to do. 
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This examination of the Socratic account, however, 
has also revealed several suggestive pointers which will need to 
be followed up when consideration is given to definitions and 
explanations of ekrasie in Chapters IV and V and to educational 
methods of combatting ekrasia in Chapter VI. These can be listed 
briefly as follows•:— 
a) Psychological features of akresia, such as wrestling with 
temptation end succumbing, feeling remorse and guilt, 
acting against one's conscience and suffering resultant 
pangs, are conspicuous by their absence in the Socratic 
account, and thereby seriously weaken its explanatory 
force. These features cannot be ignored in any dis—
cussion of ekresia, or indeed of morel judgment and 
action. 
b) "Self—knowledge", though not sufficient to ensure that 
one always does whet one believes one ought to do, never—
theless appears prima facie to be an important factor 
both in deciding whet one can, ought, wants and is likely 
to do in a particular situation, and consequently in the 
relationship between moral judgment and action. 
c) The predicting of consequences and, in particular, the 
weighing of present and immediate considerations against 
future, remote ones also offers a promising area for 
further exploration, for a characteristic feature of 
many examples of apparent akresia is that the agent 
seems to act "in the heat of the moment" and to be 
swayed by immediate, situational factors. 
These points will be developed as the study proceeds; 
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but before it can be safely assumed that the Socratic denial 
of ekresie has been successfully countered, it will be necessary 
to look at a modern attempt to eliminate the gap between moral 
judgment and action. 
3. Here's Argument  
A. Summary of the Argument  
In his books, "The Language of Morals"39 and "Freedom 
and Reason",40 R.M. Here develops a different version of the 
argument that akresie is logically impossible, and this version 
must now be examined. (In the following references, the abbre—
viations L.M. end F.R. will be used to indicate the two books.) 
The opening sentence of L.M. immediately raises issues 
that appear relevant to our problem — "If we were to ask of a 
person, 'What are his moral principles?' the way in which we 
could be most sure of a true answer would be by studying what 
he did." (author's italics) 
In amplifying this statement, Hare summarises what is 
in effect the main thesis of the book — "The reason why actions 
are in a peculiar way revelatory of moral principles is that the 
function of moral principles is to guide conduct. The language 
of morals is one sort of prescriptive language." (1.1) 
Arguing throughout the book against whet he calls 
"descriptivism", he examines the concepts of "good", "right" and 
"ought", end their function in both morel end non—moral con—
texts. While admitting that these concepts have-some descriptive 
function, Here nevertheless asserts that their primary function 
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is prescriptive or action—guiding — "Their (i.e.'ought"— 
sentences') primary function is not to give information; it is 
to prescribe or advise or instruct; and this function can be 
fulfilled when no information is being conveyed." (10.4.) 
In his analysis of "ought" (which is of particular 
relevance to the problem of ekresie) he distinguishes between 
three uses — "It is then possible to treat 'I ought to do x' as 
a confused mixture of three judgements. 
1. 'x is required in order to conform to the standard which 
people generally accept.' (statement of sociological fact) 
2. 'I have a feeling that I ought to do x'. (statement of 
psychological fact) 
3. 'I ought to do x.' (value—judgement)" (11.2.) 
It is the third sense that is crucial to Hare's thesis, 
for he claims that all value—judgments (when'"oughtsentences are 
being used evaluatively) "entail imperatives". He makes this a 
matter of definition — "I propose to say that the test, whether 
someone is using the judgement, 'I ought to do x', as a value—
judgement or not is, 'Does he or does he not recognise that if 
he assents to the judgement, he must also assent to the command, 
"Let me do x":" (11.2.) This statement is qualified by the 
concession that there are "degrees of sincere assent, not all 
of which involve actually obeying the command," but a detailed 
analysis of this problem is postponed until "another occasion". 
(11.2.) 
It follows then from the action—guiding function of 
the concepts under examination that:— 
"a morel judgement has to be such that if a person assents 
to it, he must assent to some imperative sentence derivable 
from it; in other words, if a person does not assent to 
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some such imperative sentence, that is knock—down 
evidence that he does not assent to the moral judgement 
in en evaluative sense." (11.3.) 
Earlier in the book Hare says of "assenting":— 
"If ... we assent to a second—person command addressed to 
ourselves, we are said to be sincere in our assent if and 
only if we do or resolve to do what the speaker has told 
us to do ... It is a tautology to say that we cannot 
sincerely assent to a second—person command addressed to 
ourselves, and at the same time not perform it, if now is 
the occasion for performing it and it is in our (physical 
and psychological) power to do so." (2.2.) 
Hare claims that the logical distinctions he makes 
shed considerable light on the problem of akrasie. However, he 
does not inquire further into this "fascinating problem'", apart 
from commenting that the phrase, "thinks that he ought", needs 
a more thorough analysis, end that the criteria in ordinary 
speech for saying "He thinks that he ought" are "exceedingly 
elastic" — 
"If a person does not do something, but the omission is 
accompanied by feelings of guilt etc., we normally say 
that he has not done what he thinks he ought. It is 
therefore necessary to qualify the criterion given above 
for sincerely assenting to a command, and to admit that 
there are degrees of sincere assent ..." (see above, 11.2.) 
This qualification makes Hare's implied view of 
akrasia in "The Language of Morals" difficult to summarise 
succinctly. His argument would appear to be, however, that it 
is logically impossible for a person to say "I ought to do x", 
using "ought" in a evaluative sense, end then not to do or 
resolve to do x. This is because he is making a value —judges 
ment, which must entail sincerely assenting to the command, 
"Let me do x", and because this assent (in its sincerest form, 
at least) entails doing or resolving to do what is commanded. 
One cannot then fail to do, or resolve to do, whet one thinks 
one ought to, provided that "ought" is being used in its primary 
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evaluative sense, and provided that one is physically and 
psychologically capable of doing so. 
In his later book,"Freedom and Reason", Hare tries 
to clarify and develop some of the above points; in particular 
he devotes more attention to the specific issue of akresia. 
He argues throughout the book, as in "The Language of 
Morels", for a doctrine of universal prescriptivism — "a com—
bination, that is to say, of universalism (the view that moral 
judgements are universeliseble) end prescriptivism (the view 
that they are, at any rate typically, prescriptive)." (P.R. 2.5.) 
That is, "the meaning of the word 'ought' and other morel words 
is such that e person who uses them commits himself thereby to a 
universal rule", (universalisability) (3.1.), end "it is pert 
of the meani_ ,7! of thec terms that judgements containing them 
are,-es typically used, intended as guides to conduct." 
(prescriptivity) (5.1.) 
There are, however, a greet many kinds of "off—colour" 
moral judgments lacking "full, universally prescriptive force," 
end it is these that are involved in cases of akrasie (5.1.) 
Akresie in fact results when morel judgments (in an "off—colour" 
sense) are made which lack either universalisability or pre—
scriptivity. The first case is when we do not do something 
which in general we commend, or do something which in general we 
condemn (5.4.);. the second case is where we decide that we and 
anyone in like circumstances, ought to do something, and then, 
without any hint of going back on what we had decided, do not 
do it. (5.5.) 
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To fulfil both of these conditions in morel 
decision—makin is very difficult to do — "Something has to 
give; end this is the explanation of morel weakness. Not 
only do we give, because we are morally week; we have found 
for ourselves a language which shares our weakness, end gives 
where we do." (5.5.) 
One feature of this language is the "attenuated" sense 
in which "ought" can be used. To illustrate this, Hare des—
cribes a type of backsliding which he calls "special pleading." 
This is when one starts off accepting the universal and pre—
scriptive demands of a moral principle, but discovers that it 
is contrary to one's own interests to act accordingly:— 
"While continuing to prescribe that everyone else should act 
in accordance with the principle, we do not so prescribe to 
ourselves ... The word 'ought' can remain universal in 
that it retains all the descriptive meaning that it ever 
had, but it ceases to express a universal prescription — 
the prescription is not universal and the universality is 
only descriptive." (5.6.) 
A feeling of guilty conscience restores the appearance 
of prescriptive universality and the expression "think that I 
ought" loses its "robustness", though it does so "without, in 
a sense, departing from its original meaning." (5.6.) 
Hare goes on to make an important distinction. Those 
who act in the way just described and with full awareness of 
whet they are doing are "the reel hypocrites". The majority of 
people, however, suffer from some sort of "inability" to do what 
they think they ought. (5.7.) As examples of this "inability", 
Here quotes the dilemmas of Medea and St. Paul, and concludes 
that "it is not in Medee's or St. Paul's psychological power to 
act on the imperatives that are entailed by the morel judgements 
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which they are making." (5.7.) From this he deduces thet 
"the typical case of moral weakness, as opposed to that of 
hypocrisy, is a case of 'ought but can't'," and that in this 
case the "ought" becomes "down—graded". (5.8.) 
The view of ekresie presented in "Freedom end Reason" 
appears then to be as follows. It is still logically impossible 
for a person to say "I ought to do x" and then not to do or 
resolve to do x, as long as the "ought" is being used in its 
full—blooded, evaluative, "non—attenuated" sense, end as long 
as the moral judgment is not "off—colour" and lacking full, 
universally prescriptive force. When the "ought" does become 
"attenuated" end the moral judgment "off—colour", however, one 
of two things is happening. Either it is a case of "purposive 
backsliding or hypocrisy" which can also take the form of 
insincerity or self—deception), "where a man does what he says 
he ought not to, though perfectly able to resist the temptation 
to do it", (5.9.) or it is a case of psychological impossibility, 
"where the man cannot do the act". (5.9.) 
B. Critique of the Argument  
Hare's claim that his logical distinctions shed con—
siderable light on the problem of ekrasia is not unfounded, but 
there are a number of points in his argument which invite closer 
examination. These points centre around Here's choice and use 
of terminology, end will be considered under two main headings — 
terminological oddities end terminological stipulations. 
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(i) Terminological Oddities 
At a number of key points in his argument, Hare uses 
phrases which sound decidedly odd and unnatural in the contexts 
in which they occur. Here are three examples:— 
(a) "Assenting to a commend" 
The oddity of this expression is rematked upon by 
Gardiner in en examination of Here's argument:-41 
"... the expression 'assent to a command', even when such 
assent is described as being given to second—person commands, 
is not one with a common use. We ordinarily speak of obeying 
commends, of intending to obey commands, of giving it to be 
understood that we will obey commands, end (perhaps) of 
giving it to be understood that we intend to obey commands. 
But 'assenting to commands' seems to me to be peculiar." 
Hare's own example of "assent to a commend" does not 
lessen the peculiarity — "And if I said, 'Shut the door', and you 
answered, 'Aye, eye, sir', this ... wouldb6a sign of assent." 
(L.M. 2.2.) But if the answer, "Aye, aye, sir", is a sign of 
assent, what does the assent itself consist in, apart from the 
actual shutting of the door? In many cases the response to a 
command is simply obedience or disobedience; we do as we are 
told or we do not do as we are told. Hare seems to be saying 
that the soldier on parade who is commended "About turn:" does 
something in addition to the carrying out of the commend; he 
"assents" to it as well. But no act of assent (or dissent) is 
necessarily involved in such cases, over and above the actual 
performance (or non—performance) of the action. We may at times 
ponder over whether or not to obey a command, and finally make 
a deliberate decision to "assent" or "dissent", but such a pro—
cedure is contingent end by no means necessitated by the logic 
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of commands. In many (and perhaps the standard) cases of 
obeying and disobeying commands, "assent" seems a superfluous 
concept. 
Hare has in fact failed to clarify whether he is making 
a logical or a psychological point about "assent". In either 
case there are serious problems. If he is saying that, prior 
to obeying (or disobeying) any commend, we always go through a 
psychological process of assenting (or dissenting) to it, this 
seems to be simply untrue, as the example of the soldier on 
parade shows. If, on the other hand, he is making "assent" a 
necessary, logical part of "obeying a commend", but one which 
does not necessarily refer to a corresponding psychological 
process, then it is difficult to see what work the concept is 
doing and whet it adds to our understanding of the logic of 
commands. 
(b) "Assenting to the first-person commend, 'Let me do x'." 
Here's test of "whether someone is using the judgement 
'I ought to do x' as a velue-judgement or not is, 'Does he or 
does he not recognise that if he assents to the judgement, he 
must also assent to the commend "Let me do x"?'" (L.M. 11.2.) 
Elsewhere he uses "Let me do so end so" as en example of a 
"first-person command", (L.M. 2.2.) and in another place ampli-
fies this usage:- 
"A man who is wondering, in a game of chess, what move to 
make, may say to himself, 'Let me try moving Q to KB 4,11 
end act accordingly. It is in this sense that I shall be 
using this form of expression ('Let me do a') - in the 
sense, that is, in which it is the first-person analogue 
of the second-person 'Try moving —.1 end the first-person 
plural 'Let's try moving ...'" (F.R. 4.3.) 
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The oddity of Hare's use of the phrase "assenting to 
a commend" has been mentioned in (i) above. When the command 
becomes in addition a "first-person commend" the oddity 
increases. For his interpretation of a value-judelgent Here 
needs the notion of a self-addressed imperative, but it is not 
easy to see how such en imperative functions, outside the canons 
of classical grammar. A self-addressed imperative is meaning-
ful only if whet Hare cells "the curious metaphor of the 
divided personality" (F.R. 5.8) is adopted, whereby our "higher 
self" issues commands to our recalcitrant "lower nature", but 
this is of course not a first-person but a second-person com-
mend - our "higher self" is issuing second-person commends to 
our "lower nature" (Do this, or don't do that) in the same way 
that another person might tell us to do or not do something. 
A first-person command then cannot take this form. 
It must be expressed in the "Let me do x" form, but doubts then 
arise (pace the grammar books) as to whether this is a genuine 
example of a "command", as we usually understand the term. A 
commend implies that there is someone (or something) commending, 
end someone being commended, but a "first-person command" does 
not have these two elements (unless the divided personality 
metaphor is invoked, in which case the commend becomes a second-
person one). It appears then that the notion of a "first-person 
command" is self-contradictory. 
Hare's own example illustrates the difficulties well. 
"Let me try moving Q to KB 4" is hardly a commend; it is part 
of the process of deliberation or of musing whet to do - "Let's 
see whet would happen if ..." When we are engaged in this kind 
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of process, we make suggestions to ourselves, consider possi— 
bilities, end weigh up pros end cons; we participate in a 
form of internal dialogue, but this dialogue does certainly not 
consist in the issuing of commands which are then either obeyed 
or disobeyed. The situation resembles that of the committee 
room much more then that of the parade ground. To illustrate 
this further by using Here's chess example, if I take twenty 
minutes to decide which move I shall make in a championship 
match, I shell spend that time in considering numerous possi— 
bilities end debating their respective advantages end dis— 
advantages. Whet I shell not do is to spend the time in 
addressing a series of commends to myself, which I then either 
obey or disobey. The same will apply to the deliberation of a 
morel issue. 
Again the question of the logical or psychological 
status of Hare's argument arises (as in (i) above), but this 
time it seems even clearer that "assenting to a first—person 
commend" cannot refer to any necessary psychological process 
that occurs when we use value—judgments. Indeed, "assenting 
to a first—person command" seems so inaccurate a description of 
whet happens when we decide to do what we think we ought to do, that 
we are bound to question Here's right to introduce such odd 
terminology in order, apparently, to make a logical, definitional 
point about what he conceives to be the nature of value—judgments. 
If Here's interpretation of value—judgments requires him to do such 
violence to ordinary= usage, perhaps that interpretation itself 
should be questioned. 
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(c) Morel decision—making 
Here's emphasis upon "universal prescriptivism" leads 
him to say some more odd things about the making of moral judg 
ments end decisions, 
"The reel difficulty of making a morel decision is ... that 
of finding some action to which one is prepared to commit 
oneself, end which at the same time one is prepared to 
accept as exemplifying a principle of action binding on 
anyone in like circumstances." (F.R. 5.5.) 
"We are to go about looking for moral judgements which we 
can both accept for our own conduct and universalise to 
cover the conduct of other actual or hypothetical people." 
(F.R. 10.4.) 
This description of moral decision—making in terms of 
finding actions end going about looking for moral julgwents 
conjures up some weird pictures of moral agents engaged in a 
frantic search for something to be moral about. Making a morel 
decision becomes like discovering the key to a complex code or 
solving a difficult acrostic; one tries out various possi—
bilities (addressing first—person commends to oneself in the 
process, no doubt) end finally, if successful, comes across en 
answer that fits. 
It is hard to resist the conclusion that Hare is here, 
as in the two previous cases,, (a) and (b), simply not giving a 
sufficiently comprehensive (or indeed comprehensible) account 
of what we mean by making a moral decision. As Gardiner says 
of expressions like "assenting to principles", "recognising 
situations to be ones to which a principle applies", and 
"assenting to moral judgements":— "I think that this can be a 
misleading way of referring to people's normal reactions to 
situations which call for some kind of moral decision or choice."42 
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It is misleading because it concentrates upon only 
one aspect of those situations, the aspect that is comxrned 
with the formation, acceptance and application of principles. 
These principles moreover appear to be, in a sense, "external" 
to the situations, rather than en integral pert of them — sets 
of instructions to be looked for, consulted, end either obeyed 
or disobeyed, when we come upon a problem.. More will be said 
later in this study about the role of principles in the making 
of morel decisions, and about Here's account of them, as this 
subject is particularly relevant to questions of morel learning. 
For the moment, however, it will suffice to comment that Hare's 
choice of terminology here, end the emphasis which he lays upon 
principles, suggest a picture of the moral life which is largely 
concerned with the intellectual process of looking for, and 
accepting or rejecting morel judgments and principles, end 
which largely ignores typical situations of moral conflict and 
indecision when we find ourselves called upon to make immediate, 
practical choices end decisions. 
At these three key points in his argument, then, we 
find Here using language which appears extremely ill—suited to 
the situations and events that he is trying to describe. The 
most obvious explanation of this is that he is being forced to 
use such inappropriate expressions in order to present a 
particular interpretation of morel language end behaviour. 
This interpretation also causes Hare to employ terminology that 
is stipuletive, rather as Socrates' was, and this aspect of the 
argument must next be examined. 
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(ii) Terminological Stipulations end "Centre]. Uses" 
One of Here's stipulative definitions has already 
been noted in (i) (b) above, i.e.:— 
"Value-judgement" — "I propose to say that the test, whether 
soMeone is using the judgement 'I ought to do x' as a value_. 
judgement or not is, 'Does he or does he not recognise that 
if he assents to the judgement, he must also assent to the 
command, "Let me do x"?'" (L.M. 11.2.) 
Here are some other examples:— 
"Evaluative" — "I should not say that an ought—sentence me 
being used evaluatively unless imperatives were held to 
follow from it." (L.M. 11.1) 
And again:— 
"If a person does not assent to some such imperative 
sentence, that is knock—down evidence that he does not 
assent to the moral judgement in an evaluative sense ... 
This is true by my definition of the word evaluative." 
(L.M. 11.3.) 
"Sincere Assent" — "It is a tautology to say that we cannot 
sincerely assent to a second—person imperative addressed 
to ourselves, and at the same time not perform it, if now 
is the occasion for performing it and it is in our 
(physical and psychological) power to do so." (L.M. 2.2) 
"Value—judpement" end "Prescriptive" — "In "The Language of 
Morels' I performed whet some have thought en evasive 
manoeuvre by defining "value—judgement" in such a way that 
if a man did not do what he thought he ought, he could not 
be using the word eveluatively. I have in this book done 
something similar with the word 'prescriptive' ..." (F.R. 5.9) 
What Hare has done by means of such definitions is to 
construct his own self—sufficient, interlocking set of moral 
concepts, which form part of what he elsewhere calls "a holy 
or angelic morel language". (F.R. 5.5) As a result, his 
doctrine is, as Lukes puts it,43 "curiously self—protecting" 
and "cannot be refuted, just as an axiomatic system cannot be 
refuted." If we form a"value—judgement, we are using "ought" 
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eveluatively end prescriptively, which entails that we 
sincerely assent to the commend "Let me do x", which in turn 
entails that we do x, if it is in our power to do so. 
Such en argument certainly cannot be "refuted", but 
it can be questioned on at least two grounds, i.e. can the con—
cepts end expressions which are used in the definitions be 
meaningfully applied to the actual situations which they are 
intended to describe, end to whet extent do the definitions 
proposed do violence to common usage? 
The first question has already been considered in 
(i) (a) above, where difficulties were noted concerning the 
notions of "assenting to a command" and "assenting to a first—
person commend". These notions did not offer very appropriate 
or helpful ways of describing the situations to which they were 
intended to refer. Here claims at one point that his inquiry 
is, "as most philosophical inquiries are, at one and the same 
time about language end about what happens ... One cannot study 
language, in a philosophical way, without studying the world 
that we are talking about." (F.R. 5.5) However, the references 
to these notions of "assent" are examples of the use of language 
which bears little resemblance to "whet happens" and to "the 
world that we are talking about". 
The second question, concerning common usage requires 
more detailed examination at this point, as it raises the 
important problem of "central uses". In many passages, Here is 
not merely suggesting his own system of terminology; he is 
claiming that his use of the concept is the "central", "typical", 
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or "primary" use. Here are some examples, some of which have 
already been quoted:— 
1. "... morel judgements, in their central use, have it 
as their function to guide conduct." (F.R. 5.3) 
2. "There are a greet many kinds of 'off—colour' morel judge—
ments which do not like the perfect specimen, 'imply 
"can"." (F.R. 5.1) 
3. "... the typical case of morel weakness, as opposed to 
that of hypocrisy, is a case of 'ought but can't'." 
(F.R. 5.8) 
4. "There are, indeed, many ways in which it (the expression 
'think that I ought') can lose its robustness without, 
in a sense, departing from its original meaning." 
(F.R. 5.6) 
5. tt ... there are prescriptive uses of these (morel) words, 
end ... these uses are important end central to the 
words' meaning." (F.R. 5.9) 
6. "... the primary logical interest of the evaluative sense 
of 'ought'". (L.N. 11.3) 
7. "It is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent 
to e second—person command addressed to ourselves, end 
at the same time not perform it ... " (L.M. 2.2) 
Here's claim that these uses are central, typical, 
primary, original, perfect etc. seems designed to bolster up 
his thesis that to use a value—judo vent is to assent sincerely 
to a first—person imperative, which in turn necessitates doing 
the action, if one is able to do so. This thesis end its 
dependence upon "central uses" can be examined in two parts, 
one dealing with the relationship between value—judgments and 
action, end the other with the notion of ability to act. 
(a) Value—judgments end Action 
Here maintains that a man cannot (logically) make the 
value—judgment "I ought to do x", and then fail to assent 
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sincerely to the prescription "Let me do x." Similarly a man 
cannot (logically) sincerely assent to the prescription and 
then fail to act, if he is physically end psychologically 
able. This is because of the logical force of the concepts 
"ought", "value—judgment", and "sincere assent", all of which 
in their "central uses" entail commitment to action. Thus, if 
a man says, "I ought to do x", end then fails to assent to the 
prescription, he by definition has not used "ought" in its 
"central" sense, and he hes not made a "value—judgment" in its 
"central" sense. These concepts have become "off—colour", 
"attenuated" and non—"full—blooded". Similarly if he sincerely 
assents to the prescription, but then does not act accordingly 
(given the physical and psychological ability), this is by 
definition not "sincere assent" in its "central" sense — 
It ... there are degrees of sincere assent." (L.M. 11.2) 
Hare's claim for the "centrality" of these uses has 
predictably been challenged. Gardiner44 argues:— 
"(Here's) criteria for 'sincere assent' are not the ordinary 
criteria by which we determine whether or not a men is sincere 
in the resolves or promises he makes ... We have a use for 
expressions like 'doing what I believed to be wrong' or 
'acting contrary to my principles' when there is no obvious 
implication of insincerity or of change of mind ..." 
(author's italics) 
He concludes that there are "a host of considerations, 
behavioural and non—behavioural", which are relevant in deter—
mining the sincerity of a person's morel beliefs — these could 
include feelings of guilt, shame, remorse, unease and conscience 
after the event, or actions occasioned by such feelings. 
Horsburgh, in en attempt to examine Here's "degrees 
of assent", also argues that the satisfaction of such criteria 
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es remorse, feelings of guilt, and repentence is "sufficient 
to dispose us to sey that we ere concerned with e case of 
essent to e morel rule."45 Though claiming that "conformity 
is en essentiel part of the criterion of full essent," he admits, 
"There ere times when we ettech more weight to remorse then we 
do to conformity in our judgements of relative fullness of 
essent," end noes on to make the important point that we some—
times "ettribute e higher degree of assent to a person after he 
hes violated e morel rule then we did before," i.e. intense 
remorse can be more convincing then mere conformity.° 
Eortimore47 comments that by giving the notion of 
"prescribing" some independent informetive value (in terms of 
"making e judgement, or addressing en imperative to oneself with 
the intention of guiding choice end ectiori) Here runs into 
difficulties, for "es soon es such en independent eccount is 
given, it begins to look exceedingly dubious that it follows 
from e men's prescribing, that he ects if it is physically end 
psychologically possible." 
Such arguments certainly throw into question Hare's 
claim for the "centrality" of his definitions, but they also 
exemplify e serious end significant confusion over the ambiguous 
meening of "centrality". To say that the central use of 
expression x is y cen mean one of et least two things. It can 
meen that in our ordinary use of language we normally meen or 
imply y when we use expression x, (this will be called sense A); 
or it can mean thet the interpretation y is logically prior to, 
end necessery for, all other interpretations of expression x 
(sense B). Thus, to cleim thet "I believe I ought to do x" 
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logically entails doing x (if capable of doing so), because 
this is required by the "central" use of "ought" could be 
1. in sense A, to claim that this is how we usually use 
"ought" in our ordinary language, 
or 2. in sense B, to claim that without this logically prior 
and necessary use of "ought", we should not be able to 
derive any other uses. 
The relationship between these two senses is clearly often 
extremely tenuous, for there is no reason why the logically 
central use (sense B) of an expression need be identical with 
the linguistically central use (sense A). 
Hare's critics, as the arguments quoted above show, 
have largely ignored this distinction, end have interpreted his 
reference to "central uses" in sense A; their criticism is 
elohg the lines that this is not necessarily what we normally 
mean or imply when we use these concepts. Hare himself must 
bear some responsibility for this confusion, as be does not 
always for his own part distinguish clearly between senses A and 
B. On close examination, however, it appears that his meaning 
is more fairly interpreted in most cases in sense B. 
In this connection it is significant that Hare refers 
to "perfect specimens", "original meanings" end "primary, 
logical interest", as well as to "central uses", in the extracts 
already quoted; such expressions tend to suggest sense B rather 
than sense A. 
The account that Hare gives in "The Language of Morale' 
of "oughts" and "value—judgements" makes it even clearer that he 
is trying to describe a "central use" in sense B. His 
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classification of three uses of "I ought to do x" (as a state—
ment of sociological fact, or as a statement of psychological 
fact, or as a value—judvient) is intended to demonstrate the 
"primary logical interest" of the third "evaluative" use, since 
the first two uses, when expended, must always contain a 
reference to the third use, which "shows that there must be some 
sense of that original judgement which is not exhausted by (1) 
and (2)." (L.M. 11.2-3.) 
Hare makes it plain, in fact, that this is a logical 
point end not simply one about common usage:— 
"I do not in the least wish to deny that moral judgements 
are sometimes used non—eveluatively, in my sense. All I 
wish to assert is that they are sometimes used evaluatively, 
end that it is this use which gives them the special 
characteristics to which I have drawn attention; and that, 
if it were not for this use, it would be impossible to give 
a meaning to the other uses." (L.M. 11.3) 
A similar argument could be developed for the "central 
use" (in sense B),i of "sincerely assenting to a command", (i.e. 
that if this notion in its "primary logical" sense did not imply 
some decision to act, then it would be impossible to give a 
meaning to the other uses) but Here does not elaborate this 
point. 
It is mistaken then to attack Here's account of "ought", 
"value— judgeents" end "sincere assent" on the grounds that 
there are equally "central" (in sense A) uses of these terms. 
Here in effect grants this point by contrasting his "holy or 
angelic morel language" with "human morel language" — "we have 
found for ourselves a language which shares our weaknesses, and 
gives where we do." (F.R. 5.5) Any attack therefore has to 
concentrate on Hare's claim for the logical centrality of his 
86. 
definitions, end in the next chapter en attempt will be made 
to challenge Here's account of "ought". 
One serious limitation which is imposed by the inter—
pretation of Here's "central uses" in sense B is that he is 
thereby prevented from saying anything very significant about 
ekresie. He can claim that, in terms of his "central uses" of 
"ought", "value—judgements" end "sincere assent" (in sense B), 
ekresie is logically impossible, but this does not take us very 
far because, in studying the phenomenon of ekrasia, we are more 
concerned with "central uses" in sense A; in other words, we 
are interested in whet men normally mean when they say that they 
ought to do x, whet state of mind they are describing, and what 
kind of judteent they are making. It is the contours of the 
ordinary language concepts of morality that are in question when 
we examine cases of apparent ekrasia, not the logical priorities 
of an angelic language. It may well be that the "'central uses" 
of Hare's angelic concepts are rarely if ever used in ordinary 
human discourse; certginly, as Gardiner, Horsburgh and hortimore 
argue, there is no reason to suppose that they are the 
linguistically central uses, for other uses may be said to be 
equally, if not more, "central" in sense A. Hare's account 
therefore can say little about the problem of akresie, which 
arises in the context of everyday human discourse end conduct. 
(b) Ability to Act 
At one important point in Hare's argument, he does 
appear to be talking of "central uses" in sense A rather than B. 
This is when he introduces the notion of psychological 
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impossibility:— 
... typical cases of 'morel weakness' ere cases where a 
men cannot do whet he thinks he ought." (F.R. 5.1) 
"... the typical case of morel weakness, es opposed to that 
of hypocrisy, is e case of 'ought but can't.'" (F.R. 5.8) 
Here makes it quite clear that he takes these cases es 
"typical" in sense A by saying:— 
... the state of mind that most people are thinking of 
when they speck of weakness of will involves en inability, 
in some sense, to do what we think we ought." (F.R. 5.7) 
Instances of e men thinking that he ought to do x, 
end then not doing it, are therefore classified either as cases 
of purposive backsliding or hypocrisy (where "ought" is deliberately 
used in en "off—colour" way, which "ceases to express e universal 
prescription", (F.R. 5.7)), or as cases of sheer inability or 
impossibility. In the case of physical inability, the imperative 
is simply "withdrawn altogether, es inconsistent with the 
admission of impossibility" (F.R. 5.8), but in the case of 
psychological impossibility (es with Medea end St. Paul) it is 
not in the agent's "psychological power to act on the imperatives 
that are entailed by the morel judgements which they are making," 
(F.R. 5.7) end consequently the "ought" "does not have to be 
withdrawn, but only down—graded." (F.R. 5.8) 
This attempted classification and interpretation of 
cases of morel weakness is unsatisfactory on two main counts. 
1. Can ell cases of morel weakness be classified either es cases 
of hypocrisy or es cases of psychological impossibility? The 
possible extent of the notion of ekresie end the range of cases that 
could fell within it will be discussed in Chapter IV, but et this stage 
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it is sufficient to list the possible cases suggested by 
Metthews48 — putting off the evil moment, backsliding, 
irresolution being persuaded against one's better judlipent, 
being too easily discouraged, being unable to bring oneself to 
do something, end being overcome with desire. Such a classi—
fication will need further discussion, but it does strongly 
suggest that Here's simple dichotomy fails to do justice to the 
complexities of the concept. 
2. Can "ought but can't" be celled a "typical case of morel 
weakness'? Is it in fact a case of morel weakness at all? Morel 
weakness implies blameworthiness end possible censure, but as 
Metthews argues: 49 
"If it is literally true 
not help himself, could 
much he blames himself, 
reproach end reprove as 
kleptomania." 
that the agent was powerless, could 
not do anything else, then however 
we would be as little inclined to 
we would in a clear case of 
Far from being a typical case, "the nearer this approaches to 
real impossibility, the less it seems like a case of weakness 
of will." Or, as Kenny succinctly puts it, "... this is more 
then weakness of will, this is paralysis."50 
Lukes51 makes a similar criticism of Here's position, 
arguing that it entails a "crude, ppychologicel determinism" 
which fails to distinguish between "the compulsive neurotic or 
viten the men overcome by passion or emotion, on the one hand, 
end the average backslider on the other." He also points out 
that Here is thereby driven to maintaining that "when sincere men 
are faced by temptation, if they resist it they act freely, but 
if they do not, they are unable (in a deeper sense) to do so." 
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In other words, Here has failed to recognise here 
that a morel decision presupposes some degree of freedom. If 
that freedom is not present end the in cannot act otherwise, 
the situation is not a moral one, and the question of morel 
weakness cannot arise. 
In both (a) end (b), therefore, Hare's apparent 
appeal to linguistically "central uses" is not supported by 
our normal understanding of the term "moral weakness". 
C. Conclusions 
This analysis of Here's arguments concerning the 
possibility of akresie has revealed a number of limitations. 
The terminology which he uses to describe morel decision—making 
is odd and inappropriate in several respects. Hisstipulative 
definitions involve a radical ambiguity over "central uses", 
end are mainly designed to construct an interlocking, axiomatic, 
angelic language, which beers little relation to "what happens" 
in "the world that we are talking about", to ordinary moral 
discourse, or to the practical problem of akrasia. Where he 
makes direct reference to ekresie, his account appears parti—
cularly unsatisfactory in terms both of his classification and 
of his relience upon the notion of psychological impossibility. 
Like Socrates, however, Here draws our attention to 
several areas crucial tom examination of ekresie which promise 
to yield fruitful results if explored further. These fell under 
four mein headings:— 
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a) Feelings of guilt end remorse are (grudgingly) admitted to 
provide a criterion of sorts for "sincere assent" end "thinking 
that one ought ..." if the action itself is not performed, 
for there are "degrees of sincere assent". Whether failure 
to act on en "oughtljudgment makes that judgment less sincere 
or not will be discussed in the following chapter; but the 
introduction of guilt end remorse (and, by implication, of 
"conscience" also) into Hare's account may offer a possible 
way of demonstrating how a men may be said to believe 
sincerely that he ought to do x4 even though he fails to do 
x. This point will be developed in Chapters III — V, while 
some possible reasons for Here's failure to make explicit 
reference to "conscience" in his account will be suggested 
at the end of the following chapter. 
bl Hare's preoccupation with degrees of sincerity and insincerity 
raises a further important question, to which an answer will 
be attempted in Chapter V. Even if, contra Socrates end Hare, 
the possibility of akresia is admitted, is some form of 
insincerity, self—deception or intellectual dishonesty a 
necessary feature of moral weakness? 
c) Here's claim that "typical" cases of moral weakness involve 
psychological impossibility appears unjustified. Nevertheless, 
some attention will need to be given in Chapter IV to the 
question of whether and in what sense a men who exhibits 
moral weakness "could have acted otherwise". 
d) The emphasis which Here places upon the "prescriptive" nature 
end function of moral language, end upon the pert played by 
"imperatives" end "commands" within that language, must be 
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considered in any discussion of akrasie. Some objections 
to Here's particular version of prescriptivism have been 
raised in this section, end some more general features of 
prescriptivism will be examined in the following chapter. 
Although Hare's version and the terminology it uses has been 
shown to create serious difficulties, en account of akresia 
in which morel principles and considerations are shown to 
exercise some kind of prescriptive authority over morel 
agents seems to offer a more convincing end recognisable 
picture of morel judgment end decision—making then does the 
Socratic account. 
Thus, Here's work is important in pin—pointing some 
issues of central importance to the problem of akrasie, but his 
account resembles that of Socrates in suffering from two main 
weaknesses — an insufficiently comprehensive view of moral 
judgment, decision—making end conflict, and en undue dependence 
upon arbitrary, linguistic stipulations. 
As far as the logical impossibility of ekresie is con—
cerned, Hare can only ettempt to demonstrate this within the 
confines of his axiomatic, angelic language — a limited enter—
prise, which does not deny the possibility or meaningfulness of 
en ordinary mortal thinking that he ought to do x, end then not 
doing it. 
This chapter began by demonstrating how different 
ethical traditions have placed differing degrees of emphasis 
upon ekresie es a philosophical and practical problem. Socrates 
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end Here were then taken as exemplary proponents of the view 
that ekresie cannot logically occur; their arguments to this 
effect were shown to be unsatisfactory in various respects, 
though at the same time suggestive of certain approaches which 
might further illuminate a study of ekresie. It is now 
necessary to proceed beyond the negative conclusion that 
ekresie has not been shown to be logically impossible, and to 
attempt to establish that it is not only logically possible but 
also a fact of life. 
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CHAPTER III - "OUGHTS", "CONSCIENCE" AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AKRASIA  
The aim of this chapter is to establish that it is both 
logically end empirically possible for a man to believe that he 
ought (in its most "full-blooded" sense) to do x, yet not to do x 
(although able to do so). 
To this end, certain logical and central features of 
"ought" will be suggested and examined in Section 1. These will 
then be related to the notion of "conscience" in Section 2. The 
analyses of "ought" and "conscience", when taken together, it will 
be argued, demonstrate sufficiently the logical and empirical 
possibility of akresie. 
1. Features of "Ought" 
"Ought" can be used in both morel end non-moral contexts, 
as Here (e.g. L.E. 10.2) and other morel philosophers have noticed. 
Less commonly noticed, however, has been the fact that "ought" can 
be used in non-morel contexts in two very different ways. The word 
is, as Edgley comments, "indifferent as between practical end 
theoretical judgments ... end in the theoretical interpretation 
(it) functions in the same general way as in any other prediction 
in which it is said that something ought to happen ..."1 
The following examples illustrate what appear to be the 
three main uses of "ought":- 
(e) You ought to tell the truth. 
(b) You ought to keep your eye on the bell. 
(c) You ought to be there by this time tomorrow. 
(b) and (c) are non-moral "oughts". (b) refers to the 
advisability of keeping one's eye on the ball, this being the 
suggested means of achieving the implicit aim of hitting the 
bell effectively. (c) is Edgley's case of e "prediction in 
. 
which it is said that something ought to happen, 1.e. your being 
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there by this time tomorrow. By contrast, (a) suggests a morel 
obligation to tell the truth. For convenience, we may label 
these three uses (a) "moral", (b) "practical", and (c) "pre—
dictive". 
(Although these are the most obvious interpretations 
of the three examples other interpretations are possible, e.g. 
(a) could be a "practical" nought" if truth—telling were being 
advised es a means of achieving a particular end (gaining 
reputation for honesty, for instance), or it could be a 
"predictive ought" if the sentence is merely stating what is 
likely to happen (e.g. as a result of conditioning, hypnosis, 
drugs etc.); (b) similarly could be "predictive", while (c) 
could conceivably be "moral" or "practical". This possible 
variety of interpretation, depending upon the particular con—
text, does not however alter the fact that these three dis—
tinctive uses exist.) 
It is important to consider whether any features can be 
discovered that are common to all three uses. Three such 
features appear es possible candidates, and will be examined 
in turn. They are:— 
A— the implied backing of justificatory reasons, 
B. the implied uncertainty of outcome, 
C. the implied likelihood of countervailing factors. 
A. Implied Backing of Justificatory Reasons: The Distinction 
between Justifying and Motivating Factors  
(i) Each of the above "ought"—sentences implies the existence 
of underlying reasons, which could be invoked if required. This 
can be illustrated by comparing the sentences (a), (b) and (c) 
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with the corresponding commends or imperative forms:— 
(a)' Tell the truth. 
(b)' Keep your eye on the bell. 
(c)' Be there by this time tomorrow. 
No appeal to reasons is necessarily implied in such 
commands, a point noted by both Nowell—Smith end Hare. 
According to Nowell—Smith:— 
” ... commands differ from ought—sentences in that a man who 
gives a commend is not logically bound to give any reasons 
why it should be obeyed. On the other hand if a man says 
'You ought ...' or 'It's worth ...' he must (logically) be 
able to give reasons." 2  
Here argues similarly:— 
"Plain imperatives do not have to have reasons or grounds, 
though they normally do have; but 'ought'—judgements, 
strictly speaking, would be being misused if the demand 
for reasons or grounds were thought of as out of place ..."3  
(author's italics) 
Nowell—Smith and Here here are confining their comments 
to "moral" and "practical" "oughts", but the same characteristic 
can also be detected in "predictive' 'oughts". The prediction, 
"You ought to be there by this time tomorrow" invites the reply, 
"Why? How do you know? How can you be sure?" This implied 
backing of reasons is whet distinguishes "ought" predictions 
from mere hunches, guesses and feelings about what is going to 
happen. 
The type of reason invoked by an "ought"—sentence will, 
of course, vary according to the type of "ought"—sentence. 
"Morel oughts" imply the backing of reasons that refer to 
empirical requirements for the achievement: of particular goals; 
and "predictive oughts" imply the backing of empirical reasons 
which suggest the likelihood of the prediction coming true. 
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(ii) Whatever type of reason is invoked, its function will be 
justificatory rather then motivational. This crucial dis—
tinction is well illustrated in Frankena's discussion of 
obligation end motivation:— 
"It seems to me, at any rate, that we must distinguish two 
kinds of reasons for action, 'exciting reasons' end 
'justifying reasons', to use Hutcheson's terms.4 When 
A asks, 'Why should I give Smith a ride?' B may give 
answers of two different kinds. He may say, 'Because you 
promised to,' or he may say, 'Because, if you do, he will 
remember you in his will.' In the first case he offers 
justification of the action, in the second a motive for 
doing it. In other words, A's ' IWhy should I 	 and 
'Why ought Id ,threambiguous questions. They may be 
asking for an ethical justification of the action pro—
posed, or they may be asking whet motives there are for 
his doing it. 'Should' and 'ought' likewise have two 
meanings which are prima facie distinct: a moral one and 
e motivational one." 5 
This distinction is of considerable significance for 
the present discussion, and indeed for the whole problem of 
akrasie, but Frankena is surely mistaken in stating that both 
"should" end "ought" have ambiguous meanings. "Should" is 
certainly ambiguous in this way, but "ought" in all its uses 
appeals to a justificatory, not a motivational, backing. 
"Morel oughts" clearly imply the backing of justi—
ficatory reasons. If I em told that I ought, to tell the truth, 
end I ask why, the sort of reason that I em asking for is one 
which will justify the "ought"—sentence (e.g. "Because rational 
morality depends upon people telling the truth in normal circum—
stances.") I em not asking fora motivational explanation or 
incentive for why I should tell the truth (e.g. intrinsically, 
"because you are a person with a passion for precision and 
exactitude", or extrinsically, "because it will pay you to do 
so.") "Why ouglit I to tell the truth?" is not therefore 
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ambiguous in the way that "Why should I tell the truth?" is. 
Frenkene in feet grants this point when he comments on the 
apparent meaningfulness of the question, "Why should I do what 
I morally ought to do?"6 The question can only be meaningful 
if "whet I morally ought to do" is accepted as being not 
ambiguous end as having a possible different meaning from "whet 
I should do." 
The same distinction holds for "practical" as well as 
"morel oughts". It is perfectly possible end meaningful to 
ask, "Why should I do whet I 'practically' ought to do?" e.g. 
keep my eye on the bell. If I ask, "Why ought I to keep my eye 
on the bell?" I em again asking for en answer in terms of 
justification rather then motivation (e.g. "because that will 
improve the mechanics of your swing", rather then "because you'll 
enjoy doing it.") 
With "predictive oughts" the distinction is not relevant 
as no course of action is being sugeested, (though en obligation 
to believe whet the evidence indicates is perhaps implied). In 
this case, questions of motivetion do not really arise however, 
and the implied reasons backing the "ought"—sentence are indis—
putably justificatory, e.g. "You ought to be there by this time 
tomorrow." "Why?" "Because the railway timetable says so." 
The distinction between motivating end justifying 
factors, and the logical connection between justificatory reasons 
end "ought"—sentences have particularly important implications 
for "morel oughts" end for the problem of akresie, which now 
comes within the bounds of logical possibility. 
If I believe that I ought to do x, I acknowledge that 
there are good justificatory reasons for my doing x, which will 
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refer to some generalised principle: for example, I ought to 
visit my colleague who is ill in hospitel. Why? Because 
people in hospitel like to be visited, remembered, cheered up, 
etc. I em thus signifying my agreement with the principle 
that visiting hospital idetients is in general a good thing, but 
I em not necessarily signifying any personal inclination to 
visit my colleague. I may not have the time, energy or desire 
to do any such visiting — perhaps hospitals fill me with dread, 
end I have no wish to come within a mile of one — but this does 
not prevent me from saying (meaningfully and"full—bloodedly") 
that I think I ought to make the visit. 
The distinction between justificatory and motivational 
factors, therefore, opens up the logical possibility of a man 
not doing whet he thihks he ought to do, because he does not 
went to do whet he thinks he ought to do. Edgley makes a 
similar point in discussing reasons for action:— 
"There are, I think, ... reasons of a sort such that their 
being some particular person's reasons for doing something 
does not imply that he wants to do that thing. Moral 
reasons seem to me to be of this kind."7 
Does it then follow from this analysis of "ought"— 
sentences that "morel oughts" are not "prescriptive" or "action—
guiding" in the way that Here end others hove claimed that they 
are? Care must be taken at this point to distinguish between 
the logical issue end the empirical issue, and between different 
senses of "prescriptive" end "action—guiding". 
If the justificatory reasons backing a "moral ought" 
coincide with, or help to provide, a person's wants and motives, 
that "ought" will in en obvious sense be "action—guiding". To 
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quote Edgley again:— 
"It may, of course, be the case that if someone's reasons 
for doing something are morel reasons he also, as a matter 
of fact, wants to do thet thing end perhaps wants to do it 
because he thinks he morally ought to do it."8 
In practice this is probably whet frequently happens; 
our wants and motives may provide us with reasons why we should 
do whet we morally, ought to do. If I think that I morally 
ought to tell the truth, I say well decide that I will do so, 
for a variety of motives (e.g. I may enjoy being precise and 
correct, or I may think that I shall profit by telling the truth, 
or I may simply went to do whet I think is morally right.) 
Motivational factors, then, may often fail to conflict 
with justificatory reasons, and may indeed be directly provided 
by them at times, in which case "morel oughts" are certainly 
"action—guiding". But this does not, end need not, always 
happen. It is always possible to ask, "Why should I do whet I 
morally ought to do?" and it is consequently always possible 
that justificatory reasons may conflict with wants end motives. 
Empirically, therefore, "moral oughts" no doubt often are 
"action—guiding" and "prescriptive" in the sense that they 
express what one intends to do, or what one intends that someone 
else should do. But this is a contingent fact, not a necessary 
truth. 
A similar distinction between logical end empirical 
features of "morel oughts " must be made when considering argu—
ments such as Nowell—Smith's9 that "I ought" expresses some sort 
of decision, commitment, or "pro—attitude" in favour of doing 
whet I think I ought to do. As Frenkene comments:— 
102. 
"No doubt ... a firsthand 'I ought' does normally express 
commitment or decision on the speaker's pert, for one would 
not normally go through the Process of morel deliberation 
that concludes with 'I ought' if he were not sufficiently 
devoted to the morel enterprise for this conclusion to 
coincide with his decision. This does not mean, however, 
that 'I ought' logically entails 'I shell'; it may only 
pragmatically presuppose or contextually imply this." 10 
In other words, the contingent feet that people who 
engage in morel deliberation tend to decide to do whet they 
think they ought to do again cannot be turned into a logical 
truth about the nature of "ought". 
Similar objections can be brought against the view 
that "morel oughts" are in some sense "overriding", "superior" 
end "dominant" vis—a—vis non—morel considerations.11 If this 
is en empirical claim, then it may well be true of the majority 
of people who take the trouble to decide whet they morally 
ought to do that these "oughts" normally are "overriding" 
psychologicelly but it seems equally clear that this is not 
elways, the case, for if it were one could never experience morel 
conflict or yield to temptation; there is no reason to suppose 
that for some people aesthetic considerations end principles, 
for example, are not at times psychologicallydodment over morel 
ones. To attempt to turn the claim into a logical truth, on 
the other hand, is even less satisfactory, as it leads only to 
the vacuous conclusion that moral considerations are morally 
superior to non—morel considerations. Both the empirical and 
the logical interpretation of the "overriding" claim can thus 
be queried, as Thelberg succinctly argues:— 
... I have no idea whet this superiority or authority could 
be. Are morel considerations supposed to be motivationally 
more potent then any other? That is the very problem here: 
morel principles do not always win out. And it would be 
completely uninformative to be told only that morel reasons 
have greater morel authority." 12 (author's italics) 
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"Oughts" and justificatory reasons, then, may be 
empirically "prescriptive" (and "overriding") at times, but are 
they in no sense logically "prescriptive"? The critique of 
Here's argument denied that "ought"—judgments are logically 
prescriptive in the sense of "assenting to first—person 
imperatives", but logical prescriptivity need not be inter—
preted so strictly or idiosyncratically. One may reject Hare's 
interpretation while agreeing with him that the primary function 
of moral concepts like "good", "right" end "ought" is to pre—
scribe rather than to describe. Indeed, there would be no 
reason to feel that akresia constituted any sort of problem if 
such moral concepts were held to be wholly descriptive. My 
belief that I ought (or that it is good or right for me) to 
visit my friend in hospital refers to an obligation that I feel 
"exists" for me, but if the "existence" of this obligation is 
seen as a purely descriptive "fact" about my situation in the 
same way that a medical diagnosis is a factual description of 
my friend's situation, then there is logically no reason to 
expect me (or my friend) to act in any particular way with 
regard to those "facts". A similar point was made concerning 
the Socratic (or Platonic) notion of "apprehending" or 
"recognising" the Ideal Forms; if purely descriptive, such 
apprehension end recognition can by themselves have no logical 
implications for action. This will be further discussed in 
Section 2. 
Akresie becomes a problem, therefore, precisely because 
of the difficulties that arise from any attempt to give a wholly 
descriptivist account of moral concepts. Recognising en obli—
gation has a different logical grammar from recognising a face, 
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for it entails that I feel the obligation to impinge upon or 
be binding upon me end thereby to require action. This pre—
scriptive entailment is pert of whet is meant by recognising en 
obligation, but nothing of this sort is entailed in recognising 
a face. 
Similarly the notion of accepting there to be good, 
justificatory reasons for doing x, which relate to a principle 
with which I agree (implied in the making of en "ought"—judgment), 
is "prescriptive" in the sense that it must have some sort of 
logical connection with doing or deciding to do x; the 
acceptance end agreeMent must amount to more than a descriptive, 
verbal formula. If I accept the desirability of cheering my 
friend up as a reason that justifies my visiting him in hospital, 
because I agree, with the general principle that invalid friends 
ought to be helped, encouraged, not ignored, etc., I em acknow—
ledging the prescriptive, nornetive pressure which I feel to be 
upon me end which is necessitated by my acceptance of reasons 
end principles as being justificatory. I do not see the 
situation simply as a collection of descriptive facts, but E- E; 
set of factors which weigh prescriptively with me. 
The prescriptive nature of "oughts" and other moral 
concepts will be examined further in the following sections of 
this chapter. At this point, however, it should be noted that 
"prescriptivity", in the sense that has been outlined, does not 
blur the distinction between justificetory end motivetional 
factors in the way that Hare's "assenting to first—person 
imperatives" does. The backing of justificetory reasons, which 
it has been argued is a common feature of all "ought"—sentences, 
is certainly "prescriptive" when "morel" (end also "practical") 
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"oughts" are involved, but this does not preclude the possi—
bility of motivational fectors leading a men to went to act 
other then es is "prescribed"; indeed, the following sections 
will try to show that counter—tendencies of this kind are 
implied by the logic of "ought"—sentences. However, the logical 
connection between "ought"—sentences end justificatory reasons, 
when considered alongside the logical distinction between justi—
ficatory end motivational factors, is sufficient in itself to 
cast serious doubt upon claims that ekrasia is a logical 
impossibility. 
B. Implied Uncertainty of Outcome 
The three examples of "ought—sentences given above, 
(a), (b), (c), have already been compered with the corresponding 
commends or imperative uses, (a'), (b'), (c'). They can also be 
compared with the corresponding future indicative uses, as 
follows:— 
(a2) You will tell the truth. 
(b2) You will keep your eye on the ball. 
(c2) You will be there by this time tomorrow. 
One obvious difference between (a), (b), (c), and (a2), 
(b2), (c2) is that the former express a degree of doubt as to the 
outcome, whereas the letter do not. "You ought to tell the truth 
(or keep your eye on the bell), but of course you may not" is 
not self—contradictory, unlike "You will tell the truth (or keep 
your eye on the bell), but of course you may not." A similar 
difference exists between (c) end (c2); "You ought to be there 
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by this time tomorrow" is a prediction about what mhappen, 
whereas (c2) is a pronouncement about what will happen. 
An essential feature of "ought"—sentences, therefore, 
which is brought out by this comparison, is that they imply a 
degree of doubt end uncertainty concerning the outcome or 
fulfilment of whet ought to happen. This feature is underlined 
in everyday speech by our placing particular emphasis upon the 
word "ought", or by adding the word "really": for example, 
"I (really) ought to stay in and work tonight — but in fact I 
think I'll go to the pictures," or predictively, "England 
(really) ought to win this Test series — but cricket being an 
uncertain game, they may well lose." 
The existence of the past—tense use "ought to have" is 
a further argument in support of the view that "ought"—sentences 
imply uncertainty of outcome. Let us consider the past—tense 
uses of our three examples:— 
(a3) You ought to have told the truth. 
(b3) You ought to have kept your eye on the ball. 
(c3) You ought to have been there by ten o'clock ("this 
time tomorrow" is inapplicable here). 
The implication in each case is that what ought to have 
happened did not in fact happen (i.e. you did not tell the truth, 
keep your eye on the bell, or arrive by ten o'clock.) While"you 
ought to have ..." is not in all cases logically incompatible 
with "you did ..." (e.g. "By giving yourself up, you did what 
you ought to have done,") the past—tense of "ought" is normally 
used to cast reproach for what was not done, or to express 
surprise at what did not happen. This use is a further indication 
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that "ought" in general implies the possible, probable or (at 
times) certain non—fulfilment of whet ought to be (or have 
been) done, or whet ought to be (or have been) the case. 
This uncertainty of outcome stems from the previous 
feature of "ought"—sentences, the implied backing of justi—
ficatory reasons. When "ought"—sentences are used, the backing 
of such reasons is implied, but they are recognised as being 
insufficient to guarantee the outcome; this is because of 
motivational factors in (a) and (b), and unforeseeable, chance 
factors in (c). Edgley illustrates this point in comparing 
"must" with "ought":— 
"The word 'must' expresses that pressure in which there is 
conclusive reason for someone to do something ...; the 
word 'ought' that pressure in which there is good (but 
not necessarily conclusive) reason to do something."13  
If the reasons implied by "ought"—sentences are "not 
necessarily conclusive", the outcome of what ought to happen 
thereby becomes uncertain. This means that "ought" in its 
"moral", "practical" and "predictive" uses does not imply 
"shall" or "will"; what it does imply is "may not". 
There are two further indications that "moral oughts" 
in particular possess this feature of uncertainty. The first 
arises from the notion of a free moral agent. If moral action 
presupposes freedom of choice and decision, and is incompatible 
with coercion, it follows that moral actions can never be 
infallibly predicted or guaranteed, for this is to sacrifice 
the necessary element of open—endedness in such actions. Only 
by using methods like conditioning, hypnosis end brainwashing 
could predictions end guarantees be confidently made, and it 
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then becomes highly questionable whether the resultant behaviour 
con be called "action", let alone "morel action". To deny that 
"ought" implies "may not" in moral contexts, on the other hand, 
is to argue that infallible predictions of morel actions are 
not only logically possible but logically necessitated by the 
force of "ought". The notion of a free moral agent, however, 
seems to require the logical possibility of a men not doing what 
he thinks he ought to do. He may have freely reached the con—
clusion that he ought to do x, but this process of deliberation 
still cannot infallibly determine his subsequent behaviour, if 
that behaviour is to be celled "morel action". Empirically no 
doubt, we do normally implement our moral decisions, as was 
mentioned above in A., but logically as free morel agents we 
must be able to choose not to do so. 
The second indication that "moral oughts" suggest 
uncertainty of outcome is provided by the logical grammar of 
decisions end resolutions. We make New Year resolutions rather 
then decisions, because we recognise the difficulty of what we 
are attempting end because resolutions, but not decisions, can 
logically be "broken". The old lag resolves rather than decides 
to "go straight"; the philandering husband resolves rather then 
decides to "turn over a new leaf". This is because, as McGuire 
puts it, "it is en analytic truth that a man can decide to do 
only those things which he believes to be relatively simple."14  
(author's italics) 
This truth can easily be demonstrated in non—morel con— 
texts. The reason why we smile at a nine—year old's declaration 
that he has decided to be Prime Minister when he grows up is 
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because we find incongruous the implied ease of achievement and 
certainty of outcome contained in the word "decided"; if the 
word "resolved" were substituted, we might still be amused (or 
perhaps impressed) by the child's ambition, but not because we 
felt he had ignored all the difficulties. 
Similarly, in a morel context, if we think that we 
ought, to be less bed—tempered, we may on January 1st resolve to 
be less bed—tempered, while realising the difficulties of 
effecting such a personality change. We do not speak of New 
Year decisions, precisely because of the difficulties end 
uncertainties surrounding "moral oughts". To quote McGuire 
again:— 
... if it is agreed that the notion of a conflict between 
duty and inclination is central to ethics, we then have 
good reason for giving first place in our schema of the 
structure of the language of morals to the notion of a 
resolve rather then to that of a decision. For morel rules 
do not exhort a man to do that which he would do in any 
case. Their function rather is to demand of us that we 
do that which otherwise we should not do; that is, broadly 
speaking, their function is to demand of us certain things 
4ich are difficult."15 
McGuire's argument ignores the important distinction 
between deciding or resolving that ... and deciding or resolving 
to ..., which will be examined later. However, his distinction 
between deciding to ... end resolving to ..., end his lialking 
of the latter with "moral oughts", further emphasise the 
uncertainty of outcome of those "oughts". Some possible reasons 
for this uncertainty of outcome have been briefly mentioned in 
this section, and will now be elaborated in Section C. 
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C. Implied Likelihood of Counterveiling Factors 
The third suggested feature common to ell uses of 
"ought" also supplies a generalised explanation for the second 
feature. The reason why all uses of "ought" imply uncertainty 
of outcome is because of the implied likely existence of 
countervailing fectors in each case. 
With "predictive oughts" the countervailing factors 
are possible or likely empirical conditions which make it less 
certain that the prediction will be fulfilled. "You ought to 
be there by this time tomorrow" suggests the unspoken quali— 
fication, "but of course the weather could turn worse and delay 
you," or, "but of course you never can tell with British Rail:" 
The person making the prediction cannot control or even estimate 
the effect of these conditions; he can only make allowance for 
their possible effect by using the word "ought" rather than 
"will". 
With "practical oughts" the countervailing factors are 
non—torel inclinations end tendencies which may prevent the 
translation of the "ought" into action. "You ought to keep your 
eye on the ball" implicitly acknowledges the difficulty of 
obeying this precept because of the natural tendency to look 
up before hitting the ball in order to anticipate its flight. 
As for "moral oughts", some brief suggestions about 
the nature of the countervailing factors involved have been 
made in A. end B. Motivationsl and justificatory factors 
may not coincide, and one may accordingly not want to do what 
one feels one ought to do. The reason why morel rules tend to 
demand things that are difficult is because duty and inclination 
tend to conflict. These suggestions can be further developed 
end illustrated by examining a number of concepts closely 
related to "morel oughts", each of which can be said in some 
way to presuppose counter—inclinations. The argument is similar, 
though not identical, with each concept — obligations, duties, 
rules end ideals. 
The key to "obligations" is to be found in its Latin 
derivation: obligere — to bind, fasten or fetter. Obligations 
then suggest that which is bound to or fastened upon one, but 
bindings and fastenings are necessary constraints only in 
situations where attempted escape is likely, or at least possible. 
Constraints of various kinds, therefore, provide a backing for 
obligations, end the function of these constraints is to oppose 
the possible wants or counter—inclinations that may operate 
against the fulfilment of the obligation. At the heart of the 
concept lies tension between what ought to be done and whet there 
is a tendency to do, between what one ought to do end what one 
is likely to want to do; without this tension the concept ceases 
to have meaning. 
Very similar to obligations are duties, which Moore 
describes as applying to those useful actions "which it is more 
useful to praise end to enforce by sanctions, since they are 
actions which there is a temptation to omit."16 Frenkena l  
comtenting on this, concludes that to say that B is A's duty 
"presupposes that A is tempted not to do it."17 Duties then 
appear to depend for part of their meaning upon the same tension 
that was noted in the case of obligations. Duties do not refer 
to actions which we necessarily went to perform; they imply 
temptations and counter—inclinations, which is but another way 
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of stating that "ought" implies "may not" and "may not went to". 
The notion of rules for regulating behaviour also pre—
supposes constraints upon wants end counter—inclinations. If 
there were no possible temptation or disposition to act con—
trarily to whet the rule specified, rules would be unnecessary 
end the concept would become superfluous. The same can be said 
of prescriptions. 
As for ideals, these are by definition difficult to 
attain. As Thalberg says of having ideals:— 
... pert of whet we mean is that we have, end expect to 
have, difficulty in conforming to our ideal. Not only do 
we expect occasional lack of success in our endeavours, 
but we foresee that, at times, we will be disinclined to 
try ... 'I ought (ideally) to try' implies II might 
not'.n18 
This cluster of concepts, then, to which "morel oughts" 
are closely related, each implies uncertainty of outcome 
resulting from the pressure of counter—inclinations. To show 
that such concepts possess this feature is thus another way of 
drawing the distinction between justificetory and motivational 
factors, for all of the concepts discussed mirror "moral oughts" 
in underlining this distinction and the tension that it can 
cause; without the likelihood of this tension, such concepts 
would lose their meaning. In each case justificetory reasons 
are presupposed which support the obligations, duties, rules and 
ideals, but these justificatory reasons can never guarantee the 
required action, because they do not necessarily supply the 
motivational incentives which may be needed to overcome the 
possible counter—inclinations. (What the nature of these 
counter—inclinations might be, end what would be involved in 
overcoming them, will be discussed in Cha Ater IV, when possible 
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explanations of skresia will be examined.) 
D. The "Centrality" of Features A, B and C 
The foregoing argument hes attempted to pick out three 
characteristic features of "ought"—sentences in general, end to 
examine these features with particular reference to "morerought"— 
sentences. Taken together, the three features constitute a 
defence of the logical possibility of ekrasia. "Ought"—sentences 
imply the backing of justificatory reasons, but (in the case of 
"moral" and "practical oughts") these may not coincide with 
motivational factors. The outcome of the "ought"—judgment 
becomes uncertain because of the implied countervailing factors, 
and the logical possibility is thereby opened up of a person 
sincerely believing that he ought to do x, but failing to do x 
(though able in all respects to do so). (The agent's "sincere 
belief" end "ability" will be further examined in Chapter BO 
A number of points at which this argument conflicts 
with Here's account have already been discussed in some detail, 
notably the issue of "imperative" or "prescriptive" "ought"— 
judveents. The crucial question of "central usage" must now 
be reconsidered in the light of the suggested features A, B and 
C. 
In Section 3 of Chapter II it was seen that, according 
to Hare, to make the value—judgment "I ought to do x" was to 
assent sincerely to the prescription "Let me do x", and that to 
assent sincerely to the prescription was to do x (if physically 
and psychologically able). Hare claimed that this was the 
"central", "evaluative" use of "ought", and we took this to mean 
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logically rather then linguistically "central". In order to 
challenge Hare's account it is necessary to show that the three 
features of "oughts" that have been discussed are more "central" 
than the uses which he describes; the logical possibility of 
akresie will thus be firmly established. 
This can be done by going one better then Hare and 
claiming "centrality" in both senses, i.e. logical and linguistic. 
Here does not claim that his account of "angelic oughts" 
necessarily reflects common usage, end we have seen how this 
limits the significance of whet he has to say about akrasia. 
The three features of "ought" discussed in this section are, 
on the other hand, linguistically central. The examples that 
have been used to illustrate these features do reflect common 
usage and do not depend for their meaning upon such "non—
linguistic" devices as first—person imperatives. The implied 
backing of justificatory reasons, uncertainty of outcome, and 
existence of countervailing factors are part of whet is meant 
by "ought", as it is used in everyday speech. This is shown 
most clearly by the comparison of the three "ought"—sentences 
(a), (b) and (c) with the corresponding imperative sentences 
(a'), (b') end (c') and the corresponding future indicative 
\ 
sentences (e2), (b2) and (c2). 
But are these features logically as well as linguisti—
cally central? Do they represent logically prior senses of 
"ought", without the existence of which other senses could not 
be derived? Or do they refer only to senses which are "down—
graded" end not "full—blooded", which Hare could account for 
on the grounds that "we have found for ourselves a language 
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which shares our weaknesses, end gives where we do." (F.R. 5.5) 
The easiest way of establishing the logical primacy 
of these three features is by noting that they are linguistically 
central to all uses of "ought", unlike Hare's "angelic" features, 
which could be applied only to "morel" and "practical oughts". 
The difficulties of interpreting "morel" and "practical" 
ought"—sentences in terms of "sincerely assenting to impere—
tives" have already been discussed, but to interpret "predictive" 
ought"—sentences in this way is not merely difficult but 
impossible; no imperatives can be deduced from or written into 
factual predictions of whet is likely to happen. Hare ignores 
this common and important use of "ought", and thereby seriously 
weakens his analysis. The three logical features of "oughts" 
discussed in this section, on the other hand, apply equally well 
to "predictive" uses as to "morel" and "practical" uses, and 
accordingly have a much stronger claim to logical centrality 
than do Here's features. 
The conclusion to which this section leads, therefore, 
is that if A, 11. end C do indeed reflect features which are 
logically and linguistically central to our concept of "ought", 
as has been argued, they suggest that there is nothing self—
contradictory or even surprising about the statement that a man 
may fail to do that which he believes he ought to do. 
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2. "Oughts" end "Conscience"  
The arguments advanced in Section 1 for the logical 
Possibility of ekrasie depend largely upon logical features 
which it hes been claimed are central to the concept of "ought". 
The linguistic nature of these arguments, however, may fail to 
Gerry total conviction against the common—sense view that, in 
practice, if we do not do what we say we believe we ought to do, 
we cannot "really" believe that we ought to do it. 
In order to demonstrate that the arguments in Section 1 
are applicable to practical experience, and that this inquiry is 
in Hare's words "et one end the same time about language and 
about what happens, (for) one cannot study language in a philo—
sophical way without studying the world that we are talking 
about", this section will accordingly be devoted to a study of 
a phenomenon which certainly "happens" in "the world that we 
are talking about", and which seems to have close connections 
both with "ought"—judgments end with akresie — the phenomenon of 
conscience. The study will attempt to show how the phenomenon 
of conscience:— 
A. reflects end illustrates the logical features of "ought" 
and B. constitutes in itself a strong argument for the logical 
end empirical possibility of ekresie. 
A. "Conscience" end the logical features of "ought" 
A number of philosophical problems surround the notion 
of conscience. Those problems which are of most relevance to 
akrasie can conveniently be examined under the headings of topics 
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discussed in Section 1 in connection with logical features of 
"ought", nemely:— 
(i) justificatory reesons and principles 
(ii) motivation end countervailing fectors 
(iii) uncerteinty of outcome 
(iv) prescriptivity end authority. 
(i) !'Conscience" end justificatory reesons end principles 
Before the relationship between conscience end justi—
ficetory reesons end principles cen be explored, e fundamental 
distinction must be drewn between two senses of "conscience", 
for the term is used to describe two very different processes. 
On the one hend it cen refer to guilt reactions end 
feelings of enxiety or sheme stemming from unexamined end 
unconscious sources, es in the Freudien account of the superego. 
Thus I could in this sense be seid to "heve e bed conscience" 
or "be troubled by my conscience" if I feel irretionel anxiety 
or guilt when disagreeing with somebody in authority, because 
of childhood experiences I may have had of authority figures; 
the operation of "conscience" in this sense is a non—judgmental, 
ceusel reflex. On the other hand, "conscience" is also end 
more frequently used to describe a rational, judgmental process, 
closely akin to moral reasoning. This is designated by Kolnai 
es:— 
... Conscience in the established end dignified sense of 
morel self—criticism, judgement end belief — which essentially 
aspires to truth end tries to escape from error, and in 
fact expresses the agent's endeavour to ponder end argue 
his decisions in universally valid terms and to make his 
conduct justifiable in the open court of objective 
morality.1.19 (author's italics) 
118. 
In this sense of "conscience", part Of its task is to "enforce 
my concrete obligations under a permanent and universal body 
of moral laws it apprehends as binding upon me."20 
Clearly it is this second sense of "conscience" which 
is of particular relevance to the problem of akrasie, which 
centres around the non-enforcement of obligations end laws. 
But having distinguished between whet may be celled the 
"irrational" and "rational" senses of conscience, may we con-
clude with Kolnei that "rational" conscience has close links 
with justification, reasons end principles? 
Such a conclusion cannot safely be reached without a 
more thorough analysis. "Rational" conscience is not to be 
simply equated with morel judgment or reasoning, as Hobbes for 
example supposed: "a men's conscience and his judgement is 
the same thing."21 The exercise of conscience is more specific 
then the exercise of morel judgment or reasoning. Conscience 
acts, as Ryle puts it,22  as a private monitor pronouncing 
verdicts upon one's own, but not other people's, behaviour. My 
conscience judges, condemns end rebukes me for az deviant 
actions; it tells me that I was wrong, or would be wrong, to 
do x, or that it was wrong, or would be wrong, for me to do x t 
but not that it would necessarily be wrong for anyone else to do, 
or have done, x. If conscience-verdicts, then, seem to express 
personalised criticisms end warnings rather than principles of 
universal application, can conscience be linked with justi-
ficatory reasons end principles in the way that moral "ought"-
judgments are? There are at leapt two indications that the 
answer must be "yes", end that Kolnei's account is essentially 
correct. 
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a) riheDrioritof'ustificxa EasLainaizlss. 
The personalised nature of conscience verdicts does 
not require the severance of all links with justificatory 
reasons end principles. If my conscience tells me that I was 
wrong to have that extra drink, there are implied reasons and 
principles backing that verdict (provided that conscience is 
not being used in its "irrational", reactive sense). For me to 
feel guilt end remorse for having had the extra drink (i.e. for 
me to have a "rational" conscience about it), there must be a 
body of reasons end principles which I accept as justificatory, 
end which go to make up my conscience. To quote Kolnei again, 
"morel qualities and rules ... are not a function of my con—
science but prior to it end constitutive of it."23 
This priority of justificatory rules is a logical 
priority which brings out e further important feature of 
"rational" conscience — that in its role of pronouncing verdicts, 
it is concerned not with the formulation or re—examination of 
rules and principles, but with the application of rules and 
principles which have already been eccepted.
24 
This feature is 
doubly significant for our analysis. 
Firstly it emphasises that conscience—verdicts are not 
passed arbitrarily upon a protesting end antagonistic offender 
by a judge upholding en alien set of standards. The verdicts 
represent the offender's own, previously accepted standards, 
Which he feels that he has transgressed without justification; 
these prior standards and principles are, to him at least, both 
justifiable and justificatory (though they might of course be 
judged otherwise, end his conscience thereby as being erroneous, 
by others). 
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Secondly the implied existence of previously accepted 
justificatory principles picks out clearly the more specific 
end personalised role of conscience—verdicts compared with that 
of morel judgment. Conscience—verdicts act as a bridge between 
the generality of prior, justificatory principles and the 
particularity of situations in which en individual finds him—
self. My conscience's function is not to formulate the principle 
that it is wrong to endanger the lives of other people, but to 
apply that previously accepted principle to my particular 
situation end to give the verdict that I was wrong to have that 
extra drink before driving home. 
There is then no incompatibility between "rational" 
conscience's concern with personal verdicts end criticisms and 
its concern with justificatory reasons end principles; indeed 
the two concerns are logically interdependent end together make 
up a large pert of whet we mean by "conscience". "Rational" 
conscience, however, also perforOs a second function which 
suggests even more strongly the backing of justificatory reasons. 
b) Prospective conscience—judgments  
One reason why we might initially doubt whether con—
science—verdicts imply the backing of justificatory reasons is 
that the guilt, shame and remorse caused by such verdicts are 
feelings elso associated with "irrational", reactive consciences, 
which lack justificatory support. Yet these feelings are 
appropriate, even necessary, consequences of "rational" 
conscience—verdicts to the effect that one hes not done what 
one ought to have done. (This point will be further developed 
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in the following chapter in connection with the criteria for 
"sincerely believing that one ought to do x".) 
Retrospective attribution of blame for morel lapses 
committed, however, is not the only function of "rational" con—
science. Thornes distinguishes between its retrospective end 
prospective functions, es follows:— 
"Our consciences ... judge both whet we have done in the pest 
end whet we propose to do in the future, but for whet we 
have done they also pass judgement upon us ... In its 
retrospective function conscience is intimately bound up 
with feelings of guilt end remorse, but this is not 
necessarily true of its prospective function. In its 
prospective function conscience discovers and reminds us 
of truths that ere true for every men."25 
Retrospectively, ungtUdar conscience pronounces verdicts 
end attributes blame; but prospectively it informs end instructs 
rather then rebukes, for one cannot be judged or blamed for whet 
one hes not yet done (unlessl as Thomas notes, we are rebuked for 
the intention of violating the morel law.)26 My conscience is 
thus not limited to rebuking me for having taken the extra drink; 
it can also tell me not to take the extra drink that is now or 
shortly being offered. The distinction is perhaps less clear—
cut then Thomas envisages, however, for a retrospective verdict 
will often refer to en incident which at the time involved a 
prospective judgment end instruction which were ignored. If 
conscience were not at the time overruled prospectively, there 
would be less reason for the attribution of blame and the feeling 
of guilt to result from a retrospective verdict. 
The distinction is nevertheless a useful one, and 
yields two further important implications which arise from the 
prospective function of conscience. Firstly, the justificatory 
backing of reasons end principles is even clearer here then in 
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the case of retrospective verdicts, as feelings of guilt and 
shame with their "irrational" overtones are not involved (given 
Thomas's proviso). Thomas even implies that prospective 
conscience—judgments are thereby more "cognitive" end 
"universeliseble" then retrospective verdicts,27 but there is 
no reason to suppose that prospective judgments and retro—
spective verdicts differ in their logical characteristics, 
apart from the letter's association with blame and guilt. In 
both cases previously accepted justificatory principles are 
applied to a particular situation end en individualised judgment 
is made. 
Secondly, the prospective function of conscience is of 
particular significance for akresia l which involves present and 
future actions rather then past ones. Retrospective verdicts 
are important in connection with the criteria for "sincere 
belief", as noted above, but the main problems of akrasia are 
set in the present ("I now believe that I ought to do t") and 
in the future("but em I going to do x?") The ease with which 
ekresie and its conflicts can be portrayed in terms of pro—
spective conscience—judgments ("my conscience tells me to do x, 
but ...") illustrates the close conceptual links that exist 
between conscience end ekresie, end indicates that an analysis 
of conscience cannot avoid throwing some light on the problems 
of ekresie. 
We may safely conclude, therefore, that "rational" 
conscience shares with "ought"—judgments the implied backing of 
justificatory reasons. These reasons derive from the previously 
accepted principles upon which retrospective verdicts end 
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prospective judgments are based. In both cases the role of 
conscience is to relate the justificatory reasons end generalised 
principles to a specific situation end to one's personal 
obligations end duties within that situation. (Whether these 
reasons end principles are in any sense "ultimately" justifiable 
because of their association with conscience, or whether one 
should view one's conscience as being possibly erroneous, are 
further questions of considerable complexity.28 However, the 
problem of erroneous conscience is not strictly relevant to 
akrasie, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter when 
criteria for akresia are examined.) 
(ii) "Conscience", motivation end countervailing factors 
Does "rational" conscience also reflect the distinction 
between justificatory and motivational factors, implied by 
"morel" (end "prectical")"oughts"? It seems clear that it must, 
for conscience can only operate when there is tension between 
obligation and inclination. Without the existence of counter—
vailing factors end tendencies, there is no job for conscience 
to do, prospectively or retrospectively. As Ryle puts it:— 
"Conscience has nothing to say when the really honest man 
is asked a question and when he has no temptation to 
deceive ... Conscience is awake only when there is .... 
conflict. Pangs or qualms of conscience can occur only 
when one of these dispositions is en operative moral 
principle 	 (And this "can ... only" is logical and not 
causal. )"29  
If my conscience tells me that I was wrong, or that I 
would be wrong, to do x, this presupposes that there were, or 
are, countervailing factors present disposing me to do other 
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than x. "Conscience is best understood," argues Martin, "as 
the centre of conflict between two things: morel rules ... and 
any of our tendencies to go against these rules."30 This con—
flict means that conscience must share another of the logical 
features of "ought" — implied uncertainty of outcome. 
(iii) "Conscience" end uncertainty of outcome. 
The outcome of conscience's prospective judgments end 
instructions are of necessity uncertain because of the counter—
vailing, motivational factors just mentioned. If these factors 
are strong enough to provoke en intervention by conscience, they 
may also be strong enough to overrule conscience's dictates. 
The very fact that conscience operates prospectively through 
the medium of instructions, warnings end commands shows that it 
is fighting an uphill battle of uncertain outcome, for 
instructions, warnings and commends are only needed in cases 
where possible or probable counter—tendencies have to be 
opposed. 
As for retrospective verdicts, these presuppose not 
merely uncertainty of outcome but an indubitable failure to live 
up to the standards which conscience requires (though in some 
cases no explicit prospective judgment may have been made at 
the time). Retrospective verdicts, then, closely resemble 
"ought—to—have" sentences, which have already been shown in 
Section 1, B, to imply not merely uncertainty of outcome, but 
(normally) certainty of non—fulfilment. My conscience blames 
me retrospectively for not having done whet I ought to have 
done (or for having done whet I ought not to have done). If I 
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had done what I ought to have done, no blame or guilt can 
result end conscience has no work to do. 
(iv) "Conscience", prescriptivity and  authority 
In Section 1 a number of senses were reviewed in which 
"oughts" might or might not be said to be "prescriptive". 
Hare's interpretation of prescriptivity in terms of "assent to 
first—person imperatives" was rejected, but it was allowed that 
"morel oughts" refer to obligations, which ere not purely 
descriptive but which impinge authoritatively upon the agent 
who recognises them as such, end require him to act appropriately. 
The metaphors which we use to depict the activities of 
conscience suggest that it too is "prescriptive" in this sense. 
Fotion remarks how we picture our consciences as demanding, 
telling, driving, nagging, commanding end coercing: "Conscience 
may or may not be authoritative, but it is (psychologically) 
authoritarian."31 In so far as "rational" conscience tells us 
what it was, or is, right or wrong for us to do, it is clearly 
prescriptive in both its retrospective end prospective roles, 
though it can only be "action—guidingl of course, prospectively, 
when the action has not yet taken place. Even "irrational" 
conscience qualifies as being prescriptive in Fotion's 
"authoritarian" sense, for it nags end coerces its victim by 
inflicting feelings of guilt end anxiety upon him for reasons 
of which he is not consciously aware. Conscience is thus 
"authoritarian" in both its "rational" end "irrational" forms, 
but it is the sense in which "rational" conscience is also 
"authoritative" that is of most relevance to a discussion of 
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its prescriptivity. 
The authority of conscience is a central feature of 
Butler's famous account: 
"... you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, 
without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. 
This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the 
faculty itself: and, to preside and govern, from the very 
economy and constitution of men, belongs to it. Had it 
strength, as it has right; had it power as it has manifest 
authority; it would absolutely govern the world."32  
Butler here raises crucial questions about the nature 
of conscience's authority and consequently of its prescripti—
vity. As Beier asks, "Is it authoritative the way an authority 
on marsupials is or the way a ticket inspector is?"33 Three 
possible aspects of conscience's authority can be distinguished, 
as follows. 
1. Conscience acts as en obvious authority in Fotion's 
"authoritarian" sense, described above: i.e. it functions 
both retrospectively and prospectively by commanding, telling, 
directing, superintending, etc. 
2. Its implied backing of justificatory reasohB end principles 
also makes "rational" conscience an authority on morel 
matters affecting the owner of the conscience. We recognise 
its pronouncements end instructions as authoritative and 
thereby valid, because we have previously accepted the 
standards on which they are based. The guilt and remorse 
which result from disobeying our conscience is itself 
evidence of the esteem in which we hold it as a moral 
authority, (though whether or not we should hold it to be 
an absolute end unquestionable authority will depend upon 
our views concerning its possible erroneousness). 
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3. Despite its authoritarianism (1) end its moral euthorite—
tiveness (2), "rational" conscience does not always exercise 
actual, overriding euthority, es Butler recognises in his 
peroretion — "Had it strength as it hes right; had it 
power, es it hes manifest authority; it 'mould absolutely 
govern the world." Strength end power do not necessarily 
eccompeny euthoriterien or euthoritetive directions. I may 
"hear" conscience's prospective instructions, recognise them 
es morelly authoritative, yet still (when the chips ere down) 
disobey those directions and thereby incur blame and guilt. 
Whether or not, conscience cen be erroneous, it can certainly 
be ineffectuell to use Kolnei's term: "It is bed, but quite 
possible, that my sense of e morel obligation should be out—
weighed by non—morel concerns (end awareness of this possi—
bility lies et the root of Conscience)."34 
In practice, then, the morel authority of conscience's 
prospective directions mey be overriden end made ineffectuel in 
the seme wey thet "morel oughts" mey be. These directions may 
often be psychologicelly dominant, but they cannot always be, 
for if we elweys did whet our consciences told us, conscience 
would be deprived of half of its function — the pronouncing of 
retrospettive verdicts and the essigintent of blame. Non—morel 
consideretions mey et times prove motivetionelly more potent 
then morel ones, despite conscience's prescriptive euthoritatienism 
end euthoritetiveness. 
This section hes exemined how the phenomenon of con—
science in both its prospective end retrospective roles reflects 
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end further illuminates the logical features of "ought" dis—
cussed in Section 1. In conclusion it will now be argued that 
our experience of conscience, together with the conceptual 
network we use to describe it, constitutes a further defence 
against claims, such as Socrates' and Hare's, that ekresia is 
logically end empirically impossible. 
B. "Conscience" and ekresie 
The concept of conscience is explanatory as well as 
descriptive. It describes certain aspects of our experience as 
moral judges end morel agents, end it also attempts to explain 
this experience by invoking the notion of a moral faculty acting 
as a judge end guardian, whose function is both to pronounce 
verdicts on -oast misdemeanours, thus inflicting feelings of 
guilt end remorse, and to warn against proposed or contemplated 
misdemeanours which would violate our previously accepted 
standards end principles. 
The metaphorical nature of this explanation (with its 
images of judges pronouncing end guardians dictating) may create 
some conceptual obscurity, but this cannot be used as evidence 
against the existence of the phenomena which give rise to the 
attempted explanation. We do feel guilt, shame and remorse when 
we realise that we have acted against our morel principles, and 
we do feel apprehension end unease when we contemplate performing 
such en action. The conceptual network within which "conscience" 
is located describes etiperiences of which all moral agents are 
aware, because they are moral agents:— feelings of guilt end 
remorse, temptations resisted or succumbed to, recognition of 
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obligations and duties which may appear distasteful, failure 
to live up to one's own standards, responsibility for having 
voted badly, and so on. 
The arguments for the logical possibility of akrasiel 
therefore, do not depend solely upon linguistic features of 
'sought" (or of "conscience"), for these features can only be 
identified in so far as they serve to reflect end classify our 
experience of the difficulties which actually confront us in 
our morel judgments end actions. The logical geography of 
"conscience" end its related concepts is as it is because the 
moral life is as it is — often difficult to live. An inquiry 
into "conscience" is indeed, to use Hare's phrase yet again, 
"et one end the same time about language and about what happens." 
Whet happens in the case of conscience's activities seems con—
clusive evidence for the possible (indeed likely) occurrence of 
ekresie. 
In view of this evidence it is significant that both 
Socrates end Here virtually ignore "conscience" and its activities, 
pertly perhaps because of the difficulties which it creates for 
their theses. More fundamental reasons for the omission can 
also be deduced from their respective positions, and these throw 
further light upon the connections between conscience and akresie. 
(i) Socrates' emphasis upon self—knowledge suggests one such 
reason. If moral decisions are merely a matter of "weighing 
pleasures against pleasures, pains against pains, and 
pleasures against pains" in order to calculate what will 
yield the greatest ultimate satisfaction for oneself, then 
presumably one is unlikely to decide upon a course of action 
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knowing that it will inflict feelings of guilt end remorse 
(i.e. "pain") upon oneself. Acting against one's con—
science, then, is to choose a "painful" option, which, 
according to Socrates, no men ever does except through 
ignorance end miscalculation. The phenomena of conscience, 
temptation, guilt end remorse, however, cannot convincingly 
be described or explained in terms of intellectual mis—
calculation end inadequate self—knowledge, as was noted in 
Chapter II. In yielding to temptation end going against 
our conscience, we feel guilty of violating the authority 
of morel requirements; our feelings of guilt cannot be 
attributed to a failure in .calculating our future satis—
faction, because we could not at the time be aware that we 
were guilty of miscalculation. The Socratic account of 
self—knowledge cannot accommodate the phenomena of con—
science. 
The Socratic (or Platonic) account of ideal knowledge 
is similarly irreconcilable with conscience. According 
to the Theory of Ideas, as outlined in Chapter II, a man 
only really "knows" what is good after he has reached the 
ultimate stage of apprehending the Idea of the Good itself, 
which is set at the apex of the hierarchy of Ideas giving 
"reality and being" to all the others. Gaining moral 
knowledge is thus a mystical, even religious, process, 
involving long end arduous preparatory discipline and 
culminating in an ineffable end unforgettable revelation. 
Religious or quasi—religious revelations of this kind pro—
duce conversion end commitment, faith end certainty — not 
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doubt end temptation. The question did not arise for Paul, 
following his experience on the road to Damascus135 as to 
whether he ought now to believe in God end become a 
Christian, despite his previous belief that it was his 
religious duty to persecute Christianity. Similarly it 
would be uhthinkeble for Plato's philosopher—king, once 
having undergone the revelatory experience of "knowing the 
Good", to be afflicted by crises of conscience concerning 
what it was right for him to do; real knowledge is not a 
sieve, to be "pushed around" like this. However, as was 
noted earlier, this account of moral knowledge is highly 
stipulative end dependent upon a questionable, meta—
physical theory; furthermore it can claim only that it is 
psychologically, and not logically, impossible for a man 
who "knows the good" to be tempted to act otherwise. 
Both the "self—knowledge" strand and the"ideal 
knowledge" strand of Socrates' thought suggest reasons for 
the lack of attention paid to conscience in his account of 
moral judgment end action; yet neither strand succeeds in 
presenting a convincing and comprehensive account, and con—
science thus remains a phenomenon to be taken note of, not 
ignored as if it were non—existent. 
(ii) litre likewise devotes remarkably little attention to con—
science, although he does (grudgingly) allow that guilt 
feelings may indicate that a person has not done whet he 
thinks he ought (L.M. 11.2) end may serve to preserve the 
appearance of prescriptive universality in cases of "back— 
sliding" (P.R. 5.6). At first sight this lack of attention 
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appears odd in view of his "imperativist" view of morel 
language, for "assenting to first—person commends" suggests 
a process not unlike obeying the dictates of conscience. 
Why then does Here's account of prescriptivity make so 
little reference to the role of conscience in Ooral judg—
ment end decision—making? The key to this puzzle is 
provided by some of Hare's terminologiesl oddities examined 
earlier, which in turn throw further light upon his whole 
morel theory. 
Hare's notion of "assenting to first—person com—
mends "suggests a form of morel individualism which is at 
variance with the view of conscience as a quasi—external 
authority issuing second—person commends. It was argued 
in Chapter II that a "first—person commend" is strictly 
speaking self—contradictory; if what Here calls "the 
curious metaphor of the divided self" is adopted, the 
imperatives remain, logically end grammatically, second—
person (i.e. the "higher self" issuing commands to the 
"lower self"). By employing the (incoherent) notion of a 
"first—person command", translated as "Let me do x", or 
"Let me try doing x", Hare produces a picture of morel 
judgment end decision very different from that suggested 
by the model of "conscience" as the source of second—person 
commands issued to a possibly recalcitrant "lower self". 
Here's picture is of an individual forming his own 
morel judgments, to which he automatically "assents" because 
he has made them. If he has himself decided upon them, why 
should he not also act upon them? The individual "looks 
for" suitable moral judgments and "finds" suitable moral 
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ections to perform. The "conscience" model, on the other 
hand, portreys the individual es one confronted by the 
impersonal, morel authority of rules end principles, which 
may become accepted end "internalised", but which remain 
reliant for their basis of justification upon a source 
"external" to the individual. "Assent" does not necessarily 
follow from this confrontation, because the "external" 
basis of conscience's authority creates the possibility, 
even the likelihood, of conflict end temptation. 
The individualistic nature of Here's morel theory, 
therefore, is revealed in his use of such terminology as 
"assenting to first—person commands". One consequence of 
this theory is that conscience and its related concepts are 
largely ignored. Like Socrates, Here is forced to disregard 
"what happens" in the morel life (e.g. the activities of 
conscience) because of distortions caused by a stipuletive 
theoretical interpretation of that life. The close logical 
connection between conscience and ekrasie compels both 
Socrates end Hare to turn a blind eye to the former in order 
to maintain the logical impossibility of the letter. 
Conclusion 
This section has examined certain logical features of 
"oughts" end also certain aspects of "conscience". Taken 
together, these two elements seem sufficient to demonstrate the 
logical end empirical possibility of akresie, despite the argu—
ments of Socrates end Here. To claim that akresie can and does 
occur, however, is not of course to show Ity or how it occurs, 
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though certain embryonic lines of epproech to the question of 
explenetion have already been indicated in places. These will 
be further developed in Chapters IV and V. 
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CHr PTER IV — INTERPRETA TIM; A LTD EXPLI TIUi OF 	 S IA  
The previous chapter ettempted to establish the 
logical end empirical possibility of e men thinking that he 
ought (in e "full—blooded" sense) to do x, but not in feet 
doing x, though eble to do so. The next questions to look et 
ere those of interpretation end explanation: what exactly is 
happening in such ceses, end how or why does it happen? 
Nefore considering these questions, however, some 
further clerificetion is needed of the central concepts under 
discussion. Reference hes alreedy frequently been made to the 
notions of ekresie, weakness of will, morel weakness, end not 
doing whet one thinks one ought to do. Clearly the relation—
ships end distinctions between these notions need to be explored, 
end possible criterie suggested in order to delineate more 
precisely the phenomenon thet is under investieation. 
1. Clerificetion of the Concept of Akresia  
A. Its Explahatory Function 
One mejor problem in attempting to define ek.resie is 
to avoid confusing the definition with e suggested explanation. 
Both Aristotle and Here ere guilty in this respect, eech 
apparently seduced by the word's etymological roots. Aristotle 
defines the "ekretes" es one who "knowing that what he does is 
bed, does it es e result of pessioh",1 while Here states thet 
ekresie is en "inability to reelise our ideals ... literally 
'not being strong enough' (sc. to control oneself)."2 
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Both of these accounts offer en explanation of ekrasie 
as pert of its meaning. Here suggests that ekresia involves en 
inability to est in a certain way because of e lack of strength 
end self—control. He goes on to identify ekresia directly with 
both "morel weakness" end "weakness of will", 3 end as we have 
seen concludes that "the typical case of morel weakness ... is a 
case of 'ought but cen't" ,4 thereby introducing the notion of 
"psychological impossibility". 
This argument does little to clarify the concept of 
ekresie as it 
(i) confuses definition with explanation, 
(ii) fails to consider whether any distinctions should 
be drawn between ekresie, morel weakness, end weak—
ness of will, 
end (iii) presents "ought but can't" as the typical case of 
morel weakness, although (es was argued in Chapter II, 
Section 3) it seems highly doubtful whether a case of 
"ought but can't", or psychological impossibility, is 
e case of moral weakness at all, let alone a typical 
one. 
liristotle, whose account will be examined later in more 
detail as a possible explanation of ekrasia, offers en even more 
specific explanation in the course of his definition. The 
IIekretes", or incontinent men, is said to act "es a result of 
pession";5 incontinent people "must be said to be in e similar  
condition to men asleep, mad or drunk" ;6 the incontinent man 
pursues "bodily pleasures", though thinking that he ought not to 
do so;7 the incontinent men fails to overcome the temptations of 
138. 
pleasure.8 Akresie for Aristotle, then, by definition involves 
the influence of passions, pleasures and temptations, and in its 
central use refers to bodily pleasures connected with food and 
sex — other uses are "called incontinence by a metaphor."9  
For the sake of clarity, however, it is important to 
reach a definition of akresie that is, as far as possible, 
independent of any assumed explanation, though it is easy to see 
why Aristotle, Here end others have failed to do this. Akresie, 
weakness of will and moral weakness are themselves to a large 
degree explanatory rather than descriptive concepts. Each implies  
that the phenomena to which it refers are to be explained in 
terms of some kind of weakness, a lack of strength, power or 
control. "Weakness of will" contains, self—evidently, the 
explanatory notion of "will", the strength or weakness of which, 
it is implied, will influence action; "ekresia" literally 
suggests a lack. or absence (the prefix a—) of power or command 
over oneself; while "moral weakness" similarly suggests,a lack 
of moral strength or control. Each of these concepts then offers 
an implicit explanation of a negative kind: something is thought 
to be lacking, absent or not strong enough. 
The influence of these implicit explanations upon dis—
cussion of examples which they are allegedly merely describing 
has been considerable. It is clearly difficult to examine 
examples of something labelled "weakness of will" with en open 
mind, unaffected by preconceived assumptions that explanations 
of the examples are to be sought in terms of the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of "the will". Such explanations may turn out to 
be adequate (they will in fact be considered later in this 
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chapter), but it is inadmissible to write them in initially to 
the definition end description of the phenomena requiring 
explanation. Whet must be done is to define the phenomena which 
seem to fall within the orbit of akrasia, weakness of will end 
moral weakness, drawing distinctions between these concepts if 
necessary, end then to consider possible explanations of the 
phenomena. 
Firstly, whet exactly are we trying to define? Do 
these concepts refer to a disposition, habit or character trait, 
or to an event or occurrence? However we define the concepts, 
they would seem to fell necessarily into the letter category and 
only contingently into the former, for there is no reason why a 
men should not be "incontinent", weak—willed or morally weak on 
one unique occasion alone. Psychologically it may be more likely 
that people develop the tendency to behave frequently in this sort 
of way, rather then once only or very seldom, but there is no 
logical necessity about this. Indeed, the most vivid (and per—
haps interesting) examples of akrasia, weakness of will or moral 
weakness may well be those that are unique or "out of character", 
(for example, the faithful husband who yields just once to the 
charms of another women). 
Our task, therefore, is to describe a type of event or 
occurrence, which may or may not be repeated, in such a way as 
toJavoid prejudging the question of explanation. Whet type of 
event is involved, and do akrasia, weakness of will end moral 
weakness all refer to the same type of event? 
Matthews' list of examples, which she uses to delimit 
the concepts of moral weakness end weakness of will (already 
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referred to in Chapter II, Section 3) provides a useful sterting—
point.10  She suggests end illustrates the following categories 
putting off the evil moment, backsliding, irresolution, being 
persuaded against one's better judgement, being too easily dis—
couraged, being unable to bring oneself to do something, being 
overcome with desire or being unable to resist the temptation, 
and failure to control one's anger — end' claims that all except 
the lest would usually be regarded as cases of weakness of will, 
and that all except the lest end perhaps the first could be 
regarded as cases of moral weakness.11 
Unfortunately, however, she does not attempt to drew 
any distinctions between the two concepts, apart from the 
unexplained suggestion that putting off the evil moment might 
qualify as a case of weakness of will but not of morel weakness. 
She stresses that both terms imply morel censure and that their 
main function is morel appraisal — "they are used to give blame—
type judgements about e situation rather then either descriptions 
or explanations of a phenomenon or range of phenomena."12 If 
this were in fact the case, then our search for a descriptive 
definition would be doomed to failure, but Matthews immediately 
qualifies this statement by going on to suggest elaborate 
descriptive criteria for weakness of will, which will be con—
sidered shortly. 
Is Matthews' emphasis upon morel censure end morel 
appraisal justified? Clearly these concepts are often used to 
convey moral censure, but Matthews goes so far as to suggest that 
this morel censure is logically prior to their other functions — 
"we do not use them to describe what happened, end then blame 
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the men for it". Possibly not, but this is not because the 
bleme is logically prior to the description; it is because the 
concepts basically ere not descriptive concepts, but rather, as 
hes just been argued, explanatory concepts. It is the built—in 
explanation that gites rise to blame end censure (i.e. that there 
is a leek or weakness of something which is thought morally 
valuable.) Morel °ensure is thus the logical result of an 
explenetion in terms of morel weakness, end the explanatory 
function of these concepts is logically prior to their normative 
function. 
This analysis explains one puzzling feature of weakness 
of will, end also the reason for its frequent identification with 
morel weakness. Many examples of what might be celled weakness 
of will do not, es far as description is concerned, appear to 
provide grounds for morel censure. My car is dirty end I feel 
that I ought to wash it, but I keep "putting off the evil moment" 
of getting the hose pipe out. Now washing my car is not in itedf 
a morally praiseworthy or blameworthy activity; in certain con—
texts it could be appraised in either way (e.g. if I were doing 
it on the one hand for reasons of road safety, or on the other in 
order to impress the neighbours), but normally it is not en 
activity that is subjected to morel appraisal. Yet in describing 
my failure to wash my car in terms of "putting off the evil 
moment" (or as "irresolution", "being persuaded against one's 
better judgment", or "being too easily discouraged" — several of 
Matthews' categories could be applicable here), weakness of will 
is implied and a morel query consequently raised about my 
behaviour. The implicit explenetion of my behaviour, not the 
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mere description of it, hes invited morel eppreisel. In being 
classified es a case of weakness of 	 my initially non—moral 
behaviour hes ecquired morel overtones and thus become assimi— 
lated to e case of morel weakness. 
A more extreme end paradoxical example of this process 
is where the action thet is contemplated but not performed is 
considered to be not non—moral but immoral. I conceive e hatred 
for my neighbour who keeps his car much cleaner then I do mine, 
end determine to throw a bucket of mud over his car one derk 
night. 4s in the previous example, however, I may put off the 
evil moment, be irresolute, be persuaded egeinst my judgment, be 
too easily discouraged, or be unable to bring myself to do the 
deed (to use Matthews' categories again), with the result thet my 
neighbour's car remeins unsullied. The contempleted action in 
this case is one that would normally be considered blameworthy, 
but am I also to be held doubly blameworthy on grounds of weakness 
of will end morel weakness for not having performed a blameworthy 
action? 
This paradox arises from the process described in the 
first example. The description of the event (or non—event) in 
terms of putting off the evil moment, irresolution etc. invites 
explanatory classification as a case of weakness of will, which 
in turn suggests blameworthiness in terms of morel weakness; the 
explanatory force of "weakness of will" provides prime facie grounds 
for morel censure end a charge of morel weakness. This is pre— 
sumably why we tend, to some extent, to admire such character— 
istics as resolution, persistence, determination and strength of 
purpose, even when exhibited by dictators and criminals. Such 
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people do what they resolve to do end thereby avoid morel censure 
on the grounds of moral weakness, though they may well incur 
censure on other grounds. 
The relationship between the concepts of ekresie, week— 
nets of will end morel weakness, therefore, looks to be a very 
close one. r 11 three have more of en explanatory then a des—
criptive function, but the moral appraisal occasioned by the 
explanation is implicit in ekresia end weakness of will, while 
explicit in morel weakness. Strictly speaking, then, it might 
be possible to say that my failure to throw mud over my neigh—
bour's car was a case of weakness of will (or akrasie), but not 
of morel weakness. The implicit morel censure in weakness of 
will, however, is so strong that it is doubtful whether this 
distinction could be upheld. My failure could still be said to 
reflect a "character—flaw" (i.e. a lack. of resolution), which 
might well be described as a form of morel weakness. 
For the purpose of this study, therefore, the three 
concepts will be held to be synonomous, though the important 
distinction between morel, non—moral end immoral contexts of 
behaviour will be examined later. For convenience' sake the 
term "ekrasia", rather then weakness of will or morel weakness, 
will generally be used from now on, but this is not to be inter—
preted in the narrow 1?ristotelien sense. Exactly how it is to 
be interpreted is the next question to consider. (The person 
who is guilty of ekresia will henceforth be labelled "ekrasiecu l 
but this does not imply necessarily that he has any disposition 
or tendency  to act in this way; as was noted above, one might 
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be ekresiec only once ih e lifetime.) 
B. Descriptive Criteria 
The explanatory function of ekresie end its related 
concepts hes been shown to IA logically prior to the normative 
(or "morel censure") function. Prior to explanation, however, 
there must be something to be explained, something which pre—
sumably can be described. lAresie seems to cover E wide range 
of beheviour; the concept is polymorphous in that it cannot 
be identified with any one specific cotton, activity or type of 
beheviour. Whet then are the possible criteria by which we might 
characterise en incident es en instance of ekresie? 
(i) Inconsistency criterion 
Lt the centre of the concept lies the notion of incon—
sistency. If there is no inconsistency between whet I do end 
whet I think. I ought to do, then the question of ekresie does not 
erise. I cannot be considered guilty of Ekrasie if:— 
(e) I do whet I think. I ought to do, (e.g. give up 
smoking when I think that I ought to give up smoking). 
(b) I do not think that I ought not to do whet I do, 
(e.g. tell e lie when I do not think that I ought not to 
tell e lie). 
This frees from charges of ekresie both the morally 
resolute end the immorally resolute. The dedicated mtster—
driminel who deliberates, forms intentions and implements them 
is not open to charges of ekresie because there is no incon—
sistency between his decisions end his actions. 
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But whet sort of inconsistency is involved in cases of 
akrasie? Presumably the inconsistency is in some way between a 
person's "ought"—judgments on the one hand, and his actions on 
the other. This inconsistency must also be contemporaneous; 
for example, a change of mind could occur between the initial 
"ought"—judgment and the eventual action, but this would not pro—
vide an instance of ekresie if at the time of acting (or failing 
to act) there was no inconsistency. nkresia then seems to refer 
to a particular state of mind in which a person acts or fails to 
act; while doing x, or deciding to do x, one must sincerely 
believe, think or feel that one ought not to be doing x or 
deciding to do x. ("Ought" here is to be taken "full—bloodedly" 
end not in Here's sense of a statement of psychological or socio—
logical fact.) 
"noting" is not necessarily to be interpreted as overt 
behaviour, for akrasia may also refer to failures which occur in 
the making of judgments and decisions. I may believe that I out 
to give careful thought to a particular problem before deciding 
what action to take or what attitude to adopt, yet through lazi—
ness, indifference or inattention fail to put the mental effort 
which I believe I ought to put into a consideration of the question. 
The action which I finally take will not be at variance with my 
"ought"—judgment, for I have not bothered to work out such a 
judgment, though I believe that I ought to have done, but I could 
still be held guilty of ekrasia in having failed to "do" (at the 
intellectual level) whet I believed I ought to do. A similar, 
but strictly "non—moral" form of intellectual akrasie can also 
occur, whereby the agent, working within en academic discipline, 
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is slipshod in his thinking end reasoning and eccordingly pro—
duces unsound results. Such e person's "action" (e.g. publishing 
his results, giving e lecture, etc.) mey not itself be et 
variance with any "ought"—judgment of his, but ekresie may well 
have occurred et the earlier "intellectual" stege, when he 
omitted to make his thinking end reasoning es rigorous as he 
believed he ought. Intellectual failure then, of both the morel 
end non—moral veriety must be included within en overall account 
of ekresie, and "acting" will henceforth be taken to encompass 
elso the intellectual activities involved in, for example, con—
sideting factors, weighing up evidence, working out enswers, 
reesoning to conclusions, interpreting end applying principles, 
end forming decisions. 
The possibility of intellectual ekrasie of this kind 
invites e general objection to the criterion of contemporaneous 
inconsistency. Does the ekresiec need to be consciously ewere 
of whet he believes he ought to do et the time when he fails to 
do it, or does he more typically rail to reech en explicit 
"ought"—judgment by deliberately ignoring factors which (he knows) 
would otherwise present themselves es relevant to his decision 
about whet he ought to do? If the letter is more commonly the 
ease, is not the contemporaneity requirement too strong, es the 
ekresiec et the time of acting is not consciously aware of en 
obligation to est otherwise for he hes contrited to be ignorent 
of that obligetion? 
This objection cen be countered, however, by noting 
that in such cases (which need not be thought of es particularly 
"typicel") there must still have been, prior to the action itself, 
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e conscious ewereness of the inconsistency between whet the 
egent believed he ought to do (i.e. consider ell the relevant 
fectors) end whet he actually did (i.e. allowed the relevant 
fectors to be obscured and ignored). In such ceses ekresie con 
properly be said to occur not et the time of the action itself 
(when there is no contemporeneous inconsistency), but et the 
time when the egent foiled to perform the intellectual activities 
which he believed end was consciously ewere that he ought to per—
form. The possibility of intellectual ekresie thus preserves 
rather then destroys the criterion of contemporaneous inconsistency. 
This criterion elso raises the further question of 
retrospective assessments of ekresie. Metthewsl3 seems to think 
that her cetegories of irresolution, being persuaded ogeinst one's 
better judgment and being too eesily discoureged con provide 
instances of ekresie by retrospective enelysis:— 
e) Irresolution consists in deciding or resolving to do some— 
thing and then "looking et the situetion egein from e different 
angle, considering counter—reasons end aims end principles 
which militate against the original decision or resolve." 
This, according to Matthews, could count as weakness of will 
"if one then thinks that one wes right in the first place ... 
even if one hes not done anything contrary to the decision 
or resolution, nor ellen delayed doing something in accordance 
with it." 
b) In being persuaded against one's better judgment, one is led 
"to consider the whole situetion differently, end in con—
sequence to do something which one leter considers wrong ..." 
charge of weakness is then possible, Matthews ergues, "for 
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being influenced by insufficient reesons, which only seemed 
sufficient et the time." 
c) In being too easily discouraged, one is put off one's resolve 
"by thoughts of how herd it is end how unlikely one is to 
succeed", but comes leter to realise "that one might well 
have succeeded if only one hed not been so defeatist." Again 
Yetthews thinks that this allows e cherge of 'lack of will—
power". 
These three examples challenge the suggestion that 
ekresie necessarily involves whet hes been labelled contemporaneous 
inconsistency; retrospective blame or guilt is claimed to be en 
adequate substitute. But is letthews justified in extending the 
concept thus far? 
In e), if one's action results from "looking et the 
situation again from e different angle, considering counter—
reesons end aims end principles", how can this apparently intelli—
gent re—appraisal count es en example of ekresie? The fact that 
one later thinks that one may 'neve been wrong is irrelevant. A 
later judgment is not necessarily e superior one, and even if it 
were, the appropriate cherge would not be one of ekrasie but of 
misjudgment, shortsi,ghtedness or inattention to relevant con—
sideretions. 
Similarly in b14 "being influenced by insufficient 
reesons, which only seemed sufficient et the time" cannot con—
stitute e case of ekresie if the reesons did in feet seem 
sufficient et the time. If et the time of ecting one considers 
that there ere sufficient reesons for that action, one may leter 
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in the light of subsequent events be blamed, or blame oneself, 
for having been wrong or made a mistake, but as in a) the 
appropriate charge is not one of akresie. 
In c) a parallel argument applies; if one comes to 
believe that one's task is so hard that one is very unlikely to 
succeed, it is not week—willed but realistic to accept that 
assessment end act on it. Later one may decide, rightly or 
wrongly, that the assessment was unsound, but this again implies 
e defect in judgment (possibly deserving morel censure); a charge 
of ekresia is again inappropriate. 
In each of these cases the grounds for censure would 
derive from the unsoundness of the judgment upon which the person 
acted, or failed to act. This type of censure is not that with 
which we normally associate the notions of moral weakness or 
weakness of will. The person in each of the three cases could 
be said to have "acted in good faith" — i.e. at the time of acting, 
or failing to act, he thought that he was doing the right thing — 
whereas the distinctive feature of ekresie is that the agent is 
not "acting in good faith", for he acts, or fails to act, despite 
his belief that there are good reasons why he should do otherwise. 
The distinction between retrospective blame end con—
temporaneous inconsistency' can be further sharpened by referring 
back to the two functions of conscience, discussed in Chapter III::- 
1) In pronouncing retrospective verdicts, conscience assigns 
blame for a pest misdemeanour which 
a) it may have warned against at the time, 
or b) it may not have warned against et the time. 
2) In instructing whet ought to be done, conscience presents the 
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case for duty end obligation in opposition to possible 
counter—inclinations. 
Instances of le) constitute clear cases of ekresie, es 
do instances of 2) if the counter—inclinations happen to win the 
day. But instances of lb) come into a different category, for 
the morel disapproval here is directed solely against the act 
thet wes committed or omitted, end not against any weakness of 
will or failure to ect on one's principles — et the time there 
was no such weekness or failure. If my conscience now tells me 
that I wer, wrong to put the housekeeping money on e horse lest 
week, though et the time it wes silent because the venture seemed 
e justifieble one in the circumstances (e.g. the tip wes from e 
reliable source, end the housekeeping money was insufficient to 
pey the bills es it stood), it is the recklessness of my action, 
now seen with the benefit of hindsight, that is under censure, 
not my weakness of will in felling to do whet I believed I ought 
to do. Yet I may feel just es much remorse for my recklessness 
es I would have done in different circumstances for my weakness. 
Feelings of remorse and guilt, then, do not necessarily 
signify that ekresie hes occurred. They ere, however, important 
in the enalysis of akresie l in connection with the genuineness of 
the inconsistency end the sincerity of the "ought"—judgment. The 
arguments in favour of the logical impossibility of ekresie that 
have already been examined demand e connection between "ought" 
end "shell" so tight that it becomes en analytic truth that one 
always does whet one sincerely believes one ought to do (unless 
prevented). Acting on one's beliefs is undeniably the surest 
test of the sincerity of those beliefs, but if the logicel 
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impossibility of ekresie is challenged and the connection between 
"ought" end "shell" loosened, other criteria for sincerity end 
thus for genuine inconsistency ere needed. Such criteria tend to 
centre around the notions of remorse end guilt. 
Some examples of these alternative criteria were 
mentioned in Chapter III, Section 3. Here admits (somewhat 
surprisingly in view of his overall thesis) that if e Person 
does not do something, but the omission is eccompenied by feelings 
of guilt etc., we normally sey that he hes not done whet he thinks 
he ought; Gardiner specks of "e host of considerations, behavioural 
end non-beheviourel" which ere relevant in determining the sin-
cerity of e person's morel beliefs, including feelings of guilt, 
shame, remorse end uneese; while Horsburgh also suggests es 
criteria, remorse, guilt end repentance, claiming that intense 
remorse can sometimes be better evidence for sincere belief then 
mere conformity. 
Feelings of remorse and guilt, therefore, seem obvious 
cendidetes es possible alternetive criteria for sincere belief 
end genuine inconsistency. Such feelings reflect the morel 
authority end justificatory backing of morel "oughts", which the 
ekresiec recognises es velid and which thus cause him uneese when 
he realises that he is violeting them. His uneese is e merk of 
the esteem in which he sincerely holds them. 
There ere dengers, though, in plecing undue weight upon 
criteria such es remorse. This is because the action-requirement 
is still ultimately not avoided. "The person who genuinely feels 
remorse", es Thelberg argues, " ... is e person who is disposed 
to act differently in the future."14 Displays of remorse repeated 
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indefinitely with no corresponding attempt to mend one's ways 
will soon fail to carry conviction. To rely wholly upon remorse, 
then, es en alternative criterion to action in en attempt to 
defend the logical possibility of akresie is self—defeating, 
because remorse itself requires eventual action if it is to be 
counted es genuine. This does not mean, however, that remorse 
cannot be used es e possible criterion of sincere belief on 
particular occasion when that belief was not acted upon, provided 
that there is some reason to believe that the person is "disposed 
to act differently in future". 
If feelings of remorse do not provide a sufficient, 
alternative criterion for sincere belief, we must look to 
Gerdiner's suggestion of en (unspecified) "host of considerations, 
behavioural end non—behavioural". Sincere belief can be indicated 
by a wide variety of responses: lies about what one has done, 
attempted elaborate rationalisations, over—compensation for what 
appears a trivial error, unsolicited confessions, pleas for 
forgiveness end for "another chance", self—abasement or even 
self—sacrifice, embarrassment, hesitation, undue reticence or 
extreme bravado. Any of these might or might not be accompanied 
by pangs of remorse. 
We cannot, then, point to any one necessary or sufficient 
condition for the sincerity of a person's belief that he ought to 
do xl on occasions when-lhe does not do x. Different considerations 
will apply in different oases, end where the considerations are 
"non—behavioural", it may well be impossible for an observer to 
determine et the time the sincerity or insincerity of another 
person's morel beliefs. The complexity and range of these 
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conditions, however, is no reason for ruling out everything 
except the action criterion, thus saddling ourselves with the 
doctrine that all men necessarily do what they believe they 
ought to do. 
Akresia therefore involves contemporaneous inconsistency 
between judgment end action, between a sincere belief that one 
ought to do x and e failure in practice to do x. The exact 
nature of this inconsistency will be discussed more fully when 
possible explanations of ekresie ere considered later in this 
chapter end in Chapter V. 
Decision Criterion 
Cen the inconsistency criterion be given more specific 
content by suggesting e further necessary condition involving the 
making of e decision or resolve? The examples of akrasia so far 
discussed might lead one to suppose that the paradigm case is 
where e person decides that he ought to do x (or that he ought not 
to do x), but nevertheless decides not to do x (or to do x). Are 
these two decisions then (or perhaps only one of them) e logically 
necessary element in cases of ekresie? 
Provided that no change of mind or revised judgment has 
occurred between the two decisions, they would certainly seem to 
provide e sufficient condition for akresie. Two such decisions 
would constitute one species of inconsistency, as described in 
(i), for without en intervening change of mind the two decisions 
must produce a judgment end en action that ere Et variance with 
each other. 
However, although this double—decision condition is 
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sufficient, it does not peer to be necessary. The first 
"judgmental" decision that 	 is not necessary in ell ceses of 
ekrasie, for in deciding to ect against one's principles, or 
against one's moral beliefs and sentiments, or against one's 
moral instincts, no initial, conscious, explicit decision that ... 
is required. I may find myself Feting against my principles etc. 
in telling the policemen e lie, without having previously decided 
explicitly that I ought to tell him the truth. We do not go 
through life continually rucking considered decisions that we 
ought (morally or practically) to do things. Very often we ere 
guided more or less unreflectively by our beliefs, ettitudes end 
hebits which we have built up over e long period end which free 
us from the chores of constant decision—meking. 
The second decision — the decision to ... or not to ... — 
is equally unnecessary. One need not decide not to do x; one may 
just not do it, or not force oneself to do it, or omit to do it, 
or let it slide. i:gein no conscious, explicit decision is 
required — unless it is maintained that psy ection or feilure to 
ect necessarily involves e prior "decision", so that one must 
have in feet "decided" to omit to do it, to let it slide etc. 
This argument, however, erbitrerily assumes e very tight con—
ceptuel link. between "ection" end "decision", end extends the 
concept of decision to e point where it ceases to be independently 
meeningful; it is also open to "infinite regress" objections, 
because presumably the ect of deciding would necessitate e prior 
ect of deciding, end so on. 
Furthermore, e conscious, explicit decision to do whet 
one believes one ought not to do is not merely en unnecessary 
requirement in cases of ekresie; it is probably untypical of 
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most cases. Such a decision constitutes en open admission of 
weakness and failure End en open invitation for reproach, blame 
end guilt, particularly in cases of moral akrasia. But, as will 
be elaborated in Chapter V, the morel ekresiec is not insensitive 
to morel considerations, for he sincerely holds moral beliefs 
which he thinks he ought to act upon. He will not, then, normally 
went to ley himself open to morel condemnation (from others or 
from his own conscience) by deliberately formulating a decision 
to act against whet he believes to be morally right. 
Neither an initial decision that ... nor a subsequent 
decision to ... is a necessary element in all cases of ekrasie, 
therefore, end although one or both types of decision may often 
be involved, the inconsistency that is typical of ekrasie cannot 
always be characterised in this way. Decision may, however, con—
tribute something to the clarification of ekrasie in connection 
with e further possible criterion. 
(iii) Ability Criterion end the Challenge of Actuelism 
Objections have already been put forward in Chapter II, 
Section 3 against explanations and definitions of akrasie in 
terms of "psychological impossibility". It follows from these 
objections that a men must have been physically end psychologically 
capable of acting otherwise, if his action or failure to act is 
properly to be described as a case of ekrasia. The alcoholic, 
the kleptomaniac, the drug addict end the manic depressive, in so 
far as they cannot act otherwise, do not exhibit weakness of will 
or moral weakness. Only free agents can be judged to be week—
willed or morally week; they have lime strength of will or morel 
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impetus, but not enough, end ere consequently held to be blame—
worthy. A complete leek of strength would be described es 
impotence, incapacity or paralysis; weakness implies a limited 
degree of strength, not e total leek of it. 
An ebility criterion, however, raises obvious end 
familiar difficulties concerning the interpretation of "could 
have done otherwise". When, if ever, can we say that e person 
could, or could not, have done otherwise, end how can we ever 
verify such a statement? Whet degree of determinism v.:re we 
prepared to allow in our explanations of human behaviour? 
It is not intended to devote a major section of this 
study to the problems of determinism. To examine fully the 
relationship of these problems to moral judgment and action and 
to morel education would require e separate thesis in its own 
right, end would upset the balance end emphases of this one. 
Accordingly, certain premises will be adopted but not fully argued 
in pieces. The account of action, for example, to be presented 
in the following chapter will assume that it is legitimate to 
speak of en agent being faced with e choice between alternative 
courses of action open to him; similarly, the distinction between 
ebility end inability to act otherwise will be assumed to be e 
valid end necessary one, which will feature prominently in the 
examination of suggested explanations of ekresia in the followigg 
section. 
Because, however, "ability to have acted otherwise" is 
here being proposed es a necessary condition of akresie, it is 
essentielet this point to consider, et least briefly, determinist 
claims that no one could in fact ever have acted otherwise — that 
only the actual was end is possible, and that it is therefore 
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wrong to suppose that I could have done x when I actually did y. 
This doctrine of ectuelism represents one formulation of the 
determinist principle of universal causation; if ell events, 
including human actions, have "causes", then conditions A, B, C 
which cause me to do x end not y also prevent me from doing y 
end not x — i.e. given the determining conditions I could not 
have acted otherwise. 
Any attempt et e complete refutation of ectuelism 
*Auld, for the reasons given above, be beyond the scope of this 
study. For present purposes it will suffice to list e number of 
counter—arguments which, while by no means constituting e com—
plete refutation, et least cast considerable doubt on the doctrine, 
end grant us e provisional licence to continue to use such phrases 
es "alternative courses of action" end "ability to have acted 
otherwise" without obvious logical incoherence. The counter—
arguments will be outlined under three headings: 
(e) common sense arguments 
(b) distinction arguments 
(c) linguistic arguments. 
(e) Commonsense Arguments egFinst Actuelism 
The most obvious counter—arguments are provided by 
"commonsense". As Koore ergued,15 the cleim that no one could 
ever have acted other then es he did conflicts with our common—
sense view that there is e clear distinction to be drawn between 
whet 2 person can and cannot do, or could and could not have done. 
To deny that I could have scratched my heed e minute ego simply 
on the grounds that I did not in fact do so does violence to our 
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established beliefs about action, freedom and possibility. 
Further weight is added to this commonsense argument 
when one considers the practical implications of ectualism. Why 
should we go to the trouble of engaging in lengthy end worrying 
deliberations, or attend courses on decision—making, or even 
bother to reflect upon our past and future actions, if we believe 
that only one "option" is ever open to us? If the actuelist 
counters this by maintaining that actuelism is compatible with 
deliberation in so far as the weighing of alternatives itself 
constitutes a major factor in determining action (i.e. whet we 
do could not be otherwise because of the deliberation which has 
preceded the action), he is still forced to apply his doctrine to 
that prior process of deliberation also. The ectualist's argu—
ment can thus be pushed further end further beck (i.e. we could 
not have acted otherwise, because we could not have decided other—
wise, because we could not have deliberated otherwise, because we 
could not have weighed the alternatives otherwise, because we 
could not have viewed the situation otherwise, etc.), but he 
cannot deny that deliberation must always be as "determined" as 
action. It is difficult to visualise how a person could con—
sistently hold such a view end continue to live a human life 
involving inter—personal relationships with other human beings; 
as Ayers puts it, "No one could consistently believe that, or 
act as if, there is never more than one course of action open to 
him. We can refrain from blaming, perhaps, but not from 
deciding." 
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StrewSon elaborates on the impracticality, indeed the 
impossibility, of living in accordance with the consequences of 
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deterministic doctrines. He argues that although we at times 
sdopt en "objective" attitude towards certain people in certain 
circumstances and thereby suspend our "ordinary, eactive" 
attitudes (e.g. when "seeing someone ... as warped or deranged 
or compulsive in behaviour or peculiarly unfortunate in his 
formative circumstances"),17 there must remain "the fact of our 
natural human commitment to ordinary inter personal attitudes 
(which is) part of the general framework of human life."18 
Furthermore, even if one were theoretically convinced of the 
truth of determinism, there would still be no point in con—
sidering whether it would therefore be more rational to adopt a 
universally "objective" attitude, because "it is useless to ask 
whether it would not be rational for us to do what it is not in 
our nature to (be able to) do."19('euthor's italics) 	 In other 
words, in so far as we are members of human society, we are 
unable to detach ourselves from the framework of attitudes which 
goes to make up that society, by acting consistently as if no 
one could ever behave other than as he does. 
A parallel argument against actualism and determinism 
could be developed, based on the "facts" of personal identity 
rather then of human society. The question, "Could I (ever) have 
acted otherwise?" might be shown to be meaningless because the 
concept of "I" implies en agent who is not to be wholly identified 
and equated with the sum of motives, psychological pressures end 
other "factors" that weigh with him. "I" must be more than and 
other than my motives, my inclinations, even my choices, if it 
is meaningful to speak of these as "mine". Lx1 view of a situation 
is that of a conscious agent, not that of en inanimate camera with 
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its film reacting to the stimulus of the light that is admitted; 
Liz view is the view that I see, end this seeing must be separable 
from the "I" who does it. Motives become reduced to mere stimuli 
only in cases, es Gallagher describes it, "where the 'I' retires 
to the vanishing point.'20 
 "To prove that freedom is unthinkable," 
he suggests, "the determinist would have to demonstrate the ooth—
plete emptiness of the word 'fl."21  
A number of commonsense arguments, including some of 
the above, share one important feature. They claim that deter—
minist and ectuelist doctrines are forced to blur or ignore 
various fundamental distinctions which underlie our judgments 
end interpretetions of our own end other people's behaviour. 
These arguments may be classified for convenience es:— 
(b) Distinction .1!ruments against ctuelism  
Strewson hes already provided en example of this type 
of argument by his reference to our customary categorisetion of 
certain people es "warped or deranged or compulsive in behaviour 
or peculiarly unfortunate in (their) formative circumstances." 
We do distinguish between "normal" and "abnormal" behaviour (even 
in animals, let alone human beings) despite the haziness of the 
borderline at times, end we modify our judgment of the agent and 
our attitude towards him accordingly; pleas of "abnormality", in 
Stewson's words, "invite us to view the agent himself in a 
different light froM the light in which we should normally view 
one who has acted as he has acted."22 Such pleas sanction the 
excuse "he couldn't help it", but the point of the distinction 
argument here would be that that excuse is only used to pick out 
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e particular end relatively uncommon type of behaviour. Yet if 
ectuelism is true, no one could ever hove "helped it", and my 
weshing of my hands after using e poisonous insecticide in the 
garden becomes es unavoidable en action es Lady Macbeth's com— 
pulsive efforts to get rid of her non—existent bloodstains. Thus 
our practice of assigning differing degrees of morel responsi—
bility to agents for their actions (which Piaget hes shown to 
characterise the later stages of intellectual end morel develop—
ment)23 is unjustified if the consequences of ectuelism are 
accepted. 
Distinction arguments are strengthened rather then 
weekened by uncertainties over where exactly the distinction is 
to be drawn in some ceses. The behaviour of the developing child 
illustrates this point. We ere confident in our judgment that 
the toddler "can't help" bursting into tears when he fells over, 
or becoming shy end tongue—tied in the presence of strangers; 
we ere equelly confident that older children can rationally 
deliberate end choose between elternetives — such as whether to 
choose e fiction or non—fiction book from the library, or whether 
or not to join the Brownies. But in between the two extremes 
there seem to be e number of twilight ceses where the degree of 
causal influence is uncertain — e.g. where e child plays truant 
because of en alleged "school phobia", or develops food fads, or 
invents imaginary companions to talk to. Such problems of 
classification, however, do not add weight to ectuelist theories 
of universal causal inevitability, because the very existence of 
the problems presupposes the validity of the distinction between 
causally inevitable and freely chosen behaviour. Doctrines of 
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universal causation cannot allow en eclectic approach whereby 
certain pieces of behaviour ere deemed to be avoidable end others 
unavoidable; yet this is exactly the sort of approach which 
seems to be required in studying the beieviour of the developing 
child. A similar distinction argument is developed by Strewson, 
based upon the psycho—analyst's judgment of a patient's behevioir 
throughout the period of treatment, improvement end eventual 
'►cure“.
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One other powerful distinction argument should be 
noted, which is summarised neatly by Ayers in his attack on 
Hume's ectuelistic position: 
” ... one objection to actual ism is that it leaves unexplained 
why we should ever went to distinguish between the ability 
to act end the action itself, or ever went to say that some 
one has a power at all."25 
Clearly we do often wish to say that a person has certain powers, 
abilities end capacities, end also that he et times fails to, or 
refrains from, exercising them; the laconic "could do better" 
on e school report provides a classic educational example. But 
a person cannot simultaneously exercise his powers and refrain 
from exercising them; the schoolboy cannot at the same time do 
better end fail to do better. If, then, we need to distinguish 
between abilities end actions, as it seems we often do, it 
follows that any ability must either be exercised or not be 
exercised on any particular occasion, end that therefore, as 
Ayers puts it, "either the doing or the not doing of the action 
will necessarily remain e potentiality."26 In other words, the 
distinction between ability and action presupposes the meaning—
fulness of the statement, "he could have done otherwise." 
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(c) Linguistic Arguments against Actuelism 
The words "can" and "could" may be used in several 
different senses, end consequently the meaning of such phrases 
es "could (not) have done otherwise" is far from self—evident. 
It cen be end hes been argued that the plausibility of ectuelism 
derives from these possibilities of ambiguity. 
Perticulerly misleading ere certain "ordinery language" 
uses of "cannot" end "could not". George Washington's apocryphal 
claim that he "could not" tell his father e lie is clearly not 
intended to be taken es e plea of physical impossibility, for 
such en interpretetion would rob the incident of any morel sig—
nificence. He "could", of course, have told a lie if he had so 
wished end chosen; the force of the "could not" is to emphasise 
dramatically the strength of his conviction that he ought to tell 
his father the truth. 
A similarly ineccurete use of "could not" occurs in 
ceses of epperent compulsion — where, for example, the bank clerk 
"could not" help opening the sefe for the robbers because they 
were threatening to shoot hosteges, or where the captured spy 
"could not" help revealing his country's secrets under torture. 
Although we attach no blame to the victims of such situations 
because of the extreme pressure thet was exerted upon them, it is 
still strictly incorrect for anyone (ber the ectuelist) to main—
tain thet the agents "could not" have done otherwise. The bank 
clerk could heve sacrificed the hosteges end seved the money, end 
the spy could heve let himself be mutilated end witheld the 
informetion; eech acted es he did because he felt that it wes 
not right, or reesoneble, or ddsireble to continue to resist the 
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pressure. 
Lien this exceptional type of case, then, is not 
properly described in terms of "could not have done otherwise". 
Furthermore, if the ectualist tries to maintain that the above 
examples are cases of "could not have done otherwise" because the 
agent could not have felt or believed or chosen otherwise for 
psychological reasons, a distinction—type argument can again be 
brought against him for he is then forced to treat these 
apparently exceptional situations as being on all fours with 
everyday situations; he can drew no distinction between the 
degrees of compulsion involved in confessing secrets under torture 
on the one hand and, say, passing the time of day with the milk—
men on the other. 
These "ordinary language" examples merely suggest that 
"can" end "could" may be slippery concepts; they do not demarcate 
the different uses of "can" end "could" which may cause ambiguity. 
An extended account of the conceptual complexities involved would 
again be out of place in this study, however, end all that will be 
attempted is a (by no means exhaustive) listing of certain impor—
tant and distinct senses of "can" and "could" together with an 
indication of how confusion between these senses may well add to 
the apparent plausibility of actuelism. 
Honore's distinction between particular and general 
"cans" providees useful starting—point. With particular "cans", 
"success or failure, on the assumption that en effort has been or 
will be made, is the factor which governs the use of the notion,"27 
whereas general "cans" are used "to assert a general competence, 
ability or skill in the performance of some type of action."28 
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To illustrate this distinction with an example (not used by 
Honore), we might say of a cricketer fielding in the slips that 
he could not (particular) hold a difficult catch, without in any 
way implying that he could not (general) hold a difficult catch. 
He could not (particular) hold itt because on the occasion we are 
referring to he dropped it and did not hold it, though he tried 
to; but this does not entail that he could not (general) hold 
it, because he often does hold equally difficult catches. The 
teem's captain, on being criticised after the match for placing 
that particular fielder in the slips, might well reply, "Nonsense! 
He's the only men in the teem who can hold a difficult slip catch 
(or a catch as difficult as that one)." 
It is easy to see how confusion over this basic dis—
tinction may lead to the view that nobody "could ever have done 
otherwise". As far as particular "cans" are concerned, it is 
necessarily true thet I cannot do x if I fail to do x on that 
particular occasion, but this linguistic feature of particular 
it 	 it 
cans cannot be used as proof of the ectuelist doctrine that we 
cannot in general ever act other then as we do. When judging 
whether or not a men can do x, or can do other then x, we are 
usually concerned with the general sense of "can"; we went to 
know about his "general competence, ability or skill", end in 
assessing this we take into account his normal levels of achieve—
ment, what he normally succeeds in doing if he tries. On the 
ectuelist view, however, ell "cans" are in effect Particular, which 
leads to the odd conclusion that it is irrelevant to consider a 
men's normal level of achievement and skill in determining whether 
or not he can or could do x, for the only criterion is whether he 
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actually does or did x. The actualist is thus forced to assert 
that the fielder could not (in any sense) have held the catch if 
he in fact dropped it, end that the fielder's proven ability in 
holding difficult catches is irrelevant to the question of whetter 
or not he could have held a particular catch. 
To interpret all "cans" end "Goulds" as particular also 
ignores further important distinctions. The question, "Could 
Jones have done the murder?" is not the some question as "Did 
Jones do the murder?" as the actualist must maintain; the former 
must be enovered before the letter can be decided. Furthermore, 
the ambiguity of the question, "Could Jones have done the murder?' 
reveals at least four senses in which it may be said that a man 
could have done x when he did not in fact do x. 
Firstly, the "could" may refer to opportunity; i.e. 
could Jones have done it, or was he really at home watching tele—
vision at the time, as he claims? Secondly, it may refer to 
capacity; i.e. could Jones have done it, or is he really too 
puny to have struck such e blow? Thirdly, it may refer to dis—
position; i.e. could Jones have done it, or is he really too 
gentle a men to strike another down in anger? Fourthly, it may 
refer to motive; i.e. could Jones hove done it, or was he really 
the victim's closest friend with no reason to wish him harm? In 
any or all of these senses we may decide that Jones could hove 
done the murder, without concluding that he did do it. Yet if 
ectuelism is correct, we are not allowed to say that Jonewcould 
have done it if he did not do it, nor that he could have not done 
it if he did it. 
Finally, some other important distinctions between 
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different senses of "can" and "could", apparently confused by 
the actualist, are highlighted in Ayers' discussion of various 
kinds of possibility. In particular, "natural possibility" is 
often confused with "possibility for choice", to use Ayers' 
terminology, the former referring to the "powers of things" and 
the letter to the "powers of people", despite the fact that "the 
'power to do otherwise' that relates to a men's 'liberty', 
responsibility, choice end the rest is indeed something different 
from the power of a motor car to do other speeds than the speed 
it is doing at present ..."29 This conflation of different types 
of power and possibility enables the actualist to produce a 
mechanistic, causal account of human action, but only at the cost 
of eliminating the set of concepts to which Ayers refers (e.g. 
liberty, responsibility, choice, etc.) Furthermore, the actualist 
has to face problems even with the "powers of things", let alone 
those of people, for he has to assert that a car which is "capable" 
of (i.e. designed for) travelling at 100 m.p.h. "could not" have 
travelled at 45 m.p.h. if it was in fact at that time travelling 
at 44 m.p.h. Such a claim is equally as odd as the assertion that 
the slip fielder "could not" have held the catch if he in fact 
dropped it. 
The arguments outlined above under (a), (b) and (c), 
while not intended as a fully developed refutation of ectualism, 
are sufficient at least to indicate the range end strength of 
objections which the doctrine has to face, end serve to shift the 
onus of proof on to the ectualist's shoulders. This study will 
therefore proceed on the assumption that the ectuelist's case is 
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unproven (end probably unprovable), and that the above arguments 
seem to support our commonsense supposition that it is both 
leitimate end meeningful to speck. of e person es "being able to 
ect otherwise". 
Similarly it is equally defensible to propose en ebility 
criterion for cases of akresia, which might be formulated es 
follows: that for e situation to count es en instance of ekresie, 
it is necessary thet the agent 
(i) should have been able to act other then in the wey he 
did, 
end (iii should have been able to decide to ect other then in 
the wey he did. 
Both (i) end (ii) are needed in order to include psycho—
logical es well es physical ability or cepecity. I may be "able" 
to do x, in so far es physical, externel conditions are concerned, 
but unable to decide to do x because of compulsive, psychological 
factors. Thus, although en actual decision is not e logically 
necessary condition of ekresie (see sub—section (ii)), the 
possibility, of having decided to ect otherwise is. 
The conclusion to which this analysis leads, therefore, 
is es follows. The inconsistency end ability criteria taken 
together sufficiently describe cases of ekresia, as involving e 
person doing x, or deciding to do x, while et the same time 
sincerely believing that he ought not to do x, though being able 
not to do x end able to decide not to do x. The perellel negative 
formuletion would cover cases of ekresie where e person does not 
do x, or decides not to do x, while et the same time sincerely 
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believing thet he ought to do x, though being able to do x end. to 
decide to do x. 
C. An Illustrative Example of Akresie  
To conclude Section 1 of this chapter e typical example 
of akrasie, set in en educational context, will now be described 
in order to illustrate the criteria already suggested. 
A schoolboy he se Latin set text to study. He is 
expected to prepare translations of sections for homework, which 
then form the basis of oral end written work in class. He is en 
intelligent boy, highly thought of by his teachers end anxious to 
impress both them and his fellow—pupils with his intellectual 
prowess. He is finding Latin translation increasingly difficult, 
however, end is secretly afraid that he may not possess the 
linguistic ability that he had hoped. By chance he hes discovered 
e published translation of the set text, end realises that if he 
refers to this es e crib during his homework he will save himself 
time, effort and anxiety, end be able to gain high marks in class, 
thus maintaining his reputation. Nevertheless he acknowledges 
that there ere good reasons, both prudential and morel, for not 
using the crib. Prudentially, he realises that the only wey to 
improve his standard of translation is to gain practice in 
tackling new texts off his own bet; he knows that his chances 
of success in later examinations will be lessened if he takes the 
easy wey out now. Korelly, he is aware that he would be deceiving 
his teecher end gaining en unfair advantage over his classmates 
by using the crib in order to impress end to gain high. marks. 
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Yet despite his sincere belief that there ere these excellent 
reasons why he ought to attempt the translation himself, he uses 
the crib to do his work for him, though being perfectly caDeble 
of resisting the temptation. 
How does this example satisfy the suggested criteria? 
Firstly, it provides en instance of genuine inconsistency. The 
boy sincerely believed, et the time of using the crib, that there 
were sound prudentiel end morel reesons why he ought not to do 
this. Not ell ceses of akresia of course would involve such 
combination of reesons, but this example hes been selected to 
demonstrete that there may be e morel end/or prudentiel dimension 
to ceses of ekresie. The sincerity of the boy's belief, in the 
absence of the appropriate action would need to be substantiated 
by one or more of Gardiner's "host of considerations". The boy 
might experience end perheps demonstrete guilt end remorse es a 
result of his action, and resolve never to use the crib again; 
he might confess to his teacher or fellow—pupils; he might show 
extreme embarrassment on being praised for the quality of his 
work; he might behave with unaccustomed meekness or aggression 
for the rest of the day. No one particular criterion can be 
demanded to indicate the boy's sincere belief, but some such 
"consideration" is required in the absence of the appropriate 
ection. 
Secondly, the inconsistency is contemporaneous; the 
boy believed et the time of using the crib that he was acting 
wrongly. If the wrongness of his ection only struck him after 
the event (e.g. when being praised for the excellence of his 
translation) he might be deemed guilty of (perheps moral) mis— 
judgment or shortsightedness, but he could not be held to be 
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week—willed if he did not feel that he ought not to use the crib 
at the time when he in fact did. Indeed, to quote Matthews again, 
the boy might have "thought he was right in the first place" or 
"been influenced by insufficient reasons, which only seemed 
sufficient at the time"; he might, for example, have felt that 
he would gain more peace of mind by maintaining his reputation 
at school then by producing poor results from his own efforts, only 
to discover later that the retrospective verdict of his conscience 
was in fact allowing him no peace of mind. This type of case, 
however, contra Matthews, signifies a defect of judgment or self—
knowledge, not of will. 
Thirdly, the example may well involve a double decision, 
but does not necessarily do so. The situation can most simply be 
described as one in which the boy decided that he ought not to 
use the crib, yet decided to use it; and provided that no change 
of mind or revised judgment had occurred between the two decisions, 
they would constitute a sufficient condition for, and clear—cut 
case of, ekresia, producing a judgment end an action obviously at 
variance with each other. Yet neither decision is essential to 
the example. The boy may not have consciously and explicitly 
decided that he ought not to use the crib, in the sense of weighing 
up the reasons for and against, end making a considered judgment 
on that basis. He may have been brought up to believe that 
cheating is wrong and that personal endeavour is praiseworthy, 
and have "internalised" these principles more or less unreflect— 
ively, though being capable of producing an explicit justification 
if asked; in these circumstances it would be incorrect to speak. 
of the boy "deciding" that he ought not to cheat by using the 
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crib, es opposed to "feeling" or "believing" thet he ought not 
so to act. (The further problems raised by the clessificetion of 
e perticuler situetion is en instence of e generel principle will 
be examined later in this chapter end in Chapters V — VI.) 
Similarly it might elso be incorrect to speak of the boy deciding 
to use the crib, though with this exemple it is more difficult to 
rule out en "ection—decision" then e judgmental one; yet the boy 
might have found himself glancing through the crib to help him 
over e particularly difficult pessage, and continued to use it 
for the remeinder of the prescribed section, without ever having 
consciously "decided" to do so. (To whet extent such behaviour 
must involve e degree of "self—deception" will again be examined 
in Chapter V.) The "action—decision" is more easily disposed of, 
however, in instances of ekresie where the agent foils to do whet 
he believes he ought to do — e.g. the boy might feil to own up 
to his cheeting, while believing that he ought to do so, not by 
decidin  not to but by not forcing himself to do it or not bringing 
himself to do it, or by putting it off or letting it slide. 
Fourthly end finelly, the example satisfies both parts 
of the ability criterion. where is no suggestion thet the boy 
was unable to avoid using the crib, or uneble to decide not to 
use the crib. While it is possible to imagine en instence in 
which e pupil is so obsessed with the desire to succeed, or so 
terrified by the prospect of failure (perheps because of Parental 
conditioning) that he literelly could not rerrein from consulting 
the crib once he realised the improvement it would melee to his 
results, this would be en extreme end unusual form of compulsive 
behaviour, end there is no reeson to interPret our present exemple 
in this way. Yet the possibility of such en interpretation is 
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sufficient to underline the kind of distinction between avoidable 
end unevoidable behaviour which hes been shown to constitue en 
objection to the claims of ectuelism. A special form of psycho—
loeicel explenetion is needed to eccount for the pupil who could 
not refrein from sheeting or who could not decide to refrain from 
cheating, end such en explenetion would ebsolve the pupil from 
the charge of being week—willed, for if the psychologicel com—
pulsion deprives him of the ability to act or decide otherwise, 
it thereby elso deprives him totelly of his "will—power" end his 
strength to resist temptetion. Akrasie then requires en ability 
criterion, end there is no reason to suppose that the example, es 
described, does not satisfy that criterion; weakness in the face 
of temptetion seems e more likely interpretetion of the boy's 
beheviour then en irresistible, pethologicel compulsion. 
One implication of the suggested criterie is thet 
ekresie can refer descriptively to e wide range of situations end 
ections, end eny ettempt to provide some overall, ell—inclusive 
explenetion of ekresie will need to take eccount of this renge. 
The ebove exemple shows, for instence, thet ekresie is not limited 
to ceses of morel conflict, where self—interest clashes with 
obligetions towards others; the ekresiec may also e•ct to secure 
his immediate wants while believing that his own best interests 
in the long run would be best served by acting otherwise. The 
context in which ekresie occurs mey elso be both non—morel and 
non—prudentiel, es in the Ger—washing exemple described in A. Or 
the "ought"—judgment which is not ected upon may even be en 
immorel one (e.g. e professional torturer may feel that he ought 
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to test out E. newly—developed method on e victim immediately, 
but not heve the energy or inclinetion to work le to that evening.) 
The following section will accordingly examine whet types of 
explenetion cen be end have been suggested for ekresie, and 
whether or not they provide e setisfectory end comprehensive 
account of ekresie in ell its forms. 
2. Possible EXplenetions of Ilkresie 
number of possible explanations heve alreedy been 
mentioned or implied. These and others will now be examined in 
the light of the criteria.' suggested for ekresie. 
Psychologicel Compulsion 
Explenetions of ekresie in terms of nsychologicel com—
pulsion heve elreedy been considered in connection both with 
Here's ergument (Chanter II, Section 3) end with the ebility 
criterion (Section 1 ebove). The conclusion was reeched thet if 
such e compulsion meant thet the person literelly could not have 
acted otherwise, far from being e "typical cese of morel weakness", 
es Here cleims, this would not be e case of morel weekness et 
ell. It wes• for this reason thet the ability criterion was pro—
posed, which mede either physicel or psychological inebility to 
cat otherwise e sufficient condition for denying that the case in 
question could be cherecterised es one of ckresie. Psychological 
compulsion, whether stemming from overpowering emotion, 
"irretionel" conOcience, or some other cause, cannot then pro—
vide e possible explanation of ekresie, for ekresie by definition 
• rules out such en explenetion. Less extreme formulations of this 
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type of explenetion will be considered in D below. 
B. Descriptive "Ought"—judgments  
Here rightly argues that "ought" is often used in en 
"off—colour", descriptive way; "I ought to do x" can be con—
strued es:— 
"1. 'x is required in order to conform to the standard 
which people generally accept,' (statement of 
sociological fact). 
2. 'I have e feeling that I ought to do x,' (statement of 
psychological fact)."30  
These interpretations no doubt provide en explenetion 
for many apparent eases of ekresie. Whet we do, or decide to do, 
often conflicts with our unreflective feelings or with whet we 
think other people would expect us to do, end we may loosely 
express this conflict by saying, "I feel that I ought to do x, 
but I'm not going to do it," thus using "ought" in en "off—colour" 
sense. 
This conflict, however, does not reflect the same incon—
sistency that cherecterises akrasie l end the situation cannot 
therefore count es one of ekresie. The conflict or inconsistency 
is in neither case between sincerely held, personal beliefs end 
e decision to act contrary to those beliefs. The judgment in 
each case is in e sense secondhand, representing either public 
opinion on the one hand, or the unreflective promptings of our 
emotions, intuitions or "irretionel" consciences on the other; 
whereas the judgments that typify ekresie must be firsthand, in 
the sense that they express the sincere beliefs of the agent 
which he hes personelly errived et and would be prepared to call 
his own. 
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Descriptive "ought"—judgments cennot, therefore, refer 
to or explain ceses of akresie, for they do not accord with the 
inconsistency criterion, just es instances of psychological com—
pulsion felled to meet the ability criterion. It would indeed be 
odd to label descriptive ceses es examples of "morel weakness", 
es one mey be eble to produce excellent morel reesons why one 
should not do whet it appears one "ought" to do in Here's socio- 
-
logicel end psychological senses; it may well require considerable 
morel strength to resist such social or psychological pressures. 
A failure to ect in accordance with this kind of "ought" does 
not necessarily signify s defect either in morel judgment or in 
morel resolve. 
This explenetion is eauelly unhelpful in non—morel ceses. 
if "I ought to clean my car" is e statement of socioiogicel or 
psychological feet (es it well might be), rather then an expression 
of personal belief, the situation is again not one of ekresie es 
the inconsistency criterion is still unfulfilled. Furthermore, 
my decision not to clean the car need not be irretionell (L:filpy 
Neve more interesting things to do with my time), or symptomatic 
of weakness, (I may need to be very tough—minded not to give in 
when I see all my neighbours cleaning their cars). 
Situations which can be expleined in this way, therefcre, 
whether they be morel or non—morel, cennot by definition be cases 
of ekresie. 
C. Hypocrisy, Insincerity end Special Pleading 
Hare's "typical cese of morel weakness" es e cese of 
"ought but can't" hes already been discussed and rejected (A). 
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He also, however, offers en elternative account of "off—colour" 
morel judgments end "oughts" in terms of hypocrisy (or purposive 
backsliding), which can be sub—divided into cases of insincerity 
or self—deception. 
If e men does whet he thinks he ought not to do, there—
fore, Here's explanation is either that he is physically or 
psychologically unable to act otherwise, or thet he is being 
hypocritical. In the latter cese he will be guilty of "special 
pleading", whereby en "ought" ceeses to express e universal pre—
scription end so becomes "off—colour":— "While continuing to 
prescribe that everyone else should act in accordance with the 
principle, we do not so prescribe to ourselves ..."31 This could 
be either e cese of insincerity, where we do not sty whet we 
really think, or e case of self—deception, where we think that we 
think we ought but hive escaped our own notice using "ought" in 
en "off—colour" wey.32 
Hypocritical speciel pleading of this sort is no doubt 
e not uncommon phenomenon, but is Here right to identify it so 
closely with Fkresia? His argument rests on the thesis that 
central, full—blooded uses of "ought" cannot yield examples of 
ekresie, because they entail e commitment to action. This thesis 
WFS challenged in Chapter II, while in Chapter III it wes argued 
that ekresie was by no means incompatible with central, full—
blooded uses of "ought". Here, however, by allowing only "off—
colour" "oughts" to feature in cases of ekresie is limited to 
those explanations which involve "off—colour" "oughts", i.e. 
psychological compulsion end hypocrisy. 
A further objection to Here's "hypocrisy" explenetion 
is that the relationship between backsliding, speciel pleading, 
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hypocrisy and insincerity is not made et ell clear. Hypocrisy 
end insincerity seem to be classified es types of special pleading, 
which in turn involves the use of non—universal prescriptions, 
but hypocrisy end insincerity are not internally connected to 
prescriptive "oughts" in the way that ekresie is. 
It is for this reason that hypocrisy end insincerity, 
es we normally understand these terms, cannot provide explanations 
of ekresie, for the inconsistency criterion is again not properly 
satisfied in such cases and the question of akrasia accordingly 
cannot arise. If I em hypocritical or insincere, there is 
certainly en inconsistency of sorts in my behaviour: whet I say 
or do does not accord with whet I really feel or believe. But 
this is not the kind of inconsistency that characterises ekresie, 
whereby I do x though sincerely believing that I ought not to be 
doing x. With hypocrisy and insincerity no "ought"—judgments are 
involved in the inconsistency between whet I do end whet I really 
believe. I may believe that you ere e fool but tell you that you 
ere e genius, without necessarily believing that I ought not to 
tell you that you area genius; the inconsistency does not imply 
some psychological conflict, as is the case with ekresie. I 
undertake e willing pretence if I am hypocritical or insincere, 
whereas I experience e struggle end a reluctant yielding if I em 
ekresiec. I may of course struggle against being hypocritical 
or insincere, end if I yield I will be ekresiec (if the criteria 
are satisfied), but even here hypocrisy and insincerity can be 
no more than contingent instances of ekrasie; they cannot pro—
vide en overall explanation of it. 
Self—deception is equally unsatisfactory es en 
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explenetion. If I em unaware that I am deceiving myself about 
whet I think I ought to do, there can be no inconsistency et the 
time of acting between whet I do end whet I think I ought to do. 
If on the other hand I em aware that I em deceiving myself (which 
sounds rather odd), I cannot sincerely believe that I ought to do 
whet I in feet do not do. (The complexities of self—deception 
end its relevance to certeih aspects of akresie will be further 
examined in Chapter V.) 
Special pleading, defined in terms of non—universal 
prescriptions, although logically related to prescriptive "ought" 
situations in e way in which hypocrisy end insincerity ere not, 
is also unable to provide en explenetion of akresie. The akresiec 
sincerely believes that he ought to do x, end thereby (according 
to the account of "ought" given in Chapter III) accepts the 
reesons end ?grecs with the principles which justify the "ought". 
He acknowledges the normative pressure upon him deriving from the 
justificatory nature of the reesons end principles, end does 
therefore in this sense "prescribe to himself". It is his feilure 
to act in accordance with this "Prescription" (es he sincerely 
believes he ought to) which characterises akresie end which may 
earn the rebuke of his conscience; if no such "prescription" or 
obligation were felt to exist for him, the situation would not be 
one of ekresia l end feelings of guilt or remorse would be out of 
place. 
Hypocrisy, insincerity and special pleading, then, are 
of little help in supplying en acceptable explanation of ekresie. 
Here's account does, however, highlight the problem of describing 
whet exactly is involved in the ekresiac's "sincere belief that 
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he ought to do x", end suggests that complex, mentel menoeuvres 
may be essociFted with et least some types of ekresie. This 
possibility will be considered further in Chapter V. 
D. Overriding ,Tents and Desires 
Psychological compulsion hes already been rejected es 
e possible explenetion of ekresie (A), but e prima facie case 
for e. similar though less extreme type of explenetion might be 
made out elong the following lines. While we ere not helplessly 
compelled to act contrary to our better judgment in situations 
of Eikresie l we do often seem to be swayed, nersueded or influenced 
by our desires so to act. Indeed if there were not some such 
"stronger desire" operative, our action would appear to be without 
motive or explenetion end thus incomprehensible. We are not 
incapable of ecting otherwise in such situations; we simply do 
not choose to resist the conflicting desire, end so allow it to 
override whet we believe we ought to do. This account seems to 
meet the criteria proposed for ekresie end to accord with our 
common—sense experience. 
Verious formulations of this explanation ere possible, 
end must be examined in turn. It cen, for example, be expressed 
in terms of e conflict between different wants or desires, or 
conflict between reason end emotion. In either case there is 
the suggestion that the decisive rector in the struggle will be 
the strength or weakness of "the will", which will determine the 
degree of resistance offered to the particular wapt, desire or 
emotion. 
It should be noted et this point, however, that to 
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invoke the notion of "will" es e mental organ, which can be 
relatively week or strong in resisting wants end desires, is 
unillumineting es e possible explenetion of ekresie. There is 
no empirical or logical reason to suppose that any such entity 
can be identified, end to assume its existence in order to account 
for why men sometimes do whet they believe they ought not to do 
contributes nothing of independent, explanatory value. Ps Kenny 
puts it, "... one does not -give e scientific explenetion of e 
phenomenon by assigning it to en appropriate power,"33 while 
Hirst makes the point even more forcefully: 
"A person does not possess e will ... We need to approach 
the phenomena without traditional presuppositions ... 
(concerning) the mechanistic model of mental organs or 
muscles."34 
Similar objections can be raised against the notion of 
"conscience" when used to refer to a mental organ, the weakness 
of which allegedly produces ekrasie. "Conscience" has been shown 
in Chapter III to be a useful concept in picking out certain 
logical end empirical features of morel judgment end action which 
in turn allow for the possibility of ekresie. Its function, 
however, is largely descriptive end classificatory rather then 
explanatory, end accordingly to suggest that ekresie occurs because 
one "has a weak conscience" is as uninformative and indeed as 
tautologous as to attribute it to "having a week will". 
Some formulations of the "overriding desires" explanation 
of ekresie have also to be rejected on the grounds they are merely 
alternative versions of the "psychological compulsion" explanation. 
Aristotle's account, for instance, of incontinent people being so 
influenced by passions, temptations and pleasures that they "must 
be said to be in a similar condition to men asleep, mad or 
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drunk",35 appears to come into this category, for men who are 
asleep, mad or drunk do not have control over their thoughts end 
actions, and cannot satisfy the ability criterion of ekresie. 
Aristotle's explanation of ekresie, however, cannot be dismissed 
as briefly as this, es it is interestingly related to his analysis 
of morel knowledge and decision, which will be considered in F 
below. 
Mill also pictures e situation of conflicting desires 
in which we effectively have no choice. His discussion of 
"higher" end "lower" pleasures is relevant to akrasie, for he 
claims that many men deteriorate into indolence end selfishness 
after their "youthful enthusiasm for everything noble", end con—
tinues:— 
"I do not believe that those who undergo this very common 
change voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures 
in preference to the higher. I believe that ... they have 
already become incapable of the other ..."36 
When "lower pleasures" exert this kind of irresistible 
influence, we are again outside the province of ekresia. 
Another variant of the overriding desires explanation 
which suggests en inability to resist would be the Christian 
explanation of ekresie. Men is basically sinful by nature; he 
has fallen from a state of grace, end only by seeking God's help 
can he become strong enough to overcome his sinful desires and 
so do what he knows he ought to do:— 
"I em unspirituel, the purchased slave of sin. I do not even 
acknowledge my own actions as mine, for what I do is not 
whet I went to do, but whet I detect ... It is no longer I 
who perform the action, but sin that lodges in me. For I 
know that nothing good lodges in me ... for though the will 
to do good is there, the deed is not. The good which I 
went to do, I fail to do; but what I.do is the wrong which 
is against my will; and if whet I do is agq.inst my will, 
clearly it is no longer I who em the agent, but sin that has 
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its lodging in me. I discover this principle, then: that 
when I went to do the right, only the wrong is within my 
reach ... Who is there to rescue me out of this body 
doomed to death? God alone, through Jesus Christ our 
Lord!"37 
A total inability to act otherwise is clearly implied 
here, thus violating the ability criterion and placing the 
phenomenon described by Paul outside the bounds of ekresia. A 
further objection to this account is that it fails to acnow—
ledge a fact of common experience, namely that we do at times 
act according to whet we think is right. If it is then claimed 
that such actions are made possible only by enlisting God's aid, 
this explanation can be challenged on at least two grounds: 
firstly, on empirical grounds, many people seem to be able to do 
whet they think they ought without enlisting God's aid, and 
secondly, on logical grounds, the enlisting of God's aid is 
surely itself a good act, which therefore cannot itself be per—
formed without a prior enlisting of God's aid, thus involving en 
infinite regress. The Christian explanation of akresie then 
either fails to satisfy the ability criterion, or suffers from 
logical incoherence. 
However, not all formulations of the "overriding desires" 
type of explanation need suggest psychological impossibility. 
Less extreme versions reflect more convincingly our experiences 
of whet it means to succumb to (end to resist) temptation. There 
are no doubt cases where the conflicting desire is so overpowering 
that resistance is psychologically impossible; but there are 
also cases where we feel that we have resisted temptation, end 
cases where we feel that we succumbed, although we could have 
acted otherwise. If these cases are denied or are also explained 
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in terms of psychological necessity, then the stronp—willed man 
becomes es "compelled" es the week—willed, morel strength becomes 
es pathological e condition es morel weakness, end e whole range 
of concepts concerned with potion, decision, responsibility and 
conflict become meaningless. 
The attempt to interpret all "overriding desires" 
explanations es species of psychological compulsion in feet blurs 
en important distinction which hes been emphasised by philosophers 
from Aristotle onwards. This distinction, which can be expressed 
in terious ways, is between two types of motivation. 
Pristotle's distinction concerns "propeteie" (impulsive—
ness) and "astheneie" (weekness): 
"The week do form e rOiolution but they ere prevented by their 
sensibilities from keeping to it. The impulsive or heed—
strong ere carried away by their feelings, because they have 
not thought about the setter that excites them et all. If 
they tied, their behaviour might be different. For some 
people can hold out against strong emotion, whether painful 
or pleasurable, if they feel or see it coming end have time 
to rouse themselves — b which I mean their reasoning 
faculty — beforehend."3 
liodern philosophers heve made e similar sort of dis—
tinction between reflective end non—reflective forms of motivation. 
Benson, for instance, distinguishes between wants end desires:— 
"It is wants that enter into deliberation, are themselves 
decided upon efter reflection, end can be ordered on e 
preference scale. Whereas desires ere brute impulses, or 
dispositions thereto, which we just have, and which can be 
ordered according to strength."39 
Thelberg likewise distinguishes two senses of "desire":— 
"To speak of desires is sometimes only to speak of preferences. 
In this sense, I most strongly desire whet I prefer to do. 
But we also speck. of cravings es desires. P person's 
cravings may be et variance with his preferences."40  
Peters draws e similar, though more complex, distinction 
between "emotions" and "motives". Both refer to states of mind 
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resulting from the appraisal of e situation, but the former 
causally effect or distort our subsequent behaviour, whereas the 
letter provide us with reesons for acting in e particular wey.41  
These distinctions suggest that impulses, cravings and 
emotions can cause us to behave in certain ways, while wants, 
preferences and motives influence our beheviour through the 
medium of reesons. The contrast is brought out even more clearly 
by the ambiguity of the phrase "stronger desire". This may refer 
either to that which exerts more causal pressure upon one's 
beheviour, or to that which one prefers, thinks better, or places 
more value upon. These two interpretations need not coincide, 
es Cooper argues:- 
"For to say that I have e went or desire to-do-A-in-preference-
to-enything-else is to say nothing about the intensity of 
that desire. There is no necessary one-one corx►eletion 
between the order of priority of a men's morel principles 
end the order of strength of his desires."42  
Sentes makes e similar point in his comments on Plato's 
Protegores, where he draws attention to "the possibility that the 
stronger (strongest) desire is not always the desire referring to 
the alternative that has the agent's higher (highest) ranking."43  
If such a distinction is provisionally accepted, 
between "desires" which can be so ranked in order of intensity 
that the most intense will produce the greatest causal effect 
upon behaviour, and "wants" which can be so ranked in order of 
Preference that the most preferred will be backed by the strongest 
reasons, according to the agent's evaluation, this distinction 
will need to be reflected in suggested explanations of ekresie. 
An explanation in terms of overriding "desires" (i.e. 
causal impulses) will be merely a variant of the psychological 
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compulsion explenetion, but en explenetion in terms of overriding 
"wents" need not violete the criterie Proposed for EATC'Cie. The 
ekresiac, according to this account, would accept that he ought 
to do x, but would simply went to do y more then he wanted to do x. 
His "desires" would not causally override his "ought"—judgment in 
such e way that he could not avoid doing y; rather he would 
ettech more weight to the reesons which he considered et the time 
to support y, or would allow them to weigh more heavily with. him. 
This could 'apply to both morel and non—morel contexts. 
Such en explenetion would need to be filled out con—
siderebly. In perticuler, e detailed :Analysis of "wilts" end 
their relationship with reasons end with action is required. 
There might also be important links between this explenetion end 
both the "special pleeding" explenetion (C) end the distinction 
between justificatory end motivetionel factors (Chapter III). 
Some account must also be given of exactly how end why 	 person's 
wents can "override" the reesons backing one's "ought"—judgments. 
Does this indicate thet ekresie implies some defect in reesoning, 
or feilure of retionelity re they then of morel charecter? 
These -points will be explored further in Chapter V, 
while the "defective reesoning" explenetion will be considered 
leter in this section (F). For the moment we may retein the 
"overriding wents" explenetion for closer examination. 
E. Leck of Feeling 
Severel of the explenetions elreedy discussed have 
referred to the excessive influence of desires, wents, feelings 
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end emotions. An alternative end contrary explanation is 
possible, however, for akresie may perhaps result from an 
insufficiency rather then en excess of "feeling". On this 
account the akrasiac will fail to do whet he believes he ought 
because he is lacking the necessary emotional drive. He may 
know that he ought to help old ladies across roads, but when 
he actually sees one hesitating at the kerbside, he does not 
feel sufficient care, concern or interest to induce him to do 
anything about it. 
An extreme example of a person suffering from this 
apparent deficiency would be the psychopath, who lacks PHIL, 
to use Wilson's terminology (see Chapter I); he does not care 
about other people's interests and welfare, because he views 
them as objects to be manipulated, rather then as persons. If 
the "lack of feeling" explanation were accepted, end if it were 
allowed that a psychopath is capable of making morel "ought"— 
judgments (which is doubtful), it would follow that the psycho—
path is in a permanent state of ekresie. 
Two objections can be levelled against this explanation. 
Firstly, is not this account yet another version of the psycho—
logical compulsion thesis? A lack of feeling is as much a causal 
factor as is an excess of feeling. It will effect behaviour 
rather then influence it through the medium of reasons. Certainly 
in the case of the psychopath one would feel that he could not 
decide to act otherwise, given his psychological state, and thus 
could not fulfil the ability criterion. 
Secondly, this explanation draws too crude a distinction 
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between reeson end feeling in the area of morel judgm,ents end 
ection. Forming a morel judgment is not simply en intellectual 
process which needs en emotionel nudge if it is to be transleted 
into ection. Indeed the reeson why we might doubt whether e 
psychopath could be thought cepable of meking morel judgments is 
thet he leeks the feelings, concern end imagination that are 
required in order to form end use concepts like "person", "hurt" 
and "welfere". 
Lack of feeling does not, therefore, constitute e setis—
fectory explenetion of ekresie, but it does ley emphasis upon the 
leek of motivation which the ekresiec feels to do whet he believes 
he ought to do. This "effective" factor is clearly importent, 
particularly in ceses of morel ekresie where the agent does not 
care ebout or "identify with" other people's interests end welfare 
sufficiently to consider them to be in prectice on e per with his 
own, end perhaps also does not care sufficiently about other 
people's disepprovel of his moral failings. These points will be 
explored further in Chapters V and VI. 
F. Lack of Knowledge 
A further cless of explanations, stemming from Plato 
end Aristotle, depends upon some weakness, defect or leek of 
knowledge. There ere various versions, which must be considered 
separately. 
The question of "week conviction" was briefly discussed 
in the analysis of the Socretic argument (Chapter II). Although 
Socretes is attempting to deny the logical possibility of ekresie, 
his explenetion of what eupears to be ekresie is that knowledge 
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is not present in such cases, only opinion. The inadequacies of 
the Socratic ergument have already been fully explored, but this 
explanation must now be reviewed in the light of the suggested 
criteria for ekreste. Can cases of ekresie be expla ined on the 
grounds that the agent did not really know (or was unsure or lecked 
conviction about) whet he ought (or ought not) do do? 
It is immediately evident that such an explanation will 
not suffice, es it runs directly counter to the inconsistency 
criterion, which requires that the agent must sincerely believe 
that he ought (or ought not) to do x et the time of acting other—
wise. If he acts in a staterJof uncertainty as to whet he ought 
to do, the situation cannot be one of ekresie, for it is doubt 
that is present and not en inconsistency between judgment and 
action. If certainty returns liter, a charge of ekresie is still 
trieppliceble, as was argued in the case of Ketthews' retrospective 
categories (Section 1). 
Aristotle tries to refine the "leek of knowledge" 
explanation by relating it to the practical syllogism. His 
ergument is by no means clear, end commentators differ widely in 
their interpretations. For the purposes of this study, however, 
it is less important to determine exactly which view Aristotle 
himself held then it is to examine ell the possible explanations 
that may be explicit or implicit in his ecdount. 1)t least four 
of these can be distinguished. 
(i) iristotle suggests that the distinction between dispositionel 
end activated knowledge can help to explain ekresie:— 
"But since we use the word 'know' in two senses (for both the 
man who hes knowleded but is not using it end he who is using 
it ere said to know), it will make e difference whether, 
when e men does whet he should not, he hes the knowledge but 
is not exercising it, or is exercisirw it; for the letter 
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seems strenge, but not the former."44  
This explenetion is unsetisfectory, es it merely pushes 
the problem one stage further beck. It is self—evident that the 
ekresiec does not "exercise his knowledge" — if he did, there 
would be no ekresie — but the question is why does he not 
exercise it. As Ross points out, "the account which explains 
how the wrong can be done in the ebsence of this knowledge cannot 
explein how the knowledge hes come to be ebsent."45 As was noted 
in connection with the criterion of contemporaneous inconsistency 
(Section 1), the men who deliberetely ignores factors which he 
knows would otherwise effedt his judgment end decision is guilty 
of ekresie not et the moment of action but et the eerlier point 
when he fails to perform the intellectuel ectivities which he 
believes he ought to perform. Similerly in the case of 1:1ristotlets 
"inactive knowledge", no inconsistency end hence no ekresie occurs 
when the action is finelly teken, but both have already occurred 
et the eerlier "intellectual" stege, end it is there that en 
explanation is required. 
Similar objections can be brought egeinst attempts to apply 
the ebove distinction to the universal end perticuler premismesof 
the precticel syllogism. Aristotle argues:— 
... there is nothing to prevent a men's heving both premisses 
end acting egeinst his knowledge, provided he is using only 
the universal premiss end not the perticuler.”46  
In other words the ekresiec eccepts the validity of e 
principle, but fells to "actively know" that e perticuler instence 
fells under it — en explenetion which egein feils to meet the 
inconsistency criterion, es the agent must et the time of voting 
be in some sense unewere that there is any inconsistency. Also 
e further explenetion is egein needed for why the perticuler 
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premiss is not "used". 
Aristotle does not consider the• possibility of the 
universal premiss being "known" but not "used", though some of 
his commentators have done so.47 Might not the defect in know—
ledge concern the principle or rule, rather than a particular 
instance of it? But this suggestion is open to exactly the same 
objections, i.e. the inconsistency criterion is not met, and a 
further explanation is still required. 
(iii) An alternative explanation might be that the failure of 
knowledge concerns neither the universal nor the particular 
premiss but the practical conclusion of the syllogism. This is 
perhaps the suggestion behind Aristotle's obscure claim that 
"when a single judgment results from the two (premisses of the 
practical syllogism), the soul must ... immediately act."48 A 
man might then hold a certain principle, recognise that a 
particular instance fells under it, and yet, as Hardie puts it, 
"fail to drew the conclusion ... because he did not 'put two and 
two together'." 49  
This etcount at least answers the demand for further 
explanations (unlike (i) and (a)), as such a case would pre—
sumably result from defective reasoning — en inability to drew 
logical conclusions. On the other hand, the inconsistency 
criterion is still not satisfied, for the agent is "unaware" of 
the conclusion that he should draw, i.e. that he ought to do x. 
It could also be argued that defective reasoning runs counter to 
the ability criterion, as it causes the agent to be unable to 
decide to act otherwise. 
(iv) Whatever type of knowledge it is that Aristotle deems to 
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be "absent" in some wey in cases of ekresie, the need to explein 
thet absence remains, es noted in (i) end (ii). Aristotle 
recognises this need, but his explenetion is one thet he already 
been considered end rejected in (D), i.e. overriding "desires". 
"... when eppetite hepDens to be present in us, the one 
judgment bids us evoid the object, but eppetite leeds us 
towards it; for it can move each of our bodily parts."50  
Incontinent people then, according to Aristotle, are 
psychologicelly compelled to behave es they do, under the influence 
of their eppetites end passions, end "must be said to be in e 
mimiler condition to men asleep, mad or drunk". 
Aristotelian interpretations of ekresie therefore fail 
on two counts. A person who "leeks knowledge" in any of the ways 
discussed above cannot satisfy the inconsistency criterion, and 
when the leek is further explained in terms of causal passions 
the ability criterion is also violated. 
On the positive side, however, Aristotle's reference to 
the precticel syllogism suggests that different types of knowledge 
end reasoning may well be involved in deciding whet one ought to 
do end whet one will do, e suggestion which again underlines the 
distinction between justificetory end motivetionel factors. It 
also suggests thet ekresie mey be seen to some extent es e problem 
of principles end instences. These points will be token up in 
Chapters V end VI. 
Another version of the "lack of knowledge" explanation 
of ekresie is suggested by the "cognitive—developmental" approach 
to moral behaviour, evident in the work of psychologists such es 
Pieget end Kohlberg. According to this approach, morel develop—
ment is but one aspect of intellectuel development, and morel 
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judgments reflect the level of intellectual reasoning which hes 
been reeched. Perticulerly relevant to the problem of ekresie 
Kohlberg's claim to the effect thet the higher the stage of morel 
reasoning achieved the greeter will be the likelihood thet e moral 
judgment will be acted upon.51 The implications of this "cognitive—
developmental" epproech for ekresie end for morel education will 
be considered in Chepter VI, while en enswer to the more general 
question of whether or not ekresie is in some sense essentially 
irretionel will be attempted in Chepter V. .At this point it need 
only be noted thet e child or adult must be intellectually cepeble 
of sincerely believing that he ought (in its full—blooded sense) 
to do x, before ekresie can possibly occur, end thet if that 
intellectual level (whatever it is) hes not been reeched, the agent 
will, on this interpretation as on the ilristotelien one, "lock 
knowledge" end will consequently be unable to setisfy the incon—
sistency criterion. 
U. Logicel Necessity 
A different type of explenetion was implicit in the 
argument in Chapter III for the logical possibility of ekresie. 
There it wee cleimed that ell "ought"—sentences hove certain 
futures in common which. include the implied be-eking of justifi—
cetory reasons (which do not necessarily carry motivetionel 
pressure), end en implied uncertainty of outcome. The logic of 
"ought", therefore, melees it logically necessary thet e person 
who decides thet he ought to do x may not went to do x end may 
not in feet do x, whether "ought" is being used in e morel or 
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non—morel context. This logical point hes however received 
more attention from philosophers in the moral context. Thus 
Cooper, referring to morel concepts closely related to "ought", 
argues :— 
"Between principles end practice, ideal end fulfilment, 
there will in any normal morelity be e gap — this gappiness 
is en essential feature of the morel life end is made 
manifest in the tension which may exist prior to ection 
between principle end desire."52  
This logical ergument is clearly in accord both with 
the competitive tradition of morelity outlined in Chapter II end 
with the recount of "ought" end of "conscience" which was developed 
in Chapter III, but it hes certain necessery limitations es en 
explenetion of akresie. If we accept (es the argument in Obey-tor 
III suggests we should) that "geppiness is en essentiel feature 
of the morel life", this explains why it is logically end empi—
rically possible for ekresie to occur, but it does not directly 
explein why it does occur on perticuler occasions. It is logically 
Possible for the sun to rise in the west, but this possibility 
would not prevent our seeking E further explenetion if it ectuelly 
did. The logical ergument then provides e necessery background 
against which possible explenetions of akresia must be examined, 
but it is not sufficiently informative in itself. 
Conclusion 
This chapter hes attempted to establish descriptive 
criteria for the concept of ekresie, end then to examine suggested 
explenetions of ekresie in the light of these criterie. A number 
of explenetions did not accord with the criterie; whet they were 
trying to explein les not ekresie es defined. Certain explenetions 
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remain Cs possible cendidetes, however, elong with. other 
suggestions, pointers end implications -rising from this end 
the previous chepters. 
The following chFpter will drew upon these elements in 
developing e synthetic explanation of ekresie. 
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CHAPTER V  — A  POSITIVE .ACCOUNT OF .AKRASIA  
In Chapter IV it was suggested that one criterion of 
ekrasie was contemporaneous inconsistency between judgment and 
Potion. The Fkresiac voluntarily does x rather than y, despite 
believing that he ought to do y. He is ewere that two (or 
perhaps more) alternative courses are open to him and he follows 
one of them, albeit perhaps reluctantly, guiltily and unhappily. 
His action need not however, be the result of e deliberate and 
considered choice between the alternatives (though it often may 
be), for choosing implies deciding end it hes already been argued 
that deciding is not e logically necessary element in ekrasia. 
Acts of akresia are therefore 	 particular instance of 
the more general class of actions which involve doing x rather 
than y, where x and y are alternative courses of action which 
suggest themselves to the agent and which he is aware ere open 
to him. (For purposes of classification, doing x rather then y 
will be taken to include cases when the question is simply 
whether or not to do something; x or y could thus stand for e 
course of inaction, x signifying not —y, and y not —x:— e.g. 
peying e bill rather than not peying it, or vice verse.) 
The strategy of this chapter will accordingly be firstly 
to ext.-mine the logical features of this more general_ class of 
potions in order to discover whet kind of explanation cEn in 
principle be given for doing x rather then y (1), End secondly to 
eoply these results to the particular case of ekresie (2) while 
bearing in mind the possible explanatory pointers which emerged 
from Chapter IV. 
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1. Doing x rather then y 
Actions end iqternetives 
The sterting—point for this enquiry must be the notion 
of en ection. Philosophers have geterelly agreed that to describe 
t piece of behaviour es en action is to say et least two things 
ebout thet behaviour. Firstly, it must be voluntary in the sense 
thet the cent must know whet he is doing end be free to choose 
to act otherwise if he so wishes, though he need not deliberetely 
decide to ect es he does. Secondly, it must be intentional in 
thet it can be conceived of end expleined in terms of achieving 
some end or purpose, though again the agent need not consciously 
perform this mental operation, (e.g. flicking sway e cieerette 
end unthinkingly is en ection in so far es it cen be conceived 
of end explained in terms of getting rid of en object that is no 
longer vented or usable.) Even so—celled "unintentional" actions 
are best interpreted es intentional cottons which hove somehow 
gone wrong end produced en unforeseen end undesired result; if 
I unintentionally sock my neighbour while hosing the garden, my 
ection is still to be explained in terms of timing et some purpose 
(i.e. wetering the flowers) which wes not in this case fulfilled. 
Both of these feetures suggest thet actions ere to be 
explained not by external, causal rectors, but rather by the 
agent's own intentions, purposes end wents. Action is in these 
respects necessarily retionel. Where purely external, ceusel 
explanations ere possible, we may speek of irretionel behaviour 
but not of irretionel ection. 
A person acts then in order to echieve some purpose 
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which is in principle expliceble by reference to his wants end 
choices, though choosing between elternetives is no more e 
necessary pert of ecting then is making e conscious decision. 
There must exist the .possibility of choosing en alternative 
course of ection for this is implied by the voluntary nature 
of ection, but in the majority of actions that we perform we do 
not go through the process of deliberately choosing between 
alternatives. 
Although choosing is therefore note necessary Pre—
condition of ection, nevertheless in comes of doing x rether then y, 
where x end y ere elternetive courses of ection (or inaction) 
which suggest themselves to the egent end which he is aware are 
open to him, (hereefter to be referred to more briefly es "doing 
x rather then y") it seems reesoneble to claim that the egent 
must have in some wey preferred to do x rather then y. This 
would seem to be required by the intentionelity of ection, for 
if the action of doing x is in principle explicable in terms of 
the egent 	 purposes, then the ection of doing x rather then y 
is in principle expliceble in terms of the egent's preferences. 
The purpose achieved by doing x is seen es preferable in some 
way to the purpose achieved by doing y, or elternetively doing x 
is thought to echieve e particular purpose better then doing y. 
For example, I might in the former case go to bed rether then 
stay up to watch the midnight movie, because I prefer to get e 
good night's sleep rether than gamble on the dubious entertein— 
ment value of en unknown film; or I might in the letter case go 
to bed rather then sit up swotting for next dey's exeminetion, 
because I think that going to bed is e better way to echieve my 
purpose of passing the exeminetion, and therefore prefer that 
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course of Potion- The sense in which "prefer" is being used 
here, however, will need further investigation (see C below). 
B. Wanting 
Further li,cJit cen be shed upon ceses of "doing x rather 
then y" by en enelysis of wants end wenting. There Fre severel 
senses ih which these concepts appear to be used (some of which 
were mentioned in Chapter IIT) end philosophers heve disagreed 
over where the distinctions should be drown. 
It hes been suggested by some thet there is en importent 
distinction between en "incline tionel" sense of went, whereby "I 
went to do x" means epproximetely "I desire to do x" or "it would, 
pleese me to do x", end en "intentional" sense, whereby "I went 
to do x" merely indicetes thet my aim or intention is to do x.1 
If such. e distinction could be upheld, it would mean that the 
intentional_ sense would heve e much wider field of applicetion 
then the inclinetionel sense. Thus Griffiths describes it es 
covering ell that we knowingly do:— "Within the limits of whet 
we knowingly do, saying thet we wented to do whet we did is 
vacuous, in this sense of 'went'."2 Cooper gives e similar 
though more specific account of e "minimal" sense of went, 
claiming thet it cen be epplied "to enything one is in fevour of 
for any reeson whetsoever."3 
The distinction would also heve et leest two importent 
implications for eny analysis of "doing x rather then y". Firstly, 
the intentional use would link the concept of wanting very closely 
to the concept of action, if both the action of doing x and 
venting to do x imply intending to bring about x, or if venting 
can cover ell thet we knowingly do, es Griffiths argues. Ty  
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"doing x rether then y" would then require that I went 
(intentionally) to do x rather then y, end also presumably that 
I went Ontentionelly) to do x more then y. 
Secondly, the two senses of wanting would not 
necessarily coincide, end there could consequently sometimes be 
conflict between them. I might "intentionally" went whet I 
"inclinetionelly" did not went; for example, I might have no 
wish, desire, urge or inclination to visit the dentist, yet still 
be said to "went" to do so, either in the sense of having thet 
intention or of knowingly performing the action or of being in 
fevour of performing it for some reason. A conflict between the 
two senses might occur in e "lesser of two evils" context, or 
perheps es e result of feelin^ oneself under en obligation to 
perform some distasteful duty. "Doing x rather then y" might 
therefore involve wonting to do x rether than y only in en 
"intentional" end not necessarily en "inclinetionel" sense. 
But can the distinction between intentional end incli—
netionel wilts really be drawn es sharply es some enelyses heve 
suggested? Cen there be "intentionel" wants which have no element 
of "inclination" in them? We can epnroach these questions by 
considering Deveney's account, which is representative of ergu—
ments on behalf of the distihction.4 
Deveney cleims that there is "e use of 'went' which 
doesn't involve the notion of choice or inclination" (p.140):— 
"Now in saying 'He wants ...' we may mean he aims et from 
choice. But this need not be the case; he may be doing 
whet he utterly dislikes. Nevertheless, 'He wants 
can still explain his notion because in its brooder sense 
it means 'intend' simply." (p.143) 
To illustrate this sense of "went" that is intentionel 
but not inclinetionel, Deveney gives four exemples:— 
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(i) "I went to cut my lawn before the gress grows too long. 
Oh drudgery!"' 
(ii) "I em heving lunch eerly because I went to go to the 
meeting. Unfortunetely I must attend." 
(iii) "He wants to throw himself into the see before the 
Devil cetches him." 
(iv) "I went to get the hemmer in order to drive in the nail." 
(PP. 141-2) 
Now while it is certainly possible, es in the first 
three examples, to cherecterise whet is wanted es being some—
thing unpleesent, it does not necessarily follow thet such wants 
do not "involve the notion of choice or inclination." Indeed, 
more detailed exeminetion of the four examples reveals thet 
"the notion of choice or inclination" is implicit in eech. 
In (i) it is significant thet without the clause 
"before the gress grows too long" the example does not meke sense 
("I went to cut my lewn. Oh drudgery!") This is beceuse it is 
logically odd to describe whet is wanted es "drudgery", which 
suggests unettrectiveness end undesirability. The "went" is in 
feet trensposed in the full sentence; whet is "vented" is to 
prevent the grass growing too long, i.e. longer then I went or 
desire it to be. The trensposed "went" therefore, when taken in 
connection with the normative "too long", cleerly indicates my 
inclinations, choices end desires concerning the eppeerence of my 
garden. Similerly in (iii) the effect of the subordinate 
"before ..." clause is eeein to transpose the "went"; whet the 
subject of the sentence ectuelly wants is to avoid being caught 
by the Devil, en inclination or desire so strong that it motivates 
him to throw himself into the see. In (ii) my wanting to go to 
the meeting is introduced solely to explein why I em heving my 
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lunch eerly, rether then at the normel time. The "because ..." 
cleuse is therefore ellinticel; what I went (i.e. desire) is to 
get to the meeting on time, not to be lete, not to be in e hurry 
etc. This point is confirmed, es in (1), by removing the time—
reference cleuse ("I em heving lunch early") end noting the loss 
of sense that results: "I went to go to the meeting. Unfortu—
nately I must ettend." If wents could be used in e purely 
intentional and non—inclinetionel way, there need be no such loss 
of sense. Finally in (iv), something is wanted that is not in 
this cese characterised es unpleasant ("to get the hemmer"), as 
"en instrument to some further end", in Deveney's words. But 
again it seems both arbitrary mid odd to meintain thet this went 
possesses no "inclinetionel" force whatsoever. My want could 
express s desire to achieve my purpose in thet perticuler way 
(rether then using en unsuitable, awkward or dangerous tool for 
the job), or it could, agein by trensposition refer to the 
further end which I desire to achieve. 
Deveney's examples of "non—inclinetionel" wents thus 
depend upon gremmeticel oddities rather then logical features of 
wants. Certainly there may be decrees of inclinetion in wanting, 
end whet is wented ttey not always be characterised es something 
intrinsicelly or immedietely attractive, but thet is not to admit 
the possibility of "non—inclinational" wents. How could I 
meaningfully be said to went (to do) x if I had no inclination, 
motivation, preference or desire whatsoever with regard to x, 
whether x be intrinsicelly ettrectivel the lesser of two evils, 
or instrumental in achieving e further purpose? 
"tide must conclude, then, thet the distinction between 
intentional end inclinetionel wents is e false one. Wants may 
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contain verying degrees of inclination end may express inclinetion 
in verying weys, but the notion of "non—incline tionel" wants is 
self—contradictory. This conclusion does not, however, lessen 
the importance of wants in explanations of "doing x rather then 
y". In this section it has so fer been suggested that I "do x 
rether than y" because I prefer to do x rether than y, which 
implies thet I went to do x more then y, end this want (like all 
wents) must be to some extent inclinational. A closer analysis 
is now needed of the relationship between wents and preferences, 
and of their function in cases of "doing ± rether than y". 
C. Preferring 
There is cleerly E close logicel connection between 
preferring to do x rether then y end wanting to do x more then y. 
Preferring, though, is not an exact equivelent of wanting morel 
es it cen be used in several different weys, not all of which can 
be directly trensleted into the "wenting more" form. Consider 
the following exemples:— 
(i) I prefer clessicel music to pop. 
(ii) I prefer to do my own car repairs. 
(iii) I prefer gerdening to playing golf. 
(iv) I prefer to peint the kitchen today rather then 
tomorrow. 
The first three exemples illustrete how "prefer" 
normelly expresses e generel ettitude in fevour of x rether then 
y• "Prefer" here meens "tend to fevour" or "tend to like more"; 
it indicates e disposition to fevour and like certein activities 
rether then others. "Wenting more" or "wanting rether then" can 
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elso be dispositionel in this way (e.g. I want happiness more 
then riches), but is more often occurrent end specific (e.g. I 
went some practical help from you rather then mere advice). 
Example (iv) comes closer to en occurrent, specific preference, 
though even here it seems more neturel to trenslete the sentence 
es "I would rather peint the kitchen todey then tomorrow" then 
es "I went to peint the kitchen today more than (rether than) 
tomorrow." Preferences then refer to dispositions rether than 
occurrences, end es such describe generel ettitudes end likings 
rather then situational wents. 
The general attitudes expressed in examples (i), (ii) 
end (iii) again cannot be directly transleted into the "wanting 
more" form, but such e translation would necessarily be eppliceble 
to particular instances where the attitude or disposition mani—
fested itself; for instance, if I heve e record token to exchange, 
my elleged preference for clessicel music would logically require 
that I should went to select e classical record more then e pop 
record. A similar spelling—out of the preferences in (ii) end 
(iii) in terms of "venting more" would be required in appropriate 
situations. 
An interesting distinction can be drawn between examples 
(ii) end (iii) which beers upon the problem of (non—) inclinational 
vents discussed in B. Sentences of the form "I prefer x—ing to 
y—ing" imply that x—ing is seen as a more ettractive activity 
intrinsically then y—ing. Thus in (iii) the suggestion is that 
I enjoy gardening more then playing golf, end that the preference 
is full—bloodedly inclinational. On the other hand, sentences of 
the form "I prefer to do x rather than y" do not necessarily imply 
that the activity of doing x is attractive or enjoyable in itself. 
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I may hate the chore of doing my own car repairs, yet still 
prefer to do this rather then pay exorbitant prices for inefficient 
workmanship et the local garage. The distinction between preferring 
x—ing to y—ing end -oreferring to do x rather then y can sometimes 
therefore reflect the distinction between wanting x more then y 
for its intrinsic attractions end wanting x more then y es the 
lesser of two evils or es e necessary instrument for achieving e 
further end. 
There ere then close logical connections between pre—
ferring end wanting more, though the two ere not interchangeable. 
The more general, dispositionel nature of preferences will have 
further implications for explanations of "doing x rather then y", 
to be examined shortly (E). 
D. Seeing es Desireble 
Although wents end preferences need express no positive, 
direct desire, whet is wanted or preferred must be seen in some 
way es desirable, either intrinsically or instrumentally. Wanting 
or preferring to do x rather then y is incomprehensible unless x 
can be characterised by the agent es something of which he is in 
favour because it seems to him more desirable then y in certain 
important respects. 
Anscombe refers to this "desirability characterisation" 
in describing e sense of wanting, of which "the primitive sign is 
trying to get":— 	 ... all that is required for our concept of 
'wanting, 
 is that e men should see whet he wents under the aspect 
of some good."5  
A similar point is made by Geech:— 
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"It belongs to the ratio of 'went', 'choose', 'good', end 
'bed', that, normally, end other things being equal, a men 
who vents en A will choose ... en A that he things good 
end will not choose an A that he thinks bad."6 
Although choosing, in the sense of consciously 
deliberating and selecting, does not seem to be a necessary pre—
condition either of acting or of wanting, the logical relation—
ships that Geech is here suggesting support the view that, in 
wanting to do x rather then y, x must be seen as in some way more 
desirable then y. ("Desirable" is substituted for "good" here 
because of the latter's unavoidably ethical overtones. The object 
of wanting need not of course be seen as ethically "good"; a 
robber will see the possibility of a large haul as "desirable", 
i.e. profitable for him, end accordingly went it.) 
The various forms which the desirability characterisation 
can take exemplify further some of the points made in B concerning 
(non—) inclinational wants. I may see x as more desirable then 
y, because of its intrinsic attractiveness; e.g. I want to garden 
rather then play golf, because I prefer gardening to golfing, 
because I simply enjoy the activity more, end therefore see it 
as more desirable. Or I may see x as more desirable than y because 
of its instrumental benefits; e.g. I want to fetch a hemmer 
rather then plug in my electric drill, because that is a more 
effective method of achieving my object of banging in a nail, 
end therefore I see it as more desirable. Or I may see x as more 
desirable than y, despite x's immediate end obvious unattractive—
ness; this could be a ease of "the lesser of two evils" (e.g. I 
went to mow the lawn rather then allow the garden to become 
unkempt, despite my aversion to mowing lawns, because I have an 
even greeter aversion to unkempt gardens, end therefore see the 
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lawn—mowing es tha less undesirable alternative); or it could 
be e case of feeling oneself obliged to perform e distasteful 
duty (e.g. I went to break the news of my friend's death to his 
wife rether then leave her to hear of it from another source, 
because my friend had asked me to do this for him, end I see it 
es more desirable to respect rather then ignore his wishes.) By 
no means all "distasteful duties" can be interpreted in this way, 
however, for the normative, justificatory force of the duty and 
its "ought" need not be accompanied by any motivational incli— 
nation whatever, es was argued in Chapter III. This point will 
be further developed in Section 2 in connection with interpretations 
of ekresie in terms of conflicting wants. 
Another significant implication mey be drawn from the 
letter two examples to the effect that whether a person does x or 
y may depend upon how he sees end describes to himself the alter— 
natives; e.g. whether or not I break the bed news will depend 
upon whether I see that action as respecting my deed friend's 
wishes or as gratuitously inflicting on myself a painful and 
harrowing experience. The importance of varying linguistic inter— 
pretations of situations will be elaborated in Section 2. 
The desirability characterisation also draws attention 
to the fact that "doing x rather then y's'must involve acting for 
reasons. This has already been implied in A by the intentional 
nature of action, for if all actions can be conceived of and 
explained in terTts of achieving some end or purpose, it follows 
that there must be reasons of some kind for all actions, although 
the agent may not always consciously formulate them. 
This general point about actions end reasons can be 
210. 
made more specific in the case of "doing x rather then y", with 
its implications of preference, wanting more, and desirability. 
The reason why I "do x rather than y" is because I want or prefer 
to do x rather then y, end the reason for this is because I see 
x as more desirable in some way than y. These reasons again 
need not be consciously formulated by the agent, but they are 
required by the logic of "doing x rather than y". Tyre must be 
in principle reasons of this kind for my "doing x rather then y", 
even though they need not be "my" reasons in the sense of my 
evaluating the respective desirability of the alternatives and 
deciding accordingly. 
Preferring, wanting more, and seeing as desirable, 
therefore, all have en important explanatory function in providing 
reasons for action (of a general kind) in cases of "doing x rather 
than y". More needs to be said at this point, however, about the 
notion of "reasons for action". 
E. Reasons for il.ction 
It was argued in Chapter III, that a conflict was 
possible between the justificatory reasons for doing something 
and the agent's motivation or inclination. In cases of "doing x 
rather than y" the reasons for action which were shown in the 
last section to be logically necessary need not, however, be 
justificatory (in the sense of supporting an "ought"—judgment), 
for "ought"—judgments need not feature in such cases at all. I 
do x rather than y because I went to do x rather than y, because 
of the more desirable aspect under which I see x, but whether I 
ought to do x or y is a different question and one which may not 
211. 
even occur to me. If "doing x rather than y", then, must in 
principle be explicable in terms of reasons for action, yet does 
not logically require the existence of justificatory reasons, a 
problem arises over whet kind of reasons for action are operative 
here. 
One obvious answer is to introduce the notion of 
"motivational reasons", thus reflecting the distinction between 
justification and motivation drawn in Chapter III. But there is 
a difficulty here in using "motivational reasons" to describe a 
person's wants and inclinations. Reasons suggest general prin—
ciples not specific inclinations, universal rules not individual 
wants. To answer the question, "Whet was the reason for your 
doing that?" with "Oh, I just felt like it," is tantamount to 
saying "No reason at ell:" Similarly, my feeling hungry cannot 
strictly count as the reason why I steal food; it is simply my 
motive for doing so. Reasons must reach for their explanatory 
force beyond purely situational factors which refer to particular 
persons end events towards generalisations that transcend the 
perticuler.7  
These logical features of reasons will be respected if 
we use the term "explehatory" reasons for action rather then 
"motivational", provided that we beer in mind the necessarily 
generalised nature of the explanations to be sought. An explana—
tory reason for action must relate the agent's particular, 
situational motives to a generalised rule or principle. The 
explanatory reason why I stole the food could therefore be that 
I was starving and penniless, end that people who are starving 
end penniless are likely to adopt desperate methods of obtaining 
212. 
food; my perticuler situational stete is thus linked to 
relevent generelisetion, providing en explenetory reeson for my 
e ction. 
The went mey or mey not be ewere of the explanatory 
reeson for his ection. 	 leest three elternetives ere possible:— 
(i) he mey just ect without consciously considering his 
motives or reesons et all. 
he mey try to explain his ection by describing only his 
motives end situetionel state. 
(iii) he may give e full explenetory reason by referring 
elso to the generalised principle under which his 
ection fells. 
Pn observer, however, wishing to give e comprehensive explanation 
of the ection of enother, could only do so within the fremework 
of explenetory reesons. 
6everel important questions erise from this account of 
explanetory reesons, when considered in conjunction with points 
elreedy discussed in this chepter. 
(i) Whet is the reletionship between motives and seeing 
something es desireble? 
It is enelytic that if e person wants something, he sees 
it es desirable, but this is e formal principle necesserily lacking 
in specificity. Whet motives do is to perticulerise end summerise 
the espect under which something is seen es desireble end there—
fore wented. My beliefs end incline tions iced rile to see it es 
desireble to fight for my country rether then become e con—
scientious objector; I see this action under the espect of 
defending thet which I love, opposing thet which I hete, and 
expressing my loyalty end gretitude to my mother—country. These 
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espects of desirebility ere picked , out end sumrnerised by seying 
that my motive is petriotism. 
Motives ere often used therefore es convenient, short—
bend descriptions of the perticuler espect under which certain 
things are seen to be desireble. Some motives of course, such 
es feer, do not directly refer to espects of desirebility, but 
still operete in a similer wey; if my feer leeds me to hide 
under the bedclothes rather then investigate the suspicious 
noises downstairs, this is because I see it es more desirable 
to keep out of trouble then to run the risk of entegonising e 
possibly dangerous intruder. 
(ii) Whet is the relationship between justificetory 
end explanatory reesons? 
This question will be explored more fully in Section 
2, but briefly it cen be se id et this point thet, while explene—
tory reasons can in principle be given for ell Potions, this is 
not the cese with justificetory reasons, for these ere reauired 
only when there is e doubt or query about whet ought to be (or 
hive been) done. Justificatory reasons may help to provide 
expltnetory reesons et times, for it wes argued in Chepter III that 
motives (which ere en integrel pert of explanatory reesons) need 
not conflict with justificetory reesons end may indeed be 
directly supplied by them sometimes; for exemple, the explana—
tory reeson for my visiting en aged end centenkerous relative 
could be that I consider there to be justificetory reesons which 
piece me under en obligetion to do so, end thet I generally 
prefer to feel thet I em fulfilling rather then ignoring my 
obligations. It wes also emphesised, however, in Chepter III 
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that it wes logically possible for e person to be insufficiently 
motiveted to do that for which he considered there to be justi—
ficetory reesons, end that this possibility allowed for the 
occurrence of ekresie. 
(iii) How generalised does the -orinciple which forms 
pert of en explenetory reeson heve to be? 
The wider the application of the generelisetion, the 
greeter will be the explenetory force of the reeson. For example, 
nerelisations of the form, "Most people tend to ..." will have 
greeter explanatory force then those of the form, "Some people 
tend to ..." which will in turn have greeter explenetory force 
then those of the form, "He tends to ..." Even the lest of these, 
however, would still count es e generelisetion, es it suggests e 
regulated, dispositionel pattern of behaviour which is explicable 
end to some extent predictable by reference to e principle. 
But can e sufficiently "explenetory" reason for Potion 
really be provided by eny "tend to ..." type of generelisetion? 
Is not e further explanation elweys needed of wt people tend to 
behove in e certain way? While it can be admitted thet further, 
more eleborete explenetions of e psychological or sociological 
kind can elwrys be sought, and. that such explenetions, if velideted, 
would indicate reesons for ection of e greeter explenetory force, 
this does not mean that "tend to ..." generElisetions, when 
related to e perticuler agent's situation end motives, cannot con—
stitute en edequete exnlenetory reason for action es outlined 
above; the requirement of generality implicit in the notion of 
"reeson" is sufficiently met in such cases. It is surely arbi—
trary to claim thet, before the rdvent of formalised psychology 
end sociology, people were unable to offer explanatory reesons for 
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their own end others' actions. 
(iv) Whet is the reletionship between explanatory 
reasons for action end wents? 
1? -t first sight it would appear to follow from the 
erguments already developed that wenting to do x indicates en 
inclination which cannot strictly count es en explenetory reeson 
for doing x, beceuse it refers to e specific situation and thereby 
leeks the necessary generality of e reeson; preferences on the 
other hand, because of their more general, dispositionel nature 
(see C) need not be lacking in this respect. 
It sounds undeniably odd, however, to deny that e 
person's wants can provide e reason that explains why he acted 
es he did, whether whet is wanted be intrinsicelly attractive, 
instrumentally useful, or the lesser of two evils. If asked, for 
example, "Why are you digging that hole?" my answer, "I want to 
build e pond," (instrumental), or "I went to indulge my passion 
for digging" (intrinsic), or "I went to get out of doing the 
washing—up" (lesser of two evils), seems to provide en excellent 
explenetory reeson, despite the feet that in each case e 
situetionel inclination but no generalised principle is referred 
to. 
The solution to this epperent paradox lies in the 
enelytic connections already discuss-ed between wenting end trying 
to get, end between wanting end seeing es desirable. Whet happens 
when e person's wents are given es en explenetory reason for his 
action is that the principle "people see whet they want under en 
aspect of desirability and therefore try to get it," beceuse it  
is enelytic, is taken es self—evident end so is not spelt out. 
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The went is thus left free—stending, unsupported by en explicit 
principle and giving the eppeerence of e motive or inclination 
that needs the becking of en empiricel generelisetion (e.g. of the 
"tend to ..." type) to turn it into en explenetory reason. Rather 
similar ere cases where e motive, given es en explenetory reason, 
implies en enelytic rether then en empiricel principle: e.g. "Why 
is he epplying for such en important post?" "Ambition:" (sc. "end 
embitious people by definition aim high.") 
Wents then C711 constitute explenetory reesons' this 
ebbrevieted kind. Indeed, in view of the fact thet "doing x 
rether then y" implies wonting to do x rether then y, wents must 
feeture centrally in any reesons thet explain why x rether then y 
is done. 
Whet can be said, though, about the converse relation—
ship between wants and reesons? Wents cen provide reesons for 
ection, but cen there be said to be reesons for our wants, end if 
so, of whet kind? It might be supposed that wants ere arbitrary 
stetes of mind, inclinations thet we just experience, for which 
it is ineppropriete to ask for reasons, but the account of wents 
elreedy developed in this section tells egeinst such e view. 
We do not just went something in e reesonless vacuum; 
we went it under e perticuler espect which we see es good or 
desirable. Anscombe comments in this connection on the oddity of 
someone saying thet he wents e seucer of mud: "He is likely to 
be asked whet for."8 Under whet espect of desirebility, in other 
words, does he see it? is En aesthetic object, es e possession 
to cell his own, or whet? If no aspect of desirebility could be 
specified in this way, the person could not be seid to went such 
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en object. 
It follows from this that there must be reesons for 
wents — end reesons egein of en explenetory kind. These reasons 
must be derived from the intentions or evaluations of the agent, 
and can tlweys be characterised in terms of his beliefs con—
cerning the desirability of whet is wanted. ley reeson for wanting 
x will elweys be that I see x in some way es desirable. This 
becomes en explanatory reason beceuse en enelytic principle is 
egein implicit — i.e. people went whet they see es desirable. 
The further, more fundamental question concerning the reeson why 
people see certain things es desireble will be considered in 
Section 2. 
Wants then can supply explenetory reesons for action, 
end explenetory reesons can be given for wents, because of the 
enelytic principle implicit in each case. 
Conclusion 
This section hes ettemptqd to present e general account 
of what is involved in "doing x rether then y." It hes been 
argued that I "do x rether then y" beceuse I prefer to do x 
rether then y and went to do x rether then y, though no deliberate 
decision or choice is required. As all wants were shown to be to 
some extent "inclinational", it follows that I must also be more 
inclined towards, or more in favour of, x then y. The logic of 
wilting further requires that I see x es intrinsically or instru—
mentally more desireble then y, or less undesirable in cases 
where x is in itself unettrective. There ere therefore elweys 
reesons for my "doing x rether then y", which ere explenetory 
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end relate my situetionel wents end motives to e generalised 
principle of en empirical or implicit, enelytic kind. 
2. Akresie es e special cese of "doing x rether then," 
The foregoing enelysis of "doing x rether then y" cen 
now be epplied to akresie. All ceses of Ekresie ere ceses of 
"doing x rather then y" (by definition), but the reverse does 
not hold. Whet then is the tdditionel feature which picks out 
ceses of ek.resie from the generel class of cases of "doing x 
rether then y"? 
Cleerly this feature is derived from the special neture 
of the elternetive courses of action, x or y, which suggest them—
selves to the egent. The ekresiec does not merely "do x rether 
then y"; according to the formuletion developed in Chepter IV he 
does (or decides to do) x while et the some time sincerely 
believing thet he ought not to do x, though being able not to do 
x end eble to decide not to do x. The ability criterion expressed 
by the final clause must apply to ell ceses of "doing x rether 
then y", not only those of ekresit (see 1, A, above), but it is 
the inconsistency criterion, with its requirement of "at the same 
time sincerely believing that he ought not to do x", which pro—
vides the differentie. The ekresiec "does x rather then y", but 
the y which he does not do is elso thet which he sincerely believes 
he ought to do. 
Nevertheless, if ell cases of ekresie ere ceses of 
"doing x rather then y", the logicel features of the letter, 
explored in the previous section, will necesserily epply to the 
former. This means thet the ekresiec, in doing (or deciding to 
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do) x while sincerely believing that he ought to do y, must in 
some sense went or prefer to do x rather then y, and be more 
inclined towards or more in favour of doing x rather then y; he 
must see x es intrinsically or instrumentally more desirable (or 
less undesirable) than y; end there must be explanatory reasons 
for his doing x rather than y, which relate his situational wants 
end motives to e generalised principle of some kind. ("Doing in 
will for the purposes of this section be taken to include 
intellectual activities, es described in the eccount of intel—
lectual ekresie given in Chapter IV.) 
Such en eccount raises important issues which must be 
considered in some detail if e setisfectory general explanation 
of ekresie is to be found. In particular, how Gen the ekresiects 
sincere belief that he ought to do y be reconciled with his wants, 
preferences, inclinations end motives in favour of doing x? This 
crucial problem will be approached by way of a closer examination 
of both x end y in the context of ekresia — i.e. the course of 
ection (y) which it is sincerely believed ought to be followed, 
end the course of action (x) which is in fact followed (or decided 
upon). The educational example of e typically ekresiec situation, 
described in Chapter IV, will again be referred to in order to 
illustrate the argument. 
A. Sincerely believing that one ought to do y 	 the 
ought"—judgment of the ekresiec 
k necessary condition of ekresie is that the agent 
should sincerely believe that he ought to do that which he in 
feet fells to do. But whet exactly is entailed by the akrasiecis 
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sincere belief that he ought to do y? 
In Chapter III it was argued that "oughts" imply:— 
(i) the backing of justificatory reesons end principles, 
(ii) uncertainty of outcome, 
(iii) the likely existence of countervailing factors. 
Sincerely believing that I ought to do y, then, requires that I 
accept thet there are good, justificatory reasons for my doing y, 
relating to E principle with which I agree (which may be of a 
morel, prudential, non—morel, or even immoral variety). Ky 
ecceptence End agreement express the normative pressure of an 
obligation which I feel exists for me and authoritatively pre—
scribes that I should do y. However, my "ought"—belief also 
implies that there Pre likely to exist countervailing factors, 
which make it uncertain whether the "ought" will actually lead to 
the appropriete outcome. 
These features cherecterise ell sincere "ought"—judgments, 
including those of the ekrasiac. But ere there any particular 
features of the ekresiects "ought"—judgment which, while not 
detracting from the sincerity of his belief, help to explain why 
he in feet fells to do y? 
The ekresiects "ought"—judgment is clearly "non—over—
riding", in the sense that the justificatory reesons which are 
accepted es supporting the "ought"—judgment ere in practice out—
weighed and overruled by other considerations. The reasons for 
this, however, relate more to why the akresiec in feet does x, 
or decides to do x, then to whet is involved in his believing 
that he ought to do y, and will accordingly be dealt with in B. 
The obscurity of the claim that morel "ought"—judgments must 
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logicelly be "overriding" was demonstrated in Chapter III, end 
so the sincerity end legitimacy of the ekresiecls "ought"—belief 
cennot be denied on the grounds that it is "non—overriding". 
Does the ekresiec also use "ought" in a "non—universal" 
sense, which might indeed cast some doubts upon his sincerity? 
Certainly he fells to act upon his "ought", but his "ought"— 
judgment cennot be said to be non—universal in the sense described 
by Here — "While continuing to prescribe thet everyone else 
should act in eccordence with the principle, we do not so pre—
scribe to ourselves." els was argued in Chapter IV, the akresiac 
does "prescribe to himself" or et least recognise the prescriptive 
force of the reasons end principles which he accepts es justi—
ficatory, which is why he experiences guilt—feelings, remorse, 
emberressment etc. when failing to act in eccordence with the 
prescription. If he did not acknowledge the authority of such 
prescription, he might be guilty of indifference, insensitivity 
or sloth, but not (by definition) of ekrasie. 
The ekresiec does not, then, eppeer to be using "ought" 
in e perticulerly idiosyncratic or logically improper wey, for 
his "ought"—judgment reveels ell of the logicel cherecteristics 
described in Chapter III. He accepts reasons es justifying e 
perticuler course of action, end in so doing interprets the 
situation in E7 certain wey which expresses the normative pressure 
exerted upon him by that interpretation; facts become factors 
which weigh with him and would lead to the eppropriete action, 
other things being equal. 
Thus, the schoolboy in our example sees end interprets 
the feet of his gaining higher marks by using the crib es teking 
en unfeir edventege over his clessmates end therefore es e morel 
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factor which beers normatively upon the question of whether he 
ought to ect in that way; alternatively he mey see his resorting 
to the crib es lessening his chances of later academic success end 
therefore es e prudential factor which mey influence him. These 
factors become reasons when they ere related to e principle with 
which the agent implicitly or explicitly agrees — e.g. it is 
wrong to take unfair advantage of one's colleagues, or it is e 
good thing to eein ecedemic success. 
The problem ebout principles, however, is thet they re 
inevitably "theoretical`` in the sense that they refer to e more 
general, classifies tory framework rather then to e specific 
situation. Agreeing with the generelisetion expressed in a prin—
ciple is e different matter from making e specific decision to 
act in e perticuler situetion. The distinction may be sharpened 
by noting that e "principle—decision" is always e decision that ... 
(e.g. that it is wrong to lie), whereas en "ection—decision" is 
always e decision to ... (e.g. to tell the truth); our schoolboy 
decides that he ought not to take unfair edventege of his class—
mates, but he also decides to use the crib. Principles then have 
a"cool—hour" quality, well described by Cooper es follows:— 
I t 	 F men's morel principles ere those of his principles of 
ection which in e cool hour he is leest prepared to abandon 
belief in, however much he may be tempted to deviate from 
them in the beet of the moment."9 
This end other cherectOristics of principles, both morel 
and prudential, will be further examined later in this section. 
The ekresiec then sincerely believes that he ought to 
do y, without violating the logicel features of "ounht", previously 
discussed. His "ought"—judgment, though ultimately "non—overriding" 
in prectice, carries with. it en acceptance of justificatory 
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reesons for doing y, releting to e principle with which he 
agrees. It is because of his acceptance end agreement that 
guilt, remorse or some other "beheviourel or non—beheviourel 
consideration" results from his failure to act in eccordence 
with the reesons end principles he ecknowledges as justificatory. 
Why then does he not do y? Pert of the answer must 
lie in the tension that hes already been shown to exist between 
the various logicel feetures of "ought" — between the normative 
pressure exerted by justificatory reesons end principles on the 
one hand, end the likely existence of countervailing factors 
leading to uncerteinty of outcome on the other. This tension, 
which is highlighted in ekresie, means that "ought"—judgments 
ere essentially Jenus—feced. They reveal characteristics which 
suggest both the translation end the non—translation of the 
"ought" into action, but it is only in cases of ekresia that the 
tension results in non—translation; in other cases the normative 
pressure exerted by justificatory reasons end principles is 
trensleted into ection, but with ekresie the agent does not so 
cat because other fectors ere operetive. These fectors provide 
the key to the problem of ekresie. 
Believing thet one ought to do y is to do y, in the 
ebsence of countervailing fectors. Griffiths, in his discussion 
of the status of this principle, concludes thet it is one 
"necessary to the explicebility of the rational behaviour of 
men."
10 
 6uch e principle ecknowledges the potentially conflicting 
feetures of "ought"; it expresses both the presumption in favour 
of doing y (because of the normative pressure of "ought") in the 
ebsence of countervailing fectors, end els() the possibility of 
not doing y in the presence of such factors. The explenetion of 
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ekresie, therefore, seems to lie within these "counterveiling 
fectors", which in turn will derive from the course of action x 
which the ekresiec prefers in some way to the course of ection 
y, despite his belief thet he ought to do y. 
Thus, explenetions of the Ekrasieces behaviour do not 
depend upon irregularities in his "ought"—judgment, for that 
judgment conteins the necessary features required by the logic 
of "ought", end is neither idiosyncratic nor "off—colour". It 
depends rather upon the "counterveiling factors", in whose absence 
the "ought"—judgment would be acted upon, but in whose presence 
en elternetive course of ection is preferred. That preference 
will form the subject of the following section. 
B. ... yet doing x: the action of the ekresiec 
It hEs been ergued thet the ekresiec in doing (or 
deciding to do) x rather then y must in some sense went or prefer 
to do x rether then y; he must be more inclined towerds or more 
in favour of doing x rether then y; he must see x es more 
desireble, or less undesirable then y; end there must be?exple—
netory reesons for his doing x rether then y, which relate his 
situational wents end motives to en explenetory principle. It 
is these wents, preferences, inclinations end motives, therefore, 
which supply the "counterveiling fectors" referred to in A. 
Akresie involves e conflict of reasons. The justi—
ficetory reesons why y ought to be done, releting to e morel, 
prudential or pragmatic principle end eccepted by the ekresiec 
in the sense described in A, conflict with the explenetory 
reasons why x is done, releting to en explenetory principle end 
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to the ekresiec's motives. These motives find expression in 
immediete, situetional wants which, et the time of eating or of 
deciding to act, override the normative prescriptions end the 
"theoretical" principles which support the ekresiec's sincere 
belief that he ought to ect otherwise. He wents to do x rather 
then y, in the sense that he etteches more weight to the moti—
vetionel considerations es to why he should do x then he does to 
the justificetory considerations es to why he ought to do y, end 
accordingly he does x. 
Thus, our schoolboy, although accepting in the wey 
elreedy described the morel end prudential reasons why he ought 
not to use the crib, nevertheless wents to maintain his ecadtmic 
reputetion with his teachers end classmates by gaining high marks 
in cless, end this went weighs more heavily with him at the time 
of acting (or of decision) then does his resolve not to use the 
crib. His motives (e.g. pride, embition, egotism, etc.) lead him 
to see the meintenence of his reputetion es the more desirable 
elternetive, end supply explanatory reasons for his conduct when 
linked to e relevant principle (e.g. he is the sort of person who 
will do anything to avoid losing face, or more generally, ambitious 
students dislike end fear ecedemic failure.) 
This interpretation of ekresie is supported to a large 
syitent by Kenny's eccount: 
"... if he (the ekresiec) fails to do whet he ought to do, 
this means that for the time being he wents something else 
more then he wants not to be unjust, or unkind, or foolish. 
But his failure in no way counts against his genuinely 
believing that his action is unjust, or whetever.1111  
Kenny's emphasis upon the akresiec's wants is helpful, 
but his view of "morel weakness ... as e particular case of the 
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problem of conflicting wants"
12 
differs significently from that 
which hes here been suggested, for Elthough it hes been argued 
in this chepter that the akrasiec wants to do x (which he does) 
rether then y (which he believes he ought to do), it does not 
follow from this that he must want to do y et all. Wants were 
shown in Section 1 to be necessarily "inclinetionel" in thet 
they must imply some degree of motivation, preference or desire, but 
int i is quite conceitable (es was shown in Chepter III) that in 
some ceses one mey have no such inclination towards doing whet 
one nevertheless believes one ought to do. acknowledging the 
normative pressure of en "ought" end the justificetory force of 
reesons and principles does not entail 111.11aL to ect upon the 
"ought" end in eccordence with the reasons end principles. 
Indeed, it is this non—entailment which produces the distinction 
between "ought" qnd "should", end between justificetory end 
motivetionel fectors (see Chepter III), end consequently the 
possibility of ekresie. The notion of e "distasteful duty" 
clearly demonstrates that we need not went to do what we believe 
we ought to do. Lb en though our ectcnowledgment of the normFtive 
pressure of justificetory reesons end principles might be said to 
require thet we "see it es desirable" thet the ection which we 
believe we ought to do should be done, it does not follow that 
we necessarily "see it es desirable" (end so went) to do the 
Potion ourselves, despite our belief that we ought to do it. We 
may see es desireble the bringing ebout of states of affairs 
which we ere not ourselves motivationally inclined to bring ebout. 
4kresie is better described, then, es e perticuler case 
of venting to do x rether then y then es e particular case of 
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conflicting, wants, es Kenny meinteins, though Kenny's account 
will in feet fit many instances of ekresie l in particular pru—
dential ones es will be illustrated later in this section. The 
terminology of ekresit and its implications, however, have by 
now been sufficiently. explored. Whet is needed et this point is 
en examination of certein suggestive feetures of the ekresiec's 
action of doing x, which will help to fill out the somewhat 
forme' account so fer offered end to Provide some pointers of 
educetionel relevance which cen be further developed in the 
following chapter. Three such feetures will be considered in 
some depth; they ere to some extent interrelated, but for the 
sake of clarity will be discussed under seperete headings, ES 
follows:— 
(i) the dishonesty factor 
(ii) the lenpuege factor 
(iii) the immediacy factor. 
(i) The Dishonesty Factor 
The ekresiec, it hes been ergued, sincerely believes 
that there ere justificetory reesons why he ought to do y; yet 
there must also exist explenetory reesons why he in fact does x, 
deriving from his motives end wants which. feed him to see x es 
more desirable then y. The reason why he does x rather than y 
is simply that he wants to do x rether then y, despite his 
ecknowledgment of the justificatory reesons for doing y. 
Whet the ekresiec is doing, therefore, is to acknowledge 
the normetive pressure of the justificetory reesons (by making 
his "ought"—judgment), but to fail to acknowledge the more 
immediate, motivetionel pressure of his wants, which supply the 
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explenatory reasons. The only evidence for this motivetionel 
Pressure is his action of doing x or his decision to do x, but 
this action or decision conclusively proves its existence end 
indeed its dominance. In meking reference only to his belief 
that he ought to do y, then, the ekrasiec is feiling to make 
explicit, to himself or to others, those factors which ere in 
fact weighing most heevily with him et the time of his decision 
or action (i.e. his motives end wants), end which ere revealed 
by that decision to do x or that action of doing x. Our school—
boy,for example, in forming his "ought"—judgment, melees explicit 
the justificatory reasons why he ought not to use the crib, but 
fails to ecknowledge his opposing motives end wants which go to 
provide the explanatory reesons for why he in feet decides to use 
it. 
This "feilure to ecknowledge" is closely akin to self—
deception, which, though dismissed es a straightforwerd explenation 
of ekresie in Chapter IV, helps to cherecterise thet feature of 
the ekresiec's behaviour et present under consideration. Self—
deception also involves e "failure to ecknowledge", or as 
Fingerette describes it, e failure to spell—out certain features 
of our engagement in the world:13 "the self—deceiver is one who 
is in some way engaged in the world but who disavows the engage—
ment, who will not acknowledge it even to himself es his."14 By 
"engagement" Fingarette intends to cover "such cetegories es aims, 
reesons, motives, attitudes and feelings ..,"15 
 all of which 
figure prominently in the "countervailing factors" of akrasia. 
An importent feature of akresia, therefore, eppeers to 
be e degree of self—deception or intellectuel dishonesty, in thet 
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the agent fails to acknowledge, avow, spell—out or meke explicit 
those fectors which weigh most heavily with him in the situation 
facing him. This process is facilitated by ambiguities contained 
within the judgment, "I believe that I ought to do y", for et 
least three interpretations ere possible. 
(e) "I believe that I ought to do y" may bee judgment 
that is both straightforward end final, in that only one type of 
reeson (i.e. justificetory) is motivationally operative upon the 
agent. To take another educetionel exemple, e teacher may believe 
that he ought to make allowances fora particular pupil's mis—
behaviour because of serious domestic pressures which he knows 
to exist end which he feels constitute justificetory reasons for 
treating the boy leniently rather then punishing him. Further—
more, the teacher does not went to punish the boy; he likes him 
on e personal level, he dislikes punishment generally, end he 
feels that he is more likely to establish mutual trust end under—
standing by discussing the boy's problems with him informally. 
The teacher's decision then is in accord both with his wants end 
Preferences end with his educetionel ideals end values; he wants 
to do what he believes he ought to do. He is free of doubt, 
conflict end self—deception es he forms his "ought"—judgment, 
which will, according to Uriffiths' principle, entail action 
(given that the egent is e rational being), as countervailing 
fectors, the likelihood of which is implied by the logic of 
"ought", ere not in this case present. 
(b) "I believe that I ought to do y" may, perhaps 
more commonly, bee judgment that is still final but not straight—
forward, in that conflicting reasons impinge upon the egent yet 
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he still comes down in favour of the justificatory ones. To 
continue with the example used in (e), e second teacher may 
acknowledge the justificatory reesons for treating the boy 
leniently just es the first teecher does, yet his overall view 
of the situation may be very different. This teecher dislikes 
the boy personally, hes no objections in general to the use of 
punishment, end also wents to impress the Heedmester, who believes 
strongly in the exercise of firm discipline and who is about to 
write e reference for the teecher in question. The teecher wents 
to get e good reference, for he is embitious end eager to move 
on; he also wents to punish the boy for the disruption he is 
ceusing. These motives end wants supply explanatory reesons for 
his punishing the boy, but these conflict with the justificatory 
reasons for treating him leniently, which he considers valid on 
both morel end educetionel grounds. In considering the respective 
weight of these conflicting factors, the teacher sees it es more 
desirable to stick to his morel and educetionel principles then 
to indulge his personal dislike of the boy end to use him es 
pawn in the promotion stakes. His "ought"—judgment, though in 
this cese subject to doubt end conflict (but egein not self—
deception), leads accordingly to the same action es in (e) but 
es e result of e different judgmental process. 
(c) "I believe that I ought to do y" may also be 
judgment that is not straightforward, nor final in the sense that 
(e) end (b) ere, for in this cese the final action or decision is 
not that which the justificatory reasons support. A third teecher, 
for example, mey face exectly the same situation es the second 
teecher in (b), yet decide to punish the boy. His analysis of 
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the boy's behaviour end of the best way of deeling with it is 
identical with that of the teachers in (e) end (b), and his 
sincere belief that he ought to treet the boy leniently expresses 
his ecknowledgment of the justificetory reesons for so acting. 
In this cese, however, embition end personal dislike constitute 
counterveiling fectors of greeter motivationel influence. He 
sees it et that time es more desireble to put the boy in his place, 
impress the Heedmester, end get a good reference then to follow 
the dictates of his morel end educetionel principles. Accordingly 
he does whet he sees es more desireble in preference to whet he 
believes he ought to do but wents to do less (or perhaps not et 
ell). Despite his feilure to ect es he believes he ought, the 
sincerity of his belief may be demonstrated by eny of Gerdiner's 
"host of behavioural or non—behavioural considerations." The 
teecher may feel uneasy while punishing the boy, or guilty end 
remorseful after the event; he mey go out of his way to show con—
sideration to the boy next dey (perhaps to en excessive extent); 
he may be bed—tempered or withdrawn et home; he mey tear up his 
Heedmester's reference, or even decide to give up teaching; he 
may try to convince himself end others thet the boy hes benefitted 
greatly from being punished, despite the lack of eny evidence to 
support his contention. Any of these or countless other such 
"considerations" is sufficient to indicate the sincerity of his 
"ought"—judgment. There is no reason to suppose that this judg—
ment would not have been ected upon in the absence of counter—
vailing fectors, but the judgment is note final one es in (e) 
end (b). This then is e typicel cese of ekresia. 
If the third teecher describes his eppreisel of the 
situation by referring only to his belief thet he ought to treet 
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the boy leniently, he is guilty of intellectual dishonesty end 
self-deception, for he is revealing end portraying only e pert 
of his overall judgment, end feiling to acknowledge the moti-
vetionel factors whioh in feet weigh most heevily with him. The 
ambiguities of "ought"-beliefs described above allow him to imply 
thet his judgment wes really, intended to be final (es in (e) end 
(b)), but thet some causal factor, external to that judgment, 
prevented him from ecting upon it. His apparently mysterious 
behaviour is thus attributed to the obscure phenomenon of "week 
will", wherees the reel explenetion is no different from that 
which covers ell cases of "doing x rather then y" - he wonted to 
do x rather then y because he sew it et the time es more 
desirable. Foiling to admit end spell-out these wants and to 
include them explicitly when portraying his overall judgment end 
epproisel of the situation helps to create the apparently 
explenetory concept of "weakness of will". 
1)n important feature of ckrasie then is the failure to 
ecknowledge those factors end reasons which in fact weigh most 
heevily with the agent, but is this failure to be construed es 
en inability or as e deliberate policy? The ability criterion 
of ekresie would not necesserily be violated by e psychological 
inability to spell-out one's motives end wants in e particular 
situation, as this need not entail e further inability to act or 
decide otherwise in thet situation. The ekresiec teacher in (c) 
may be psychologically uneble to ecknowledge thet he is piecing 
e higher priority upon personal advancement then upon his 
educational ideals, but this does not mean that he is uneble 
to act or decide to act otherwise (e.g. by reviewing the situation, 
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seeing it in a different light, etc.) Some cases of ekrasie may 
thus carry with them en inability to acknowledge motivational 
factors, end this possibility will be further examined in the 
following chapter. 
Certain logical features of akmasia discussed earlier, 
however, suggest that the "failure to acknowledge" is likely to 
be more akin to a deliberate policy. Wilson appears to support 
this view by describing the akrasiac as having a "counter—
syllogism" end "following different rules"; this may result from 
"unconscious beliefs end emotions ... (but) it is often the case 
not that S cannot, but that in an important sense S does not 
want to, perform the required Potion."16 (author's italics) 
Fingarette advances a similar argument with reference 
to self—deception:— 
"This inability to spell—out is not a lack of skill or 
strength; it is the adherence to a policy (tacitly) 
adopted ... The self—deceiver commits himself to avoid 
spelling—out his commitment ... (end) has decisive reasons 
for his commitment not to spell this engagement out."17 
Similarly the akrasiac may have decisive reasons for 
tacitly adopting a deliberate policy of "non—acknowledgment", 
end these reasons are likely to arise from the typically moral 
context within which ekrasie is logically situated. Two indi—
cations of this context were given in Chapter IV:— 
(a) the immorally resolute men cannot be guilty of ekrasie, as 
there is no inconsistency between his "ought"—judgments and 
his aotions, end 
(b) akresie implies some strength of will or moral impetus, but 
not enough; a complete lack of strength denotes impotence 
or incapacity, not weakness. 
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These two points suggest that the morel ekresiec is 
far from being totelly emorel. Indeed the conflict which 
theracterises ceses of morel ekresie presupposes en agent who is 
concerned with the morel question of whet he ought to do. Sincerely 
believing that one ought to do y end ecknowledging the reasons 
that justify this requires moral ewereness end sensitivity, 
without which cases of morel ekresie could not occur. (Prudential 
ceses will be considered seperetely below.) 
Morel ekresie then takes place within e morel framework; 
it provides grounds for morel censure of En egent who is ewere of 
the morel dimensions of e situation. Given such e framework, it 
is herdly surprising that the akrFsiec ecknowledges end spells—
out justificatory reesons more openly then he does his wants end 
motives. His ewereness of justifice tory reesons is morelly 
preiseworthy, whereas en edmission of the greeter motivetionel 
influence of his non—morel wents end motives would invite morel 
criticism. So he makes explicit only the morelly respectable 
reasons becking his "ought"—judgment end not the morally blame—
worthy factors which in fact lead him to act es he does. His 
"decisive reesons for tacitly adopting e deliberate policy of 
non—acknowledgment" ere, therefore, to seek e lest line of defence 
egeinst morel censure, either from others if he is revealing his 
judgmental processes publicly, or from his own conscience if his 
"acknowledgment" end "non—ecknowledgment" of various factors is 
e purely private matter. In either oese, to spell—out his overall  
judgment of the situation would be to declare, either to others 
or himself, his reel priorities, i.e. the greeter importance he 
attaches to non—morel then to morel consideretions. By making 
explicit only the morel and "non—finer elements in his overall 
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judgment, however, he can attribute his "lapse" to weakness of 
will, a notion which, as previous chapters have shown, can 
easily (though mistakenly) be given a causal, compulsive inter—
pretation, which if accepted would exonerate the akresiac from 
morel responsibility, or at least lessen his culpability. 
Cases of prudential ekrasie reveal similar character—
istics. Pmen when the "ought"—judgment refers solely to the 
agent's own (usually longer—term) interests, the justificatory 
reasons backing that judgment still carry with them overtones of 
greater morel, or at least social, respectability then would en 
open admission of the agent's (usually more immediate) wants end 
motives. If, for example, our ekresiac schoolboy's judgment that 
he ought not to use the crib is backed by purely prudential 
reasons (i.e. he needs practice in tackling translations himself 
in order to increase his chances of academic success Aater), 
those reasons are more likely to win morel or social approval 
then his desire, by fair means or foul, to outdo his classmates 
end to gain praise from his teacher. Similarly, the ekresiec, 
heavy smoker who acknowledges the prudential, justificatory 
reasons why he should give up (i.e. to improve his health and 
life expectancy), recognises that these reasons are more praise—
worthy then his desire for immediate sensual gratification in 
the form of en addictive tranquiliser. In general, the reasons 
supporting e prudential "ought"—judgment presuppose the premise 
that, other things being equal, self—advancement and self— 
preservation (if not pursued to the detriment of others) are more 
justifiable end acceptable than self—neglect and self—destruction; 
prudence is more often viewed as a virtue then as a vice. The 
explanation of the prudential ekresiac's failure to spell—out his 
overall judgMent end his attribution of his "lapse" to weakness 
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of will is, therefore, basically the some es in the cese of the 
morel ekrasiec. 
Even ceses of ekresio where"precticol oughts" are 
involved con be similerly interpreted. If I claim to know end 
believe that I ought to keep my eye on the bell, yet in feet fail 
to do so, I em epein spelling—out only the justificatory reasons 
supporting the "ought", end not the counterveiling rectors (e.g. 
I em too lazy to practise herd enough to get it right, End con—
sequently do not went to meke the necessary effort), because those 
countervailing factors even in such ceses normally oerry with them 
overtones of morel censure. 
One central fee tore then of ell forms of ekrasia eppears 
to bee degree of intellectual dishonesty. The ekresiec fails to 
acknowledge, to himself or to others, those countervailing factors 
which outweigh for him the justificatory reasons backing his 
"ought"—judgment. This feilure, whether due to e psychological 
inability or e deliberately adopted policy, stems from the logical 
framework of morel end social epprovel within which ekresie 
typically occurs. The effect of concealing this feilure end of 
invoking the explenetory, auesi—ceusel notion of "week will" is 
to mitigate the blame which would ettech to on edmission of the 
etc:re-sleets overall judgment of the situation. 
(ii) The Lenguege Fector 
The ekresiec, in wanting to do x rather then y though 
believing that he ought to do y, is faced with e situation which 
offers him elternetive courses of Potion or inaction. But there 
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is no unique way of describing any situation or any alternatives. 
Different people interpret the some situation differently and 
classify the some alternatives differently. One person may view 
the situation economically, another aesthetically, another 
morally, another metaphysically, end so on. 
The aspect under which a situation is seen can be 
characterised only through the medium of language, spoken or 
unspoken. As language, end especially morel language, often 
carries with it overtones of approval end disapprovell of 
exhortation end prohibition, the terminology used to describe 
the alternatives facing the ekresiec will be en influential 
factor in determining his judgment of the situation and his 
response to it. 
The ekresiec does not fail to see situations in moral 
terms. He does not lock whet Wilson labels "relevant alertness."
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This is en important problem in morel education, but it is not 
the problem of morel ekresie, for the ekrasiec in sincerely 
believing that he ought, for justificatory reesons, to do y is 
acknowledging the morel dimensions of the situation. The school—
boy in our example does not see his dilemma of whether or not to 
use the crib simply es e question of whether he will get found 
out or whether he will be able to doctor his own translation well 
enough to fool his Latin master; he sees it (partly et leest) 
es e question of whether he morally ought, to use the crib, thereby 
gaining an unfair advantage over his classmates end winning praise 
under false pretences. (The prudential version will again be 
considered separately.) 
Yet if the ekresiec is able to see situations and 
alternatives in morel terms, why does the normative pressure of 
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morel language not influence his final decision or action? If 
he possesses sufficient morel sensitivity to be able to apply 
morel concepts to relevant situations, why does his formulation 
of e morel interpretation not bite upon his behaviour? 
Three possible solutions suggest themselves:— 
(e) Perheps morel concepts, though correctly used by the akrasiec, 
for psychologicel reasons simply fail to motivate him; he 
experiences none of their normative pressure, which he realises 
they exert on most people. The schoolboy, for example, mey see 
his ection es being "unfair", but for psychologicel reasons the 
concept of unfairness may not influence his final judgment or 
ection in eny way. 
(b) Perheps et the moment of acting or deciding to ect (or 
immediately prior to it) the ekresiac fails to concentrate 
sufficiently upon the morel interpretation or in Wilson's termi—
nology to "think thoroughly" about it.
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He focusses his 
ettention upon the "countervailing factors" end allows them to 
occupy e more prominent position in his appraisal of the situation. 
On this account the schoolboy would allow the prospect of his 
gaining higher marks end his fear of failure to occupy his 
ettention et the exnense of the morel considerations of fairness. 
(c) Perhaps et the moment of acting or deciding to est (or 
immediately prior to it) he fells to present the morel inter—
pretation to himself attractively enough; the colours in which 
he paints the morel picture do not heve es greet e motivational 
appeal es those of the non—morel nicture. The schoolboy might in 
this case see his using of the crib as en instance of "lying" (to 
his teacher) rather then of "sheeting" (his clessmetes), while 
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not considering truth—telling (especially to en authority figure) 
to be en overriding obligation which he positively wents to fulfil, 
es might be the case with fairness (especially to one's peers). 
The less attractive the morel interpretetion the less likely it 
is to be translated into action in the farce of countervailing 
factors. 
Of these three possibilities (e) can be discounted for 
the same reasons that "leck of feeling" was ruled out es e possible 
explanation of ekresia. If morel concepts cennot, for psycho—
logical reasons, exert any influence upon the agent, then he is 
clearly eble to act only in response to his non—morel wants end 
motives, end is unable to decide to ect otherwise. Such e case, 
of which psychopathic behaviour is en obvious example, would fail 
to meet the ability criterion end would thereby fell outside the 
category of ekresie. 
Either (b) or (c), or e combination of the two es they 
ere not mutually exclusive, seems to offer the most likely 
solution, without violating any logical features of ekresie. Some 
examples of ekresie may well accord best with (b), others with 
(c), and others with (b) and (c) in combination. In all cases, 
however, a further explanation will be needed of mhz the ekresiec 
treats the morel elternetive es he does. 
In (b) the reason why the ekresiec fails to concentrate 
sufficiently upon the morel interpretetion is presumably because 
of the strength of the countervailing factors in that perticuler 
situation; he sees x es so much more desirable than y that he 
allows y to fade from his attention. Our schoolboy sees it es so 
desirable, end thus wents so much, to maintain his reputation end 
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avoid criticism that he allows the morel alternative of telling 
the truth or playing fair to go out of focus in his viewing of 
the situetion. A similar reason might also be given for (c): 
because of the strength of the countervailing factors the 
ekresiec may consciously choose e less attractive morel inter—
pretation (e.g. telling the truth to en authority figure rather 
then playing fair with one's colleagues), knowing that it will 
have correspondingly less motivational influence upon him and 
that he will thereby find it less difficult to do whet he really 
wents most to do. A less devious explanation, however, is also 
possible for (c), es the agent may siOply have seen only one way 
of interpreting the situetion morally, end that may happen to be 
en interpretetion which does not weigh so heavily with him es 
another more attractive one might. 
On e more general level, both (b) end (c) can be further 
illuminated by recalling certain feetures of morel principles die—
cussed earlier. A morel interpretetion must necesserily refer, 
implicitly or explicitly, to morel principles for purposes of 
classification and justification, end it has been argued that morel 
principles possess e theoretical, generalised and "cool—hour" 
quality which enables them to be expressed only in decisions that 
... end not in decisions to ... These feetures of morel principles 
cannot fail to detract from the motivational influence of e moral 
interpretetion in comparison with that of the agent's more 
immediate wents. The principles of fairness and truth—telling 
upon which the schoolboy's morel interpretation is based ere 
necesserily less specific than the situational motives which make 
him went to keep gaining high marks end praise. Our motives and 
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wants ere en integral pert of the situation and our experience 
of it, but e framework of morel language has to be imposed upon 
that situation before morel principles Gen be seen to be appli—
cable to it. The reason why the ekrasiec in (b) end (c) treets 
the morel alternative es he does, therefore, may be pertly due 
to the feet that moral concepts end principles cannot be directly 
identifiable, self—evident elements in our experience of situations. 
These points concerning morel concepts end principles 
ere not directly relevant to ceses of prudentiel ekresie. How—
ever, in so far es prudential reasons carry with them overtones 
of morel or sociel approval (see (i)), they could be said to refer 
to quasi—morel elternetives, which the prudential akresiec treats 
in the same way es the morel ekresiec treets morel alternatives. 
Explenations (b) end (c) could thus be applied equally to pru—
dentiel ekresie: for instence, the ekresiec smoker may fail to 
concentrate sufficiently upon end/or fail to present to himself 
ettrectively enough the quasi—morel alternative of improving his 
health and prolonging his life. The reasons for his failure 
though cannot be sought in the logic of morel language, es hes 
been suggested in the cese of the morel ekresiec, for moral 
language is not directly involved. The quasi—morel alternative, 
however, shares with the morel alternetive the quality of 
"remoteness", though not in en identical sense. The "remoteness" 
of the prudentiel ekresiects "ought"—judgment will accordingly 
be examined in detail in the following section on the Immediacy 
Factor (iii). 
Linguistic interpretetion is also e relevant factor in 
ceses where "precticel oughts" ere not acted upon. The explenetion 
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for why I fail to keep my eye on the bell may well be that I see 
the alternatives before me es either continuing to play et my 
present standard or becoming a moderately efficient player by 
putting in hours of arduous practice, end the letter alternative 
does not sound sufficiently ettrective to motivate me to try end 
play es I believe I ought. 
One final observation needs to be made concerning the 
lenguege rector. The fundementel question of why people see certain 
things es desireble was briefly mentioned et the end of Section I. 
To teckle such e question comprehensively would be beyond the 
scope of this study, but it is necessary to note et this point 
the crucial role pleyed by lenguage in the process of "seeing es 
desireble", especielly in view of the possible educational impli— 
cetions of this which will be considered in Chapter VI. 
One wey, end perhaps the most important way, in which 
people, including children, come to see things es desireble and 
valuable (or the reverse) is by exposure to the prescriptive end 
persuasive functions of lenguege. To accept that e pe•rticuler 
series of events end actions represents "persecution", "exploitation", 
"liberation" or nrefor4 for instance, is to adopt e certain 
eveluetive stance which is delineeted by whatever interpretative 
concept is used. One of the reesons, then, why we initially come 
to see certain things es desireble or otherwise mey well be thet 
they ere presented to us, epperently descriptively, in lenguege 
which carries overtones of epprovel end disepprovel; end one of 
the reesons why we continue to e considerable extent to hold 
reesonebly consistent views es to whet we think of es desirable 
or otherwise may well be our adoption of e linguistic fremework 
of interpretation which crystallises our eveluetive attitudes end 
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helps to keep them constant. If we have been brought up to think 
of policemen, for example, in terms of heroic guerdiens of law 
end order, end friendly servants of the public, we will be in 
possession of en established set of evaluative concepts which 
will, other things being equel, dispose us in favour of helping 
end respecting the police rather then impeding end despising them; 
it will need e drastic disillusionment and e deliberate re—
orientation of values for us to come to see policemen as Fascist 
pigs. The concepts we use end the values we hold ere radically 
intertwined. 
Language then in various respects contributes signifi—
cantly to explanations of ekresie. The concepts used by the agent 
to portray the situation end the elternetives facing him con—
stitute his interpretation and evaluation, which will in turn 
f!overn his response. The morel ekresiec uses morel concepts to 
form his morel interpretetion of the situation, but fore variety 
of reesons sees this es less ettrective motivationally then the 
non—morel interpretetion. Language, by reason of its close con—
nections with evaluation, may also help to answer the further 
question of linx people see certain things es more or less attrac—
tive end desirable. 
(iii) The Immediacy Factor 
Ceses of prudential ekrasie l while not directly 
illuminated by the account of morel interpretations given in (ii) 
above, reveel on investigation e further, related, characteristic 
feeture which will be shown to be applicable in pert to cases of 
morel ekrasie es well. This feeture is concerned with the 
244. 
immediacy of countervailing factors and the corresponding remote—
ness of justificetory reasons. The nature of this immediacy end 
remoteness will form the subject of this sub—section. 
Prudential ekresia, like morel akresie l involves en 
inconsistency between "ought"—judgments and action, resulting from 
a conflict between whet the agent sincerely believes he ought to 
do end whet he most wants to do. Whet typifies prudential cases, 
however, is that the conflict seems to be describable also in 
terms of the agent's present end future wants, or his short—term 
end long—term interests. The akrasiec smoker, for example, wants 
to enjoy good health in the future (end thus believes that he 
ought to give up the habit), but also wants at present to soothe 
his nerves by enjoying a cigarette. Similarly the ekresiec school—
boy wants to achieve future academic success (end thus believes 
that he, prudentially, ought not to use the crib which will prevent 
him from gaining the necessary practice at translation), but also 
wants at present to gain high marks in class and maintain his 
reputation. The prudential ekresiec then, though acknowledging 
the justificetory reasons which support his longer—term wants, 
allows his present wants to weigh more heavily at the time of 
acting or deciding to act; immediate, situational factors are 
seen as more important than more remote, future considerations. 
Again, as in cases of morel ekresie, an element of intellectual 
dishonesty is evident here in the failure to admit explicitly that 
the countervailing factors do in fact outweigh the justificatory 
reasons in the final, overall assessment of the situation. 
The prudential akresiec's conflict between present end 
future wants can also be portrayed in terms of his self—concept. 
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In cases of morel ekresie the conflict is typically between self—
interest end the interests of others; even in examples where it 
appears that self—interest does not enter in (e.g. I mey hove to 
choose between acting in such a wey es to further the interests 
of person A et the expense of person B or vice verse, and decide 
for situational reasons to favour A while believing that I really 
ought to favour B), my decision still results from my personel 
end self—regarding wents, motives End interpretations, (e.g. I 
like A more then B, and would prefer to do him a good turn.) A 
parellel account of prudential akrasie cen be given, whereby the 
agent sees his -future self, elong with its wents end interests, 
es in some sense "other" then his present self, and thus exerting 
e less immediate motivetioneLinfluence. To the akresieb smoker 
the image of e possible, future, non—smoking self will appear 
very much es "another'' self, quite alien from his present self 
with its present wants, end perhaps unettrective end undesirable 
in certein respects, despite the prospects of better health. The 
ekresiec schoolboy will likewise see his future self, possibly 
gaining e university place in several veers' time es e result of 
his efforts end application now, es e remote end different person 
from the one who will tomorrow et school have to show how well 
he hes done tonight's homework. In both cases the difficulty lies 
in trying to identify with the future self, whereas there is no 
problem in identifying with the present self, its interests end 
its wants, es the agent who ects, or decides to ect, in the light 
of these wents is that present self; the greeter difficulty of 
future identification is thus grounded in logicel, es well es 
psychological, considerations. 
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The prudential ekresiec's preference for the wants and 
interests of his present rather' then his future self recalls 
Socrates' explenetion of ell epperently ekresiec behaviour es 
involving mistakes in "weighing pleasures against pleasures" end 
so exaggerating the size of e Pleasure (or pain) which is close 
to us in time, (see Chepter II, Section 2). An objection to our 
interpretation of prudentiel ekresie in terms of e conflict between 
present end future wents must be considered et this point, however, 
for might not the prudentiel ekresiec be said to be faced with 
conflicting present wents, rather then with a present versus a 
future went? According to this account, the smoker would went 
both to heve e cigerette end to refuse one now, end the schoolboy 
both to use the crib and to do the work himself now. However, 
the argument in Section 1, B, on inclinational end intentional 
wents suggests that this is e misleading way of describing the 
conflict. The statements "I went to give up smoking before I 
demege my heelth" end "I went to do the work myself in order that 
I may become better et trensletion" recall Deveney's so—celled 
"non—inclinational" wents — e.g. "I went to cut my lewn before 
the press grows too long". But, as with Deveney's examples, the 
ekresiec's epperent "wants" are in fact transposed. What the 
smoker really wants is not now to refuse e cigarette but to enjoy 
better heelth in the future; end whet the schoolboy really wants 
is not now to do the work himself end thereby gain low marks, but 
to be better at Letin translation in the future. The prudential 
ekresiec's conflict then is better described es being between 
present end future wants (which are to some extent "inclinational" 
like all wants, as ergued in Section 1, B), then between a present 
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"intentionel" end e present "inclinetionel" went. The dis—
tinction between present end future, or immediate end remote, 
consideretions seems centrel to the problem of prudential ekresie. 
The respective motivetional influences of present end 
future wents ere described by Geuthier es being such that only 
the former cen impel us to act, while the letter cen only 
determine reasons for us to act now.20 The terms in which 
Geuthier drews this distinction cennot be unreservedly accepted, 
es the notion of "impelling wents" suggests a purely ceusel account 
of present vents, whereas it hes elreedy been argued in Section 1 
that there must be reasons for ell wents, deriving from the 
eveluetions and intentions of the agent end from his beliefs 
concerning the desirability of thet which is wented. Nevertheless 
Gauthier rightly emphesises the potentially greeter immediacy of 
present wents (deriving, es shown above, from logical es well es 
psychological fectors), end also raises by implication en important 
aucry concerning the retionelity of the prudentiel ekresiec's 
beheviour. 
Does the prudential ekresiec's Preference for the present 
end immediete, and his disregard for the future end remote, sig—
nify E leek of retionelity? Reesons, es Negel puts it, "represent 
velues which ere not time—dependent";21 they were described in 
Section 1, E, es reaching beyond purely situetionel fectors which 
refer to particuler persons and events towards generalisations 
thet transcend the perticuler. "The most obvious end ell—
pervading feature of reeson is surely this trenscendence of the 
this, the here, end the now," claims Peters, "... in prudential 
reasoning ebout conduct, when one seys 'No' to oneself, there is 
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e presupposition that, other things being equal, the mere 
position in time of the satisfection of e desire is of itself 
irrelevent."22 Similerly, labbott makes e central feature of 
reason end rationality the "recognition of time", which involves 
"putting off e present desire with e promissory note" end 
"envisaging time—plans es solutions for ... problems end con—
flicts." 23 
But do these time—connected features of reesmn mean 
that the prudential ekresiec, with his preoccupation with the 
immediate, is simply behaving irrationally? If so, it seems that 
prudential ekresie may turn out to be not e cese of ekresie et 
ell, for irretionality denotes defective reesoning, which wee 
ruled out es e possible explanation of ekresie in Chapter IV, as 
it ren counter to the ebility criterion in ceusing the agent to 
be uneble to decide to act otherwise. 
To dispose of prudential ekresie in this way, however, 
is erbitrery end, on further consideration, unjustified. The pru— 
dentiel akresiec is guilty of intellectual dishonesty but not of 
irrationality. He edopts thet course of action which he hes reesons 
for seeing et the time as most desireble end thus for wanting most, 
though he does not openly spell—out those reesons. His beheviour 
mey be adjudged to be perverse or ill—advised, but it is expli—
ceble, consistent end re tionel in so far es it will effect whet 
he most wents et that time to effect. Irretionel beheviour on the 
other bend involves the conscious adoption of ineppropriete means 
to echieve e desired end — for example, putting on e fur coat in 
order to keep cool in e hest weve. "An irrational belief," es 
Peters puts it, "is one that is held wittingly in the face of 
conclusive evidence against it or one that is held with conviction. 
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when it is extremely problemeticel whether anything could count 
es evidence against it."
24 The prudential ekresiec's behaviour 
is not of this sort; the ekresiec smoker does not take another 
cigerette in the belief thet it will improve his future health, 
and the schoolboy does not resort to the crib in the belief that 
it will improve his future skill in trensletion. In both cases 
the course of action adopted is seen in itself as more desirable 
et the time then the future possibility, end not es e means of 
echieving that possibility. It is not irretionel to heve e cige—
rette when whet one really wents most of all et that moment is 
to soothe one's nerves, despite one's beliefs about the long—
term effects of smoking; whet would be irrational would be to 
have e cigerette in order to improve one's health, knowing thet 
ell the evidence suggests that the reverse will happen. 
central feature, then, of the prudential ekresiec's 
behaviour in doing x rather than y is thet x is seen es more 
desirable by reason of its immediacy, end y es less desirable by 
reason of its remoteness. Is this immediacy factor eppliceble 
also to cases of morel ekresie? Kenny seems to ergue, that it is, 
by giving en overell account of "the will" es "the feculty for 
giving effect in one's life to long—term projects end stable 
policies." Thus, "the man of strong will is the man who can 
prevent the short—term wents from interfering with the execution 
of the long—term volitions."25 In addition, there is some 
empirical evidence (which will be referred to again in Chepter VI) 
to suggest that there exists e connection between being able to 
resist temptation end being able to delay the gratification of 
one's desires end impulses.26  
But is it safe to conclude that temPorel immediacy is 
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e necessary, explanatory feeture of all cases of moral ekresia l 
es it seems to be in prudentiel cases: Some types of moral con—
flict end of morel ekresie (notebly the "putting off the evil hour" 
variety) can be portrayed es e weighing of present ageinst future 
consideretions. If I believe that I ought to be the one to break 
some bed news to e friend, yet keep putting it off so thet the 
task eventually fells to someone less suitable, I em seeing it es 
more desirable that I should avoid immediate embarrassment end 
unpleesentness then that my friend should suffer even greeter 
distress later on. Such cases, however, seem to be the exception 
rether than the rule, es meny instances of morel conflict and ma•el 
ekresie do not fit this temporel pettern. This is because the 
justificatory reesons eccepted by the ekrasiae es supporting his 
"ought"—judgment do not necessarily refer to future as opposed to 
present consideretions. The schoolboy, for example, in using the 
crib is cheating end is taking en unfair advantage; the principles 
of fairness end honesty do not apply to some future state of 
affairs, but form part of the present consideretions generated by 
the immediate situation. 
Temporal immediecy then is not a necessary feature of 
the "countervailing factors" in morel ekresie em it is in pru—
dential ekresie. Nor is geographical immediacy, though again 
there are some interesting morel instances where this feature is 
evident. Milgrem's experimental work on obedience to authority, 
for example, in which subjects are told to carry out a series of 
acts which come increasingly into conflict with their conscience, 
in that they are instructed by the experimenter apparently to 
inflict severe electrical shocks upon "victims" who fail 
(deliberately) to perform learning tasks correctly, clearly 
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illustrates the importance of geographically immediate fectors in 
carte in types of morel dilemme.
27 (Subjects who obeyed the 
experimenter though believing that they ought not to inflict the 
shocks are clearly guilty of morel akresie l end following the 
account developed in this chapter their behaviour can be inter—
preted es their seeing it es more desirable to gein the experi— 
menter's approval than to prevent the "victim's" sufferings.) 
Some of Milgrem's experiments showed that the closer the contact 
between subject end victim, and the greeter the isolation of 
subject from experimenter, the more likely was the subject to 
disobey his instructions (end so to do whet he believed he ought 
to do). Thus, the countervailing fectors, represented by the 
influence end authority of the experimenter, carried weight with 
the subject in proportion to their reletive geographical immediacy 
compared with that of the justificatory reasons for ecting other— 
wise, represented by the victim's sufferings. 
Both empirical evidence end commonsense, then, suggest 
that it may well be eerier to feel concern for the interests of 
another person when that person is geographically immediate, or 
es Hume puts it, "We sympathise more with persons contiguous to 
us, than with persons remote from us ..."28 Clearly not all morel 
dilemmas will fall into this "geographical" category, but it is 
significant that the immediacy factor, in both e temporal end e 
geographical sense, operetes in et least some cases of moral 
akresie. 
But does it also have any more general end logically 
necessary connections with morel cases? That it does hes already 
been suggested by various references in this section to the effect 
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that morel conflicts involve e clash between more immediate end 
more remote considerations, though not in e strictly temporal or 
geographical sense necessarily. These references will be briefly 
reviewed in turn. 
(e) Loral principles have been described em possessing 
e theoretical, generalised, "cool—hour" quality which enables 
them to be expressed only in decisions that 	 rather than in 
decisions to ... Justificatory reasons, being dependent upon 
morel principles, must therefore leek the immediecy, specificity 
end first—handedness of countervailing factors arising from the 
egent's situational wants and motives. 
(b) In cases of morel ekresie the conflict is typically 
between self—interest end the interests of others. The morel 
ekresiec is motivated by considerations of his own welfare end 
wants rather then those of others. As with the prudential 
ekresiec, this can be viewed es e problem of identification: 
just es the prudential akresiec finds it difficult to identify 
with e future self because of its remoteness from his present 
self, so does the morel ekresiec find it difficult to identify 
with the interests of others because they lack the first—hand 
immediacy of his own interests. To identify with the interests 
of others requires an ect of imeginative insight end e focussing 
of attention away from the immediecy of one's own wants. The 
morel ekresiec's failure, then, to consider the interests of 
others es of equel motivetionel importance to his own can be 
attributed to a favouring of immediate over remote considerations. 
(c) The morel ekresiec fails to make explicit reference 
in his overall judgment of the situation to those factors which 
are in fact weighing most heavily with him at the time of hist 
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decision or ection. He also fails et the moment of acting or 
deciding to act (or immediately prior to it) to concentrate 
sufficiently upon the morel interpretetion, or to present it to 
himself attractively enough. The morel ekresiec's response 
results from his view of the situetion es it appears to him et 
the time of his decision or ection, end that situational response 
may well be et odds with whet his view of the situation would be 
from the standpoint of e deteched observer. The situational 
neture of his decision End/or ection underlines the immediacy of 
the countervailing factors which et thet time eclipse the more 
remote morel consideretions. 
The immediacy factor then is applicable in these respects 
to morel es well es to prudential ekresie, end in eddition can be 
easily shown to be equally applicable to cases where "precticel  
oughts" are not trensleted into action. This is because the 
reasons supporting e "practical ought" refer to e future state 
of effeirs, the desirebility of which cennot be experienced until 
cotton is taken now in the face of possible counter—inclinetions. 
If I believe thet I ought to keep my eye on the bell end to 
practise herd to acquire this technique, the justification is 
that these activities will be instrumental in helping me to hit 
the bell better end so improve my game. But es in cases of pru—
dentiel ekresie, future, more remote consideretions (e.g. I went 
to become 2 better golfer) cen conflict with present, more 
immediete ones (e.g. I do not went to hove to discipline myself 
by putting in hours of tedious prectice), end can weigh less 
heavily because of their relative remoteness. 
central feature of ekresie, in its various forms, 
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hes therefore been shown to be the greater weight placed by the 
egent upon immediate considerations then upon more remote ones, 
though the precise interpretation of "immediate" end "remote" 
will very in different cases. 
Conclusion 
This section hes attempted to throw light upon the 
problem of ekrasie by viewing it es e special case of "doing x 
rether then y". The formal account of "doing x rether then y", 
developed in Section 1, wes first applied to the two elements 
thet constitute ekresie — "sincerely believing that one ought to 
do y" and "doing x". It was argued that the ekresiec basically 
wants to do x rether then y, i.e. the justificatory reasons 
supporting y ere in some way outweighed by his wants end motives 
which supply the explanatory reasons why he does x. 
This formal eccount was then supplemented by an 
exeminetion of three central features of the akresiects behaviour, 
labelled the dishonesty fector, the language factor end the 
immediacy fector. Taken together these offer e general explene—
tory framework for the verious forms of ekresie, end elso carry 
some important implications for morel education which will be 
explored in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI — IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL EDUCATION 
The previous four chapters have examined various 
philosophical problems surrounding ekresia, notably its logical 
possibility, its characterisation and its explanation. It is 
now time to return to some of the issues raised in the opening 
chepter to discover whet light this philosophical investigation 
hes thrown upon the relationship between children's morel judg—
ments end actions and upon the part which morel education might 
play in strengthening that relationship in practice. It is also 
time to reconsider Mortimore's exploratory questions end to 
suggest some answers to them: 
... how would (various) ways of conceiving of cases of weak—
ness of will effect our ways of teaching morality? Are our 
current weys of teaching strength of will misguided, or do 
they just need to be redescribed?"1  
This final chepter will in the mein follow the direction 
indicated by Mortimore's questions. The overall strategy will be 
to consider in Section 1 the possible relevance end application 
of the foregoing analysis to the morel behaviour of children; in 
Section 2, the extent to which perticuler conceptions of morality 
end of ekresie dictete perticuler methods of morel education in 
generel end of combatting ekresie in perticuler; in Section 3, 
e typology of "weys of teaching morality" with special reference 
to their enti—ekresiec value; and finally in Section 4, e syn—
thesis of the most promising aspects of these methods with some 
implications of the three "factors" of akresie discussed in 
Chapter V, Section 2, B. As morel education is the focal point 
of this chepter, it will be for the most pert morel akresie (rether 
then the other varieties described earlier) which will be con— 
sidered in the following sections. 
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1. Can  dhildren be tukresiac? 
it first sight it might seem that there is no diffi—
culty in releting the foregoing analysis to the beheviour of 
children. Why should not the account of ekresie so fer developed 
be applied to the judgments end actions of children end adults 
alike? Why should not children es well es adults fail to do 
whet they believe they ought to do? 
Problems erise, however, when the criterie for akresie 
ere re—exemined. Akresie, it was argued in Chapter IV, section 
I, B, involves e person doing x, or deciding to do x, while et 
the same time sincerely believing that he ought not to do x, 
though being eble not to do x end to decide not to do x (or the 
perEllel negative formulation). Both en ability requirement end 
en inconsistency requirement have to be met before e case of 
ekresie cen be seid to have occurred, and it might be argued that 
the judgments end actions of children cen meet neither, 
A. ability Criterion 
Doubts centre here around whether children, es opposed 
to adults, ere eble in renerel to act or decide to act other then 
es they actually do. Given the forms of reasoning end levels of 
intellectual ectivity which cherecterise children's behaviour, 
perhaps that beheviour should be thought of es "determined" end, 
children es "uneble to ect otherwise". 
fly such sweeping attempt to classify the beheviour of 
children es "detdmined" in e way in which adult beheviour is not, 
however, invites some obvious objections. Who, for exemple, is 
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to count es being e "child"? The new—born baby may be in some 
sense unable to act or decide to act otherwise when he emits his 
first cry, but it is less clear whether the one—year old who 
cries to gain attention fells into the same category. And if 
there ere these difficulties over the classification even of 
babies' beheviour, how is e dividing line to be drawn between 
"children", who ere unable to act otherwise, end "adults", who 
ere? A child does not lake up on his tenth or thirteenth or 
sixteenth birthday suddenly able to satisfy the ability criterion. 
Clearly there are some children who, because of mental 
or physical handicap, are et times unable to act other then they 
do, but their beheviour cannot be classified differently from 
that of similarly handicapped adults because they are "children". 
s far es the majority of children ere concerned, e study of their 
development suggests e gradual shift away from "causal" towards 
more freely chosen behaviour, rather then e specifiable period 
of universal causation followed by one of universal freedom. is 
was claimed in Chapter IV, Section 1, B, when "distinction argu—
ments against ectuelism" were presented, e large intermediate area 
exists where the degree end nature of causal influence is un—
certain, but the very existence of this twilight zone weakens 
rather than strengthens the blanket claim that the beheviour of 
"children" is determined in e way that that of "adults" is not. 
In to far, then, es it appears legitimate to regard much of human 
beheviour in general es satisfying the ability criterion (in the 
absence of convincing arguments to the contrary from the ectuel—
ists), so does it appear equally legitimate to count much of 
children's beheviour es felling within the broader category end 
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thereby also satisfying the ability criterion — though it may 
well be thet e greeter proportion of children's beheviour, 
especially very young children's, is ceuselly determined. 
B. Inconsistency Criterion 
The epplicebility of the inconsistency criterion to 
children's beheviour creetes more subtle and serious difficulties. 
The ekresiec sincerely believes thet he ought to do that which be 
in feet does not do, but cen e child properly be said to believe  
sincerely that he ought to do x in e sense which setisfies the 
inconsistency requirement? 
To summarise the definitionel points mede in Chapters 
III end IV, "sincerely believing that one ought ..." implies the 
following:— 
(i) recognising the backing of justificatory reasons. 
(ii) uncertainty of outcome. 
(iii) the likely presence of countervailing factors. 
(iv) recognising en obligation which would lead to the 
eppropriete action in the absence of these counter—
veiling fectors. 
(v) the occurrence of regret, remorse, uneasiness, or some 
other such "beheviourel or non—behavioural consideretion", 
if the "ought" is not Feted upon. 
These conditions cen cleerly be satisfied in some 
instances of children's beheviour, for the exemple of the school—
boy end his Latin crib, which hes elreedy been extensively dis—
cussed, wes chosen es e paradigm case to illustrete the necessary 
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features of ekresie end of "ought"—judgments. Yet the fact that 
this example described the beheviour of en intelligent teenager 
mey induce the suspicion that younger children et lower stages of 
intellectual development may neither qualify es being able to 
"believe sincerely that they ought to do x", nor consequently 
count es possible ekresiecs. 
The mein obstacles appear to lie in conditions (i) end 
(iv) above. EXemples can easily be given of the uncertain out— 
come of children's "ought"..judgments (ii), of countervailing 
factors weighing against those judgments (iii), end of resultant 
feelings of regret, remorse, etc. (v). But can many children, 
especially young children, be said to hold beliefs which have the 
backing of justificatory reasons end imply the recognition of en 
obligation which would lead to the eDpropriete action, ceteris 
paribus? 
Condition (i) — the backing ofjustificetor reasons 
Acknowledging the backing of justificatory reesons need 
not be en intellectually sophisticated exercise. The requirement 
is not that the agent should be able to present en elaborately 
argued philosophical case for e particular course of action, but 
that he should recognise that certain considerations constitute 
"good" reesons of some sort for that course of action, which 
derive from e more general_ principle of some sort which he accepts. 
The reesons end principles do not have to be "moral" to be justi—
floe-tory in this sense; 11 precticel" oughts will be justified by 
instrumental, pragmatic reesons (see Chapter III), end in cases 
of prudential ekresie the reesons end principles will refer to 
the agent's own self—interest. 
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A child, then, has only to be able to recognise that 
certain factors in a situation constitute "good" reasons (of some 
sort) for a particular course of action, deriving from a more 
general principle (of some sort) which he accepts, for the first 
condition to be satisfied. Llthough there is some empirical 
evidence to suggest that the giving of reasons to young children 
has little effect upon their behaviour,
2 
 it would be arbitrary 
to assume that young children are totally unable to work out or 
recognise, albeit in en embryonic way, that certain factors con—
stitute "good" reasons for doing x rather than y. Indeed both 
logic and commonsense suggest that the concept of "(good) reasons" 
is gradually built up by young children alongside the concepts of 
"cause" end "effect", end that these notions must be basic 
elements in the development of human thinking from its earliest 
stages. 
The "good reasons" end the "general principles" which 
the child accepts, therefore, do not need to be of a particularly 
abstract or exalted kind. Kohlberg, whose work will be referred 
to at several points in this chapter, has attempted to describe 
sequential stages of moral development, each of which can be 
characterised by a particular type of reason or principle which 
the subject sees as "justifying moral action". Six levels of 
reason were isolated, "each congruent with one of the develop—
mental types ... as follows: 
1. Punishment by another. 
2. Menipuletion of goods, rewards by another. 
3. Disapproval by others. 
4. Censure by legitimate authorities, followed by guilt feelings. 
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5. Community respect end disrespect. 
6. Self—condemnetion."3  
There is clearly e considerable overlap between the 
justificatory end motivational espects of these (end, es was 
suggested in Chepter III, of all such) reesons, but is there e 
distinctively justificatory element in them which can be detected 
even et Level 1? Some disagreement exists among psychologists 
over this aspect of children's morel reasoning. Pieget, for 
example, holds that the young child relies upon external adult 
sanctions, rules end commends to define end justify whet is right 
end wrong,4 while Kohlberg argues that children's judgments et 
the lowest levels reveal only e motivational "realistic—hedonistic 
desire to avoid punishment"5 end a consequent prediction of whet 
action is most likely to echieve this. Kohlberg, however, eppeers 
confused over the distinction between ,motivation end justifi—
cation (speaking, for example, of "the 'motivational' aspect of 
morality (es) defined by the motive mentioned by the subject in 
‘ justifyinp. morel ection"h6 
 end Piaget's eccount of the young 
child's morel judgments, not es mere predictions of likely rewards 
end punishments, but es rudimentary forms of justification based 
on the euthoritetive pronouncements end ections of adults, draws 
e more convincing picture of how the notion of "justification" 
(end consequently of "ought", es distinct from "should") originetes 
end develops in children. 
It is reesoneble to suppose, then, that even at Kohlberg's 
lower stages the young child does not merely believe thet he 
should do x because he will ovoid punishment or gein reward thet 
way, but thet he ought to do x because the Prospect of punishment 
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or reward, as the embodiment of adult authority, means that it 
is wrong not to do x. The "heteronomous" child who believes that 
he ought not to play in muddy puddles "because Mummy says so" is 
not just predicting disapproval or punishment if he does play in 
muddy puddles, but acknowledging justificatory reasons and 
principles of e rudimentary kind for behaving in a particular 
way; even he, then, can be said to satisfy minimally the first 
condition of "sincerely believing that he ought to do x." 
Condition (iv) — recognising an obligation which would lead to 
the appropriate action in the absence of countervailing factors  
In considering whether children can also satisfy this 
condition, which is closely linked to the previous one, it is 
necessary to distinguish between "recognising an obligation" in 
the sense of feeling it to impinge upon oneself and to require 
action, and "knowing the rules" in the sense of being aware that 
certain things are forbidden as a matter of fact. Here's similar 
distinction between using "ought" as a "value judgment", and 
using it as a "statement of sociological fact"7 is apposite here, 
for children no doubt often use "ought" in the latter, descriptive 
sense: "we ought not to talk during Assembly" may well mean in 
many cases "we are not expected (or allowed) to talk. during 
Assembly, end there is in fact a rule forbidding it". The failure 
to translate descriptive "ought"—judgments of this kind into 
action does not constitute a case of akrasie, as was argued in 
Chapter IV. 
But why should children be thought to use "ought" always, 
or even normally, in this descriptive way? In the example just 
given, a child would be more likely to say, "We are not supposed 
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to telk'during Assembly", thus indicating that he was descriptively 
recounting e rule or social expectation rather then acknowledging 
the ?Prescriptive euthority of en obligation es in, "We ought to 
own up and save the rest of the class from being kept in". In 
the letter case the children involved could certeinly quelify es 
"sincerely believing that they ought to own up", either if they 
did own up cc e result of their belief (becked by justificatory 
reasons of some sort) or if they failed to own up es e result of 
countervailing factors (e.g. feel' of punishment) but then felt 
guilty or uneasy or showed embarrassment, etc. 
The apparent difficulties, then, involved in trying to 
apply conditions (i) end (iv) to children's judgments end 
behaviour are not as serious es they might seem. Leturity of 
intellectual or morel reasoning is not required in order to 
quelify cc "sincerely believing that one ought ..." The intelligent 
teenager with his dilemma of the Latin crib will certeinly quelifY/ 
but so also will the younger child in the example just described, 
who believes that he ought to own up to e classroom offence. A 
third end more extreme example could encompass the behaviour even 
of the pre—school child who knows that by climbing on to e stool 
in the larder he can reach e tin of his favourite sweets, but 
also knows from previous experience that he may fell end hurt 
himself if he tries end that his mother hes forbidden him to climb 
on the stool. 
But Gen such e child properly be said to "believe 
sincerely that he ought ..."? Or does he merely see the Potion 
Pc forbidden end likely to result in punishment if detected? It 
is not unreesoneble to see in some such cases et least e rudimentary 
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awareness of justificetory reesons, es suggested in Pieget's 
interpretation. The child could thus be said to believe 
sincerely that he ought not to climb on to the stool, if he cen 
acknowledge that there are reasons why he ought not to do so, 
based pertly upon considerations of his own safety end pertly 
upon the authoritative validity which he sees his mother's pro—
nouncement possessing, not merely es e motivational sanction but 
Cs e justificetory fiat. Such e child might well believe that 
he ought, not to climb on to the stool 'oeoeuse his mother says so 
(end whet mother says is right), rather then that he should 
refrein from climbing on to the stool in order to avoid punish—
ment. This embryonic form of justificetory reason is likely to 
be associated with the pronouncements of en adult for whom the 
child feels some respect, admiration or trust. The justificetory 
reesons, then, constitute en obligation which he feels to weigh 
upon him end which he will act upon, other things being equel; 
but other things may not be equel, for strong countervailing 
fectors may exist in the shape of e tempting sweet tin elmost 
within his reach, while his mother, busy in the next room, 
represents a less immediate consideration. The outcome of this 
child's sincerely held "ought"—belief is thus highly uncertain, 
creating e potentially ekresiec situetion. 
"Sincerely believing that one ought ..." cen therefore 
be used to describe c wide range of children's judgments. Some 
children, like some adults, will be intellectually incapable of 
satisfying the suggested criteria, end the further problem hes 
been mentioned of deciding when end how young children grasp the 
notion of e "justifying" reason why one ought ..., es distinct 
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from a "motiveting reeson why one should ... However, while it 
may not be possible to say of certain children or groups of 
children that they "sincerely believe that they ought ...", the 
argument in this section has suggested that most children, at 
least of school age, can properly be said to be capable of 
sincerely holding en "ought"-belief. Akresia in consequence 
becomes a problem for children as well as for adults - a problem 
which moral education hes to consider. 
2. How are conceptions of moral education related to conceptions  
of akrasie? 
"'Morel Education' is a name for nothing clear," declares 
Wilson.8 Certainly the term is used to describe a wide variety of 
activities, intentions end processes, which have been the sub-
ject of much recent debate. Is morel education, for instance, 
concerned with teaching the form of moral reasoning or the content  
of particular codes end principles? Should it be seen as a dis-
tinct area of the school curriculum, or as a more incidental 
element in the teaching of more traditional school subjects, or 
as a reflection of the overall ethos of a school as characterised 
by its interpersonal relationships and orgenisetional structure? 
Is moral education indeed the concern of the school at a11?9  
It is not intended to consider questions of this 
generalised kind in this chapter, though some of the issues 
involved will be discussed in so far as they relate to ekresie. 
For the purposes of this chapter "morel education" will be taken 
to refer to any activity or process which is implicitly or 
explicitly directed towards influencing young people's moral 
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thinking, beliefs end behaviour; "morel education" is therefore, 
by this definition, not limited to what goes on in schools, and 
consequently the term "teacher", es used throughout this chapter, is 
not to be equated necessarily with "schoolteacher". 
Toral education is not wholly or even mainly concerned 
with the problem of akresie. It hes other equally important 
functions, es Wilson's list of "morel components" suggests,
10 
end 
illustrations were given in Chapter I of how some 'accounts of 
morel education place little or no emphasis upon the possible 
difficulties of translating morel beliefs and judgments into 
action. However, unless the function of morel education is held 
to be wholly "judgmental" or "cognitive", or unless en extreme 
version of the "conformist" tradition of morality is adopted, a 
possible gap between judgment end action must be admitted of which 
morel education must take account. 
One result of the disagreement over the meaning end 
function of morel education has been e wide diversity of methods 
proposed end used for the teaching or transmitting of morality. 
A typology of methods will be presented in Section 3, but first 
it needs to be demonstrated how those accounts of morality end 
morel education which (et least implicitly) recognise ekresie em 
e possible problem can derive their suggested practical methods 
of tackling the problem only from E perticulPr theoretical inter—
pretation and explanation of ekresie. To illustrate this relation—
ship, five approaches to morel education will be briefly described 
end linked to certain of the explanations of akresia which were 
discussed in Chapter IV. No attempt will be made et this point 
to evaluate either the validity of the explanations (which have 
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already been scrutinised in Chapter IV) or the appropriateness 
of the resulting methodologies (which will be examined in 
Sections 3 end 4). 
A. The "Repressive" Approach 
One traditional approach to morel education, often 
associated with strongly held religious views, hes been to attempt 
to quell or repress the child's "nature", which is seen as 
essentially wayward end rebellious. An innate predisposition 
to wickedness ensures that the child can do no right until that 
predisposition is countered in some way end the child "reformed". 
This "repressive" approach to morel education derives 
from a belief in the fundamentally evil nature of men (until 
redeemed by a relationship with God), End in the "competitive" 
nature of morality, as described in Chapter II; both of these 
elements are to be found in the already quoted passage from Paul 
on man's "inability" to do what is good.11 The value of the 
Pauline account as en explanation of akrasia was questioned in 
Chapter IV, but whatever its inadequacies it has influenced for 
centuries men's views on the morel upbringing of children. 
The methods associated with this approach seem to be 
suggested by the models of exorcism or disease control. The evil 
element within children's nature which prevents them from 
behaving es they ought has to be removed or stamped out in some 
way, e.g. 
(i) by preaching end verbal exhortation, designed to direct 
children towards the redeeming influence of God, 
(ii) by telling stories of children who disregarded such 
preaching, end consequently received their deserts in 
270. 
this world or the next, 
(iii) by the use of rewards end punishments to reinforce (i) 
end (ii). Physical punishment has often been considered 
to be perticulerly effective, probably because of the 
models mentioned above; if the evil element is seen 
in the some light es e demon to be exorcised or e disease 
to be eradicated, one obvious remedy will be to drive 
or beet out the badness.12 
It might be objected that these methods are not intended 
to combet ekresie, for if the child is thought to be basically 
evil, how con he hold morel beliefs that he ought to do y, even 
if he in fact foils to do y? This objection recalls the problem 
mentioned in connection with the Pauline eccount of ekresie in 
Chapter IV: how can man, being essentially wicked, summon up the 
goodness initially to invoke God's redeeming aid? However, even 
if the child's nature is seen es being in some sense radically 
wicked, reform end improvement must presumably be thought to be 
possible if preaching, exhorting end punishing are considered to 
have any point. Once the reformative process hes (somewhat inex—
plicably) commenced, therefore, there will be meny occasions when 
the child's developing morel scruples conflict with the inclinations 
of his originel nature and when ekresie will consequently rear its 
heed. The methods associated with the "repressive" approach to 
morel education, then, owe their origin end justification to 
particular view of the nature of men end of morality, end also to 
e particular explenetion of ekresia. 
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B. The "Good Hebit" Approach 
second epproech to morel education, also of e tradi—
tional nature but lacking the religious overtones of the 
"repressive" epproech, hes centred around the notion of "cherecter—
treininn" end the formation of "good hebits", thus concentrating 
upon the beheviourel rather then the judgmentel espects of 
morality. According to this epproech, practice makes perfect in 
the learning of morel behaviour just as it does in the learning 
of skills — or, in Aristotle's words, "We become just by performing 
just ections."13 The eim then is to build up a pettern of 
behaviour which exhibits consistency end even predictebility 
through the prectising of certain types of action which become 
hebituel end thereby definitive of the individuel's "cherecter". 
Severel elternetive views of morel action end of 
ekresie may lie behind this epproech to morel education. A common 
feature, however, is that some element in the egent's psycho—
logical meke—up is thought to be too week or ill—developed to 
ensure thet morel beliefs end principles are elweys acted upon; 
it is accordingly pert of the function of morel education to 
strengthen this element. The defective component mey be variously 
conceived end described — either es "will" or es "cherecter" or 
es "conscience" — end differences of methodology will erise from 
differences of clessificetion. 
Defects of "will" are usuelly thought to be best remedied 
by e training proremme of hebituetion resulting in more or less 
automatic responses to those situations in which e "week—willed" 
person would be most likely to succumb to temptetion. A child's 
"will" might thus be strengthened if he is treined, for example, 
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to hind the cakes round to visitors et teatime before taking one 
himself end so becomes so hebitueted to this routine that the 
instinctive urge to grab the best one for himself presents less 
end less of e temptation to him. Rewards end punishments will 
probably be used to reinforce the desired behaviour. 
Defects of "cherecter" may be tackled in simile's weys, 
but by less direct forms of training end conditioning. There is 
en implication that the individual is more aware of end in con—
trol of the state of his "cherecter" then of his "will" end should 
be encouraged to feel that he is the mein agent responsible for 
its "development". ;Methods typically associated with "character—
training" consist in piecing the learner in situations which demand 
end test qualities like determination, endurance, consistency end 
reliability. Gemes, sports end other physical ectivities (such 
es mountaineering or camping) Neve been held to be particularly 
velueble in this respect, on the assumption (to be examined in 
Section 3) that whetever is developed in these ectivities is 
transferable to the learner's morel life; so that, for exemple, 
leerning to playa straight bet on the cricket field will help 
to produce a person who is morally "streight" end unflinching in 
situations which test honesty end reliability. 
Defects of "conscience" seem to cell for "will—
strengthening" rether than "character—training" methods, for one 
does not consciously build up one's conscience so much es have it 
implanted by others. floral education directed towerds the child's 
conscience, es opposed to his "will", however, will place rether 
less emphesis upon overt behaviour and rether more upon getting 
the child to believe and feel that certain actions are right or 
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wrong, though the basis of these beliefs end feelings will vary 
according to the degree of self—conscious awareness end rationality 
with which they ere held (cf. the distinction between "retionel" 
end "irrational" conscience drewn in Chapter III.) The aim of 
this approach will be to esteblish e form of internelised control 
within the child which will deter him from acting es he otherwise 
would, thus removing the necessity for en external euthority 
figure to be constantly present. Methods of producing this 
internelised control will egein include verbel exhortation, prise 
end blame, rewerd end punishment, supplemented by the processes 
of unconscious "identification" end conscious "example—following." 
Despite the above differences of emphesis, ell three of 
these "defect—remedying" eccounts shere e similar, generel view 
of ekresie end its explenetion. Eech is firmly rooted in the 
"competitive" tradition of morality, end eech portrays on one 
side of the competitive struggle e potentially defective com—
ponent which hes in some way to be !Tiede strong enough to resist 
the temptetion to act immorally. lore' ekresie is therefore 
assumed to be ceused by overriding, non—morel wents end desires, 
which have to be somehow counterbelenced and indeed outweighed 
if one is to do whet one believes one ought. Morality requires 
the formetion of good hebits, which can only become established 
if the agent comes to went to perform the habitual, "right" 
actions more then he wents to act otherwise. Habit—formation 
then produces morel beheviour through the modification of wants, 
which is in turn achieved by strengthening the defective "will", 
"cherecter" or "conscience". 
This view of morelity hes direct implicetions for methods 
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of morel education. The child must be brought to went to do 
whet he hes been treined to do, or whet his character leads him 
to do, or whet his conscience tells him to do, more then he will 
went to contravene these forms of control end incur the con—
sequent punishment, unease or guilt. So the "strong—willed" 
child, who hes been treined to behove in e certain way, will 
normally went to continue with these hebits and so gain the 
rewerd of approval, rather then abandon them end suffer dis—
approval; the child who has developed en honest end reliable 
"cherecter" will normally prefer to ect"in" rather then "out of" 
that character, for such actions will reflect his general 
attitudes end dispositions; end the child with a "strong con—
science" will normally want to do whet he feels is right, rather 
then earn the rebuke of his internal monitor. 
The "good habit" approach to morel education, there—
fore, like the "repressive" approach, results from a particular 
view of morality end a particular set of explanations for akresie. 
The letter make use of the explanatory concepts of "will", 
"character" and "conscience", defects in which it is suggested 
may be remedied by various methods and processes. 
C. The "Linguistic" Approach 
third approach to morel education sees morality as 
essentially e language into which children have to be initiated. 
Just as children make mistakes in Science and Mathemetics because 
they are not fully conversant with the logic of scientific end 
methematicel thinking, so can they also make mistakes in morality 
by ignoring its logical features. Morel education, then, will 
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consist in teaching the rules by which morel concepts operate 
end the demands they make upon their users. 
The particular problem of ekresie arises, according to 
this view, when morel concepts like "ought" are misunderstood 
end misused with respect to their "prescriptive" end "universal" 
features. Children, because they are still learning to use the 
language, will be especially prone to these mistakes. 	 child 
may, on the one hand, accept the proposition that one ought to 
share one's toys with other children as a descriptive fact about 
the world end the beliefs of adults, rather than as a rule which 
prescribes that he must share his toys if he accepts it; on the 
other hand, he may interpret the proposition as a convenient, 
non—universal licence to play with other children's toys without 
laying himself under any reciprocal obligation. 
The methods associated with this approach are largely 
linguistic, as it is the child's grasp of morel language that is 
thought to be defective. They will include explicit teaching of 
how morel concepts work; examples of adults using them correctly; 
elementary courses in ethics for older children; and commentaries 
upon actual situations with younger ones. Confirmation that such 
methods are often used even with young children (though seldom 
perhaps by teachers or parents fully aware of the above rationale) 
is provided by the frequency of the response, "How would you like 
it if that was done to you?" or "How would it be if everyone did 
that?" given to children who are apparently failing to appreciate 
morel "universality". 
This form of moral education again clearly derives from 
a particular interpretation of morality and moral language, which 
in turn suggests a particular explanation of akrasia: that it is, 
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in Hare's words, e form of "special pleading" which only becomes 
possible if morel language is used in en "off—colour" way (see 
Chapter II). 
D. The "Cognitive"- Approach 
Like the "linguistic" approach, this emphasises the 
judgmental aspects of morality, but is more concerned with teaching 
e particular form of reasoning and mode of thinking the-n the con— 
ceptual_ structure of morel language. 	 least two strands can 
be distinguished here — the "Aristotelian" end the "develop—
mental". 
iocordine to the "Aristotelien" strand, F. form of 
reasoning exists (described and discussed in Chanter IV) which 
we have to "know" and "use" if we are to act morally; this con—
sists, in brief, of coming to hold general morel principles, of 
recognising particular instances es falling under them, end of 
drawing the correct conclusions. Defects of "knowledge", it is 
claimed, can occur et any of these stages, end so iced to ekresie. 
in C, children will be particularly liable to make mistakes 
because of their lack of acqueintence with end practice in this 
form of reasoning. They may fail to "actively know end use" 
principles end rules to which they assent (e.g. by looking upon 
the principle that one ought to shere one's toys with other 
children less fortunate then oneself descriptively rather then 
prescriptively, es in C); or fail to realise that Johnny counts 
es e child less fortunate then oneself; or fail to "put two and 
two together" and to drew the conclusion that one ought to shere 
one's toys with Johnny. Despite the objections to such "defective 
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knowledge" explanations of ekresie discussed in Chapter IV, it 
is possible to conceive of e form of morel educetion based feirly 
end squarely upon the practical syllogism. 
iiccording to the "devekquentel" strend of the "cognitive" 
approach, morel development is but one aspect of intellectual 
development, end to behave more or less morally is to behave more 
or less retionally end exhibit more or less intellectual meturity 
(see Chapter IV). Moral thinking proceeds by way of sequential 
stages from e state of heteronomy in which controls, sanctions 
end justifications ere externally based to e more autonomous mode 
of reesoning in which the individual comes to accept rules end 
principles es "his own". Morel education, on this eccount, will 
obviously consist in encouraging children to progress to the 
highest stage that they ere capable of reaching. This will also 
be regerded es the best defence egainst ekresie, which is agein 
seen es essentially e defect in the individual's reasoning 
cepecities; indeed some empirical evidence in support of this 
cen be produced (which will be considered in more deteil in 
Section 3), to the effect thet the higher the stage of morel 
reesoning echieved the greeter the likelihood that e morel judg—
ment will be ected upon.14 
Methods of morel educetion deriving from a "cognitive" 
view of morality, then, will aim et improving the level of chil—
dren's thinking about morel questions, but will very according 
to one's conception of exectly how morel reesoning develops. 
one extreme no direct teaching methods will be thought to be of 
any use beceuse the child's progression from a lower to a higher 
stage is held to be dependent upon msturationel "readiness" which 
is in turn determined by his more general cognitive development; 
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at the other extreme will lie courses in ethics end in logic, 
designed to illustrate end teach the characteristic features of 
morel reasoning. In between the two extremes can be located a 
variety of discussion methods (to be distinguished and examined 
in Section 3), aimed at stimulating children to talk. end think 
about morel questions, and sometimes supplemented by teaching 
15 
materials specifically devised for this purpose. 	 An individual 
rather than a group approach is also suggested by some of the 
"developmentelists", who recommend that a child et stage x of 
his morel development should be confronted with arguments, reasons 
and considerations representative of the stage x 
	 1, in order to 
accelerate his progress to the higher stage.16 
Both strands of the "cognitive" approach to morel 
education and the methods which they suggest, therefore, again 
represent a particular, theoretical perspective upon the nature 
of morality end of morel learning, which in turn implies e perti—
culer explanation of akresie — this time in terms of "defective" 
knowledge or reasoning. 
E. The "Affective" A proech 
Finally in this sample survey mention must be made of 
en approach which sees morel education as a matter of encouraging 
the right feelings, emotions end attitudes towards others. Again 
two interpretations of morality and morel learning can be dis—
tinguished here. According to the first, morality is essentially 
concerned with interpersonal relationships and consequently with 
values such as consideration, concern, caring end sympathy; 
according to the second, we become moral by conforming to What 
others expect us to be end would be shocked if we were not, and 
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because we care ebout these social expectetions end expressions 
of epprovel or disapproval. 
Both of these interpretations lead to E similar 
explanation of akresie (i.e. thet the ekresiec lacks "feeling", 
end simply does not core enough ebout the welfere or expectetions 
of others), end elso to similar conclusions ebout the elms end 
methodology of morel educe tion. The me in problem in morel edu—
cation is seen es trying to get children to "identify" with others, 
to be concerned with their feelings, attitudes end interests, end 
to accord these es much consider? tion es their own. Wilson's 
PHIL component encompasses the mein requirements here: under—
stending that persons share important similerities, believing 
that they ere equelly worthy of respect end consideretion,ectuelly 
feeling respect end benevolence, end acting to help others es e 
result. The child who fails to look efter his little sister when 
crossing e mein reed, though ewe-re that he ought to take care of 
her, is therefore felling to "identify" either with his sister's 
interests in one or more of the above ways, or with the wants end 
expectetions of his parents end teachers, end so is in either 
case "lacking in feeling". 
Methods intended to remedy this defect may include dis—
cussion of whet constitutes e "person", end of how various groups 
or individuals with whom children may find it difficult to "identify" 
(e.g. foreigners, invelids end eighty year—olds) still qualify es 
"persons" with their own interests end feelings. .A further, 
increesingly ponuler method is to ensure thet children ectuelly 
encounter such people (e.g. by exchange trips ebroed, visiting 
hospitels end old people in the neighbourhood etc.) in the hope 
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that relationships will be formed and understanding developed. 
If "identification" with sociel expectations is seen as the main 
aim on the other hand, methods will include clearly indicating 
whet those expectations are, end reinforcing conformity with them 
by means of e consistent system of praise and blame, approval end 
disapproval, and bestowing end witholding affection. 
The "lack of feeling" explenetion of ekresie (see 
Chapter IV) is thus implied in this view of morel behaviour end 
morel learning, which age in suggests in turn e particul=ar approach 
to morel education and its methodology. 
The five epproeches to morel education which have been 
outlined represent e sample of whet Lortimore would cell "ways of 
teaching morality". The mein point of this section hes been to 
demonstrate the close logicel interrelationships between:— 
(i) conceptions of morality 
(ii) conceptions of morel education 
(iii) explenetions of Fkresie 
end (iv) methods of morel education, particularly designed to 
combat ekresia. 
Several of the explenetions of ekresie mentioned in this 
section have already been rejected es unacceptable because they 
imply F violation of the criteria for ekresie established in 
Chapter IV, but these objections hove not been repeated here, for 
even unsetisfectory explenetions still illustrate the logical 
interrelationships under discussion. 
This study too hes inevitably presented e perticuler 
account of whet it sees to be some central logical features of 
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morality — en account which hes more in common with the "com—
petitive" then with the "conformist" tradition, and which con—
sequently holds ekresie to be both logically possible and 
practically problematic. It has also argued for e particular 
interpretetion of ekresie in terms of "wanting more" and has 
suggested certain explanatory factors, concerned with dishonesty, 
language end immediacy, which ere implied by that interpretetion. 
It now remains, therefore, to consider whet implications for the 
methodology of morel education, with particular reference to the 
problem of akresie, can be drawn from this explanatory framework 
by reason of the logical interrelationships demonstrated above. 
This investigetion will consist of two stages. The 
first (Section 3) will attempt e typology of morel education 
methods, end will examine whether any one method can provide en 
adequate defence against ekresie. The second (Section 4) will 
adopt e more constructive and eclectic approach in suggesting 
some combinations of methods designed to combat Ekrasia l based 
upon the explenetory factors described in Chapter V. 
3. Is there e particular method of "teaching morality" most  
likely to combat Ekrasia? 
Three preliminary points need to be emphasised before 
specific methods can be considered: 
(i) "Combatting ekresie" should not be equated with 
"preventing ekresie". .Any form of morel education which is 
intended to "prevent", "cure" or "eradicate" ekresie in toto hes 
felled to appreciate the necessary "geppiness" between principles 
end practice (to use Cooper's term), which, es hes been argued 
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throughout this study, is en essential, logical feature of 
morelity. !ny method or process which guerenteed to prevent 
ekresie would also deprive the agent of the freedom to (decide 
to) ect against his principles or beliefs, with the result that 
his behaviour could not count es morel action et ell; to eliminate 
the possibility of ekresie is to eliminate the very idea of 
morality end of free, morel action. Nethods of morel education, 
therefore, will be evaluated in this section end the next in 
respect not of their power to Prevent akresia l but rather of their 
Possible usefulness in helping young people to ect upon their 
morel beliefs. "Combatting ekresie" or "anti—akresiec" will be 
used es short—band descriptions of this function. 
(ii) It is, prime facie, highly unlikely that any one 
method will in itself be edequate in combatting ekresie. The 
enelysis of ekresie developed in the previous chapters hes shown 
it to be e complex phenomenon, the logical feetures of which 
suggest that et least three types of explanatory fector ere 
operative. If, then, there is no simple, unitery explanation of 
ekresie, it is improbable thet there will be e simple, unitery 
method of combatting it. 
(iii) The confusion between description and explanation, 
which was noted in Chapter III in connection with definitions of 
akresie l reappears when methods of combatting ekresie ere con—
sidered. The methods which have already been briefly mentioned 
in Section 2 cen be divided into two categories: those which 
simply describe whet is done (e.g. discussing, rewarding, 
punishing), end those which embody en implicit explanation of 
whet the method is trying to combat (e.g. treining the will, 
developing character, strengthening the conscience). The letter 
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group, containing references es they do to the explenetory con—
cepts of "will", "character" and "conscience", tend to prejudge 
eny investigation into the reletive usefulness of verious methods 
and contribute little of substance to it; for example, if it is 
essumed that ekresie is to be defined and expleined in terms of 
"having e week conscience", it is uninformetive to suggest thet 
the wey to combat ekresie is to "build up e strong conscience" 
in children. 
The methods considered in this section, therefore, will 
be defined end discussed es far es possible in descriptive rather 
then explenetory terms, though the dividing line is not elweys 
cleer; "telking", for example, would count es wholly descriptive, 
wherees "rewerding" cerries with it some explanetory overtones 
which distinguish it from e purely beheviourel description. It 
would, however, be pedantic end perhaps logicelly impossible to 
try to exclude ell explanatory overtones from descriptions of 
enti—ekresiec methods, end all that will be ettempted is es 
descriptive en account es is possible end practicable. 
It will be convenient in presenting the typology to 
divide the "ways of teaching morelity" into two mein groups — 
"verbel" end "precticel" — though there will in prectice be con—
siderable overlap between the two. Indeed, many combinations of 
methods ere possible, end the doubts expressed above over the 
existence of e simple, unitary method for combetting ekresie 
suggest thet the most fruitful epproech mey well lie in one of 
these combinetions. In this section, however, methods will be 
examined seperetely in order to gein e cleerer picture of their 
particular strengths end weaknesses, before the advantages of 
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verious combinations are considered. 
A. "Verbal" Iethods 
These will be taken to refer to occasions when adults 
either telk to children or encourege them to telk among them—
selves about morel matters, and can be olessified into three 
groups, to be labelled: (i) exhortation end preaching, 
(ii) rational instruction, (iii) discussion. 
(i) Exhortation end Preaching 
ildults using these methods with children ere aiming to 
set before theme pattern, model or ideal of behaviour, and to 
urge them to strive to achieve it. Preaching is directed towards 
the former objective; it paints e picture of the state of good—
ness which can be attained by children (in morel or religious 
terms, or both), and often of the state of badness in which they 
ere et present languishing, or ere in danger of languishing. 
Exhortation is directed towards the letter goal, being designed 
to stir the listener to improve his morel condition. 
The morel content of exhortation End preaching is 
usually explicit end clear—cut, consisting of rules, precepts, 
principles end instructions which range in their epplicebility 
from the generel, "Alweys show respect to your elders end betters", 
to the perticuler, "Don't upset your mother by staying out too 
lete." Explanations end reesons may be edded, but the main con—
cern_ of this method is to convince End convert, rether then to 
justify. It seeks en emotional response from the listener, end 
consequently often tekes the form of story—telling, which provides 
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dramatic exemples of model behaviour performed by saintly or 
heroic characters. 
.Ls e means of combatting ekresie, this direct presentation 
of rules end principles would seem to have some value in connection 
with the lenguege factor. The child is being exposed, through 
exhortation end preaching, to the prescriptive end persuasive 
functions of lenguege, which, es was suggested in Chapter V, is 
one important way in which. we come to see things es desirable 
end valuable, or the reverse. This prescriptivity is obvious in 
the above imperative exemples, containing the further normative 
concepts of "respect", "elders end betters", "upset" end "too 
late"; it is less overt in pronouncements like "only children 
who ere spoilt end selfish don't share their sweets", but the 
descriptive form of such sentences cloaks the intended pre—
scription: "It's right to there your sweets; if you don't, you 
ere spoilt end selfish, which is bed." Exhortation end preeching, 
then, strongly convey approval end disapproval of various forms 
of behaviour, which must to some extent influence e child's 
linguistic framework through which he views the world, and con—
sequently his morel concepts, attitudes and interpretations also. 
There is in addition some empirical evidence to suggest that the 
verbalising of rules can help young children to resist temptation; 
O'Leery, for example, found that by teaching young children e rule 
which they hed to break. in order to cheet, end by getting them ip 
say the rule to themselves while performing the task et which 
they had the opportunity to cheet, the incidence of cheating was 
greatly reduced. 17 
The weaknesses of exhortation and preeching, however, 
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es methods of combatting ekresie, outweigh their possible strengths, 
for the verbal transmission of rules end prescriptions to e lergely 
passive recipient creates severel serious problems. 
Firstly, even the linguistic justificetion of the method, 
which represents its strongest point, hes severe limitations, for 
exposing children to the prescriptive end persuasive functions of 
language end to expressions of epprovel end disepprovel in this 
way will not necessarily meke them went to follow the prescriptions 
or be persuaded unless they can "identify" in some way with the 
prescriber end went to gein his epprovel. The erchetypel conflict, 
often portreyed in children's stories, between e family or group 
of children end en unsympathetic, euthoriterien step—parent, 
governess or teacher, demonstrates how "prescriptive exposure" 
can frequently be insufficient to ensure compliance with whet is 
prescribed, end cen even directly provoke non—complience. 
Secondly, end with perticuler reference to the "honesty 
factor" discussed in Chapter V, this form of verbalism is likely 
to produce "ought"—judgments that ere incomplete, unexamined, end 
therefore conducive to self—deception end intellectual dishonesty. 
child who, es e result of exhortation end preaching, comes to 
"leern" end "believe" that he ought to respect his elders end 
betters will probebly have no more then e hazy appreciation of 
any justificatory reesons becking the "ought" (perheps only at 
the punishment—evoidence level), end will certainly not be 
encouraged to edmit or examine his counterveiling, non—morel 
wents in e perticuler situation of temptation (e.g. when he meets 
en "elder end better" whom he intensely dislikes end would greatly 
enjoy being rude to), for the very existence of these wents, if 
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admitted either to himself or to others, will be taken es en 
indication of his wickedness end failure to heed the exhortetion 
end Preaching. If this child, on the other hand, is rude to en 
adult whom he dislikes, but explicitly acknowledges only thet 
pert of his eppreisel of the situetion represented by the "ought", 
then he is encouraging both in himself end in other judges the 
belief that his behaviour is to be described end expleined es 
"week—willed". To balance one's openly ecknowledged vents end 
motives egeinst the demands of justificatory reasons may not 
Effect one's ultimate decision end action (though it is possible 
that it may), but it will et least leed to e more complete end 
honest eppreisel of the situetion, e result which exhortetion end 
preeching seem unlikely to achieve. 
Thirdly, end perheps most seriously, the verbal trens—
mission of rules end prescriptions is necessarily "non—immediete" 
in severel of the senses described in Chepter V. Exhortation 
end preeching can only pronounce thet certain things ere right cr 
wrong, end ought to be done or avoided. They can, strictly 
speaking, only be "propositional.", however much insistence is 
laid upon the desirebility of acting in eccordence with the pro—
positions, end it hes also been ergued that morel principles ere 
similerly "propositionel", in that their acceptance is expressed 
in decisions or resolves that ... rather then in decisions or 
resolves to ... The leerning of rules end principles from 
exposure to exhortetion end preeching will therefore also be 
"propositional". I child mey leern thet he ought to respect his 
elders end betters by being told thet he ought to do so and by 
coming to believe thet he ought to do so (End perheps resolving 
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that he ought to do so), but verbalism alone cennot claim to 
bridge the gap between judgment end action, for it cennot claim 
that it hes thereby taught the child to respect his elders end 
betters or ensured that the child hes leernt to do so. 
Further weight is edded to this objection when the 
question of temporal immediacy is considered. In Chapter V it 
was argued that although some cases of morel conflict end morel 
ekresie can be portrayed es e weighing of present against future 
considerations, many do not fit this temporal pattern, beceuse 
the justificatory reasons accepted by the ekresiec do not 
necessarily refer to future es distinct from present factors. 
However, when rules and principles are taught end leernt by 
means of exhortation end preeching, the present/future distinction 
hes much greeter relevance, for the whole aim end point of these 
methods is thet the verbal lessons leernt now should be applied 
to situetions encountered in the future; so thet the child who 
todey is told that he ought to respect his elders end betters will 
tomorrow decide to be polite to en elderly visitor. But there is 
of course no guarantee, or even probability, thet E rule which is 
verbally transmitted todey will weigh more heavily then will the 
immediacy of possibly countervailing wants end motives tomorrow 
when e judgment end decision will be made in the light of those 
situational factors which eppeer most influential et that time. 
Other aspects of "rion—immediacy" ere revealed in the 
story—telling method of exhortation end preeching, referred to 
ebove. Any example of model behaviour presented in the story 
must be non—immediate in the obvious sense of referring to e 
situation in which the listener is not personally involved. The 
problems surrounding this epproech will be considered in some 
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detail in subsection (iii) below, in connection with discussion 
methods using hypothetical morel situations, and et this point it 
will suffice to note the following difficulties which relate more 
directly to exhortation end preaching: 
(e) The child to whom the story is told may well feel 
that the character end situation described beer no relationship 
to his own life end problems. The predicaments end challenges 
which immortalise saints end heroes are not commonly encountered 
by children (or even adults). Deeds of self—sacrifice in 
P.nterctic blizzards or of devotion to duty ih Crimeen hospitals 
may make for dramatic stories, but opportunities to "follow" such 
examples et all faithfully ere so limited that children may fail 
to see these stories es in any way prescriptively applicable to 
themselves. 
(b) It is also ergueble whether such morel examples of 
saintliness end heroism, which go far beyond the normel require—
ments of morel duty, are even logically prescriptive or universeli—
seble. is Urmson maintains, although the agent may see e saintly 
or heroic act es his duty, he cannot logically be called upon by 
enother to perform it, or be reproached by enother for failing to 
perform it, or expect anyone else to perform it.18 In en example 
strongly reminiscent of the educetionall "saints and heroes" 
approach, he argues: 
"It hes no doubt often been the case that e person who hes 
gone off to distant parts to nurse lepers hes thereby done 
e deed of greet morel worth. But such en action is not 
merely too far beyond average human capacity to be regarded 
as a duty ...; it would be quite ridiculous for everyone, 
however circumstanced, to be expeCted to go off end nurse 
lepers."19 
(c) If the preacher tries to counter the above objections 
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by claiming that he is recommending the rule or principle 
exemplified in the story rather then the exemplary beheviour 
itself, he is raising further problems of transferability. The 
child on this interpretation will have to grasp firstly that 
the deed in the story does exemplify some abstract principle, 
end secondly that that some principle hes application to the 
child's own, and totally different, experiences. But why should 
it be thought that this roundabout method is the best way to 
teach children to act upon their principles? The actions of e 
child picking up someone else's litter in the playground end of 
Oates walking out of his tent to die con both no doubt be sub—
sumed under the general principle of altruism, but this logical 
connection provides no grounds for assuming that the latter 
beheviour con be encouraged by appealing to the former. 
Exhortation end preaching, therefore, hove some con—
tribution to make towards the combatting of ekresio with regard 
to the language fector, but reveal serious weaknesses in connection 
with the honesty end immediacy factors. Some of these weaknesses 
are to be found not only in exhortation end preaching but in 
other verbel methods of morel educetion also, end will thus be 
mentioned only briefly when these other methods are examined. 
(ii) Rational Instruction 
The second verbel method will be labelled, somewhat 
arbitrarily, "rational instruction". It can be distinguished 
from exhortation end preaching in et least three ways. Firstly, 
it will be less dogmatic, end will encourage end take serious 
notice of children's questions, comments end objections, rather 
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then ettempt to impose upon them en inviolate set of rules end 
prescriptions. Secondly end consequently, it will place more 
importance upon exPlenetion end justification. (Both of these 
points reflect Scheffler's analysis of "teeching" es en essentially 
retionel ectivity.)20  Ind thirdly, in trying to develop retionel 
eppreisels of morel questions rether then to provide ready—medel 
euthoritetive enswers to them, it will concentrate es much upon 
the form es upon the content of morality. 
The lest point provides the most cleer—cut differentia 
between "retionel instruction" end"exhortetion end preeching", 
for some examples of the letter need not rule out a measure of 
"feed—beck" from the children end of retionel explanation from 
the teecher. Exhortetion end preeching ere, however, inescepebly 
"content—bound", in that they present en unequivocal account of 
what constitutes model, morel behaviour. Rationel instruction, 
on the other hand, though it mey well include the Brewing of 
specific conclusions from evidence exemined end discussed, to the 
effect thet certein actions ere more justifiable end of greeter 
morel velue then others, is elso directed towerds developing 
children's understanding of how morel judgments ere mode end their 
skill in meking them. 
Three possible epproeches to teaching the form of morel 
reesoning have eIreedy been mentioned elsewhere in this study. 
Children could be taught by means of retionel instruction the wey 
in which morel concepts "work" end ere to be used (i.e. their 
logicel properties, relationships end implicetions), es Here 
claims could be done with the properties of "prescriptivity" end 
"universelity".
21 
Cr they could be taught the wey in which morel 
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conclusions may be drawn from premises, es in -istotle's precticel 
syllogism.22 Or they could be taught whet constitutes e "morally 
educated person", or e "moral reason", FS suggested by Wilson's 
"components".23 In eech cese, teeching whet the form of morel 
reesoning is thought to be would need to be supplemented by 
teeching how to employ it (e.g. in the discussion of exam-Pies). 
The mein strength of eny of these methods es e meens 
of combatting ekresie lies in their emphasis upon the compelling 
validity of justificatory reasons end logical requirements. If 
ekresie is to be pertly explained by the leek of motivetionel 
pressure exerted by justificetory reesons, eny attempt to demon—
strate that in forming morel judgments there is e right end e 
wrong way of using concepts, of adducing reasons, of freming 
arguments, end of drawing conclusions may help children to feel 
the logicel force of justificetory reesons more strongly. If e 
child appreciates that there ere procedures end skills for 
deciding whet ought morally to be done, which he cen to some 
extent either "get right" or "get wrong", just es there ere 
methematicel procedures end skills for solving mathematical pro—
blems which he can "get right" or "get wrong", he will vent to 
get the morel reasoning right rather than wrong, other things 
being equal; or in other words he will come to see that to accept 
reasons es justificetory is, in pert et lest, to acknowledge 
that there ere logicel rules of procedure operative in the morel 
es in other spheres of reesoning. 
Rational instruction, however, es en enti—ekresiec 
method, suffers from several of the same disadvantages em did 
exhortation end preaching, notably its failure to remove the 
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Problem of motivetion end its necessarily propositionel nature. 
rs for es motivetion is concerned, describing the form 
of moral reesoning to children (whetever thet form mey be) does 
not ensure thet children will went to edopt it. There mey be e 
greeter likelihood that, other things being  eauel, e child will 
went to "get it right" when he knows what counts es "getting it 
right", but, es hes been frequently emphesised, other things ere 
not equel in situations of potential ekresie because of the 
particular influence of counterveiling factors. Just es e child 
mey feil to use methemeticel rules correctly to solve e methe—
meticel problem, although being well ewere of them, beceuse he is 
lazy or cannot be bothered, or ellows himself to be distrected, 
or dislikes Meths. end the Meths. teecher, or thinks thet he hes 
better things to do with his time, so might e child feil to employ 
for similer reasons the procedures of morel reesoning of which he 
is well aware, when faced with e morel problem, end so not expose 
himself to the Pressure of justificetory end logical considerations. 
12 1ternetively, he may choose not to epply whet he hes been taught 
about morel reesoning, because he perceives, perheps hazily, that 
the conclusion to which his reasoning is likely to lead will be 
distesteful (e.g. that he ought to see his younger sister safely 
home from school rether then go into town with the rest of his 
gang), with the result thet he commits intellectuel ekresie es 
described in Chapter IV end so evoids embarking upon the reasoning 
process in eny thorough—going wey. Furthermore, the motivetionel 
problem does not only epply to ceses where the agent does not went 
to exercise the skill which he hes been teught; the boy in the 
ebove example might take the trouble of reesoning to e conclusion 
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but still decide thet he wents to go with his friends rather then 
do whet his morel conclusion indicates. Instructing children in 
the form of morel reasoning, therefore, feils to overcome the 
motivetionel problem of ekresie l whether or not the reasoning is 
ectuelly employed by the child. 
As far es its propositional nature is concerned, 
retionel instruction is again open to similer objections to those 
brought egeinst exhortation end preaching. Whether children ere 
teught by retionel instruction that morel judgments ere pre—
scriptive end universal, or thet conclusions can be drewn from 
premises, or thet beihg morelly educated implies certein attitudes 
end skills, successful teeching in these erees can only ensure 
thet children leern end know thet these things ere so; the 
logicel gep must remein between leerning propositions end ecting 
upon them. In defence of verbel instruction it might be ergued 
thet it is concerned not so much with propositions es with skills, 
end thet it is best cherecterised es teeching how to ... rather 
then teeching that ... This move still feils to bridge the 
logicel gap, however, for teeching how to ... is by no meens 
equivalent to teeching to ..., es Scheffler hes demonstreted.
24 
If I succeed in teeching children how to drew e sound conclusion 
from evidence, I heve provided them with e skill but I have not 
necesserily teught them to drew sound conclusions from evidence 
so thet on eppropriete, future occesions they will drew sound 
conclusions from evidence. Teeching e child how to signel e 
right—hend turn when riding e bicycle cennot be ecrueted with 
teeching him to signel right—hend turns, for I mey claim success 
in the former testi even if the child consistently feils thereefter 
to signel whenever he is turning right. The logicel gap which 
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skrasie requires thus remains, whether it is propositions or 
skills which are taught. 
Rational instruction, however, need not be direct 
only towards the form of morel thinking, though this feature does 
serve to distinguish it clearly from exhortation end preaching. 
Children can also be taught about the facts of e situation or the 
consequences of en action, which they might otherwise have not 
known or ignored (e.g. that playing with e herd cricket bell 
rather than e tennis ball Gen cause more damage to persons and 
property, end therefore needs more care). Such instruction may 
be helpful in developing children's morel sensitivity in F way in 
which teaching merely the form of morel reesoning could not do, 
but it remains necessarily propositional end es such is open to 
the objections that have already been raised. 
Rational instruction, then, appears to score no more 
highly then did exhortation end preaching es e unitary method of 
combatting akresie. Further problems Prise et the practical 
level over how exactly such teaching would be formulated (e.g. 
how does one teach e five year—old that "ought" is "prescriptive" 
and "universal"?), end et the theoretical level over what exactly 
constitutes the"form" of morel reesoning end the logical features 
of morel concepts. The letter question, in so far es it relates 
to ekresia l however, has already been discussed in Chapters II — 
III, and the former will be returned to in Section 4. 
(iii) Discussion 
The third verbal method of morel education to be 
examined will be labelled "discussion". This is to be distinguished 
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from the previous two methods in both its practical implementation 
end its theoretical rationale. "Discussion" will be taken to 
refer to e consideration of morel questions in which. attention 
is focussed not upon en individual adult's prescriptions or 
teaching but upon the arguments end opinions arising from the 
whole group, in which the adult's role is participatory rather 
then directly instructional. (Vor the sake of convenience, the 
adult will again be referred to es the "teacher", but this does 
not imply that he is "teaching", nor that he is necessarily e 
schoolteacher.) The re.tionele of discussion es e method of morel 
education rests upon the view that we heve to form our morel 
judgments for ourselves if they Ere to count em such, end not 
have them imposed upon us by authorities; end consequently that 
e good way of learning to work out these autonomous judgments is 
through the refining process of group discussion. 
Three types of discussion will be distinguished, end 
while these ere not necessarily mutually exclusive, they will be 
considered separately because they reveal different types of 
strength end weakness es means of combetting ekresie. 
(e) Discussion of Hypothetical Loral Cituetions  
This approach, which is characterised by its content 
more then by its form of procedure, consists of describing' to 
children factual or fictional situations which ere thought to 
Pose morel problems or dilemmas, and of encoureging discussion 
of these situations by asking questions like, "Whet should the 
person in the situation have done?" or "Whet would y221 heve done 
in that situation?" Brief mention hes already been made of this 
approach in Chapter I, in connection with the Schools Council 
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Loral Education Project, whose Lifeline material mekes wide use 
of hypothetical situations es e stimulus for discussion.
25 
"1e 
do not favour the teecher doing the morel work for ohildren", state 
the members of the Project. "Our materiels approach is designed 
to help adolescent boys end girls find their own solutions to 
questions ebout behaviour in interpersonal situations."26 
This type of discussion has some effinities with teaching 
the form of morel reesoning((ii) ebove), for the aim is principally 
to provide children not with reedy—mode "answers" to morel questions 
but with skills end opportunities for practice in forming their 
own morel conclusions. It also shares the mein enti—ekresiec 
strength of the "rational instruction" method in thet it may help 
children to feel that there ere logically compelling, "right" ways 
of working out e moral argument, though unless there is some overt 
"teaching" es well es "discussion", there can be no guarantee 
thet eny cleer methodology of morel reasoning will emerge or be 
grasped. 	 additional enti—ekresiec advantage might also be 
cleimed for this epproech on the grounds that it simulates reel 
morel conflict by getting children to "put themselves" into pro—
blematic situetions end esking whet they would do in them (e.g. 
pert of the Lifeline meteriel consists of e set of booklets under 
the generel title, "What would you have done?" which describe e 
veriety of historical end contemporary incidents in which morel 
problems arise.) 27 
Discussion of hypothetical morel situetions, however, 
es e method of combatting ekresie, also shares to e large extent 
the weaknesses of retionel instruction alreedy noted: any learning 
which results will be primarily of propositions end skills, and 
the child will not necessarily went to use in other contexts the 
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skills which he acquires end the propositions which he learns 
during discussion (see (ii) above). Other objections cen be 
levelled against this approach, es I have argued elsewhere,28 and 
in particular against its apparent assumption that there is e 
straightforward end close connection (both logically and empiri—
cally) between e child's response to e hypothetical situation 
End his response to e similar situetion personally encountered 
in reel life, i.e. between the morel judgment formed in e hypo—
thetical situetion end the decision made end action performed in 
e similar reel—life situetion. This assumption leads the Schools 
Council Morel Education Project, for example, to claim of its 
Lifeline meteriell "Without doubt work of this kind can produce 
improvements in behaviour es well es in attitude ..."29 end again, 
"The use of the 'Whet would you have done?' series is intended to 
encourage in pupils ... e willingness to Pot upon one's beliefs."30 
(my itelics) The anti—ekresiec value of this approach is thus 
taken for grented "without doubt", though it can in feet be 
questioned on the following grounds: 
1. Hypothetical dilemmas used in morel education tend 
to involve e conflict of principles (e.g. the Lifeline booklet, 
"Solitary Confinement", in the "Whet would you have done?" 
series,31 dealing with the issues of conflicting principles raised 
by conscientious objectors in wertime). But the conflict which 
cherecterises ekresie is not between rival morel principles, but 
between principle end inclinetion (e.g. I believe that I ought to 
tell the policemen the truth about the speed et which I was 
driving (principle), but I elso believe thet telling the truth 
will get me into trouble end I do not went to get into trouble 
(inclinetion)). There is no reason to suppose that discussing 
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morel conundrums of conflicting principles, es in en Ethics 
seminar, will have any effect on whether one acts on e principle 
which one holds, when faced with e conflicting end tempting 
in 
 
2. Even if Principle—versus—inclinetion situations 
are used, doubts still erise over their enti—ekresiec value, 
perticulerly in connection with the immediacy factor. Oen such 
F situetion (e.g. the policemen example above) quelify in feet 
es e "morel" situetion or experience for the listener to whom it 
is presented hypotheticely? TiThat seems to be lacking in the 
hypothetical presentation is precisely that feature which would 
make the reel—life situetion F. morel problem — immediacy. It is 
the immediacy of the incline tion (not to ,net into trouble with 
the police) which I experience et first hand that creates the 
morel conflict; it is my own situational reesons, motives, wents 
end emotions which clash with the principle of truth—telling, end 
so face me with e morel decision (of the "to ..." rather than 
"that ..." veriety). 
But the ectuel motivational effect of states of mind 
like fear, love, jealousy end grief cennot be properly appreciated 
"secondhand". However me/1y novels I hove reed or ploys I have seen 
and discussed in which People fell in love, become jeelous or 
suffer bereavement, end however well I cen in discussion. describe 
the situetion end feelings of those people, it will still be e 
completely new end different experience for me when I personally 
encounter love or jealousy or bereevement.32 The psychological 
effect that these experiences will hove on me cennot be rehearsed 
in edvence or predicted. 
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Consequently it will be impossible to rehearse hypo—
thetical principle—versus—inclinetion situetions, because the 
inclination is not something that can be experienced "second—
hend". It will be the immediate situational factors (e.g. the 
Policemen's manner end eppeerence; my particular feet of the 
publicity at thet time; the domestic strain I heppen to be under 
just then, etc.) that help to decide whether principle or incli—
nation wins. The leek of immediacy which is e necessary fee ture 
of hypotheticel morel situetions, therefore, suggests thet one's 
response to e hypothetical situation may have little connection with 
whet one's response would be to e similar situation in reel life, 
end thet discussing with children the question, "Whet would you 
have done in that situation?" will not necessarily produce a 
"willingness to Ect upon one's beliefs" in octuel situetions. 
3. Questions about hypotheticel morel situetions which 
ere put in the form, "Whet would you do ...?" or "Whet do you 
do ...?" ere ambiguous es they could be token to meen either 
"Whet do you predict that your action (or reaction) would be ...?" 
or "Whet decision do you think you ought to melee ...?" end these 
are very different questions. The answer to the prediction 
question will be descriptive, while the answer to the decision 
question is prescriptive, end the two may point in opposite 
directions; for instance, I may predict that I shell tell the 
policemen e lie, but decide thet I ought to tell him the truth. 
Both interpretations reveal pitfells in connection with 
the combatting of ekresie. The decision question may be useful 
in posing e problem which cells for morel reasoning end for the 
prectising of the relevent skills, but it would be resh to assume 
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either that the decision that 
	 made about e hypothetical 
situetion will bear much. relation to the decision that ... to be 
made in e similar reel—life situation (for the reasons given in 
2), or that either decision that ... will necesserily lead to 
the appropriate decision to ... which is actually taken (for the 
reasons given in Chapter V, Section 2). The prediction question 
may be useful in encouraging children to acknowledge their wants 
end motives more clearly end openly, but it is subject to the 
same limitations of non—immediacy end non—transferability es is 
the decision question, end also need not lead to any morel 
discussion et all unless supplemented by some overt teaching. 
Discussion of hypotheticel morel situations, therefore, 
may well improve children's cognitive grasp of the possible 
dimensions of e morel dilemma by helping them to see how various 
people's interests end feelings ere et stake, end how the problem 
may allow of differing interpretations, but it does not follow 
self—evidently from this that such discussion will produce 
"improvements in behaviour es well es in attitude" or "e willing—
ness to act upon one's beliefs", es the Schools Council Forel 
Education Project claims. 
(b) Neutrelly—cheired Discussion 
This second discussion method is to be distinguished 
from the first not necesserily by its content, which could again 
include hypotheticel morel problems, but by its procedure. With 
the previous method, (e), although the attention is focussed 
upon the deliberations of the group, the teacher mey still play 
en important directive, though not instructional, role in 
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initiating the discussion, describing the problem, contributing 
to the discussion, end even presenting his own viewpoint. With 
the present method, however, the teacher is cast in the role of 
e neutrel chairmen who directs proceedings only in the sense of 
Providing the necessary materiels end evidence for the group to 
be able to discuss ell aspects of the question under consideretion. 
The teecher does not declare his own views end opinions, end 
indeed tries to ensure that no indication whetever is given of 
whet they Fre, in order that the group mey not be influenced by 
pronouncements becked by the teecher's authority. 
The locus clessicus for this epproech is the Schools 
Council Humanities Curriculum Project,33 which although aimed not 
so much et morel educetion FS et developing sociel understending 
of controversial_ issues, hes been widely debeted es e possible 
method of morel educetion. The Project hes also provoked con—
siderable disegreement over whether, or in whet sense, e teecher 
cen be "neutrel" in the context of e discussion by children about 
morel end other controversial questions, end over whether such 
"neutrality", even if possible, is morally end educetionelly 
desirable.34 The detailed arguments within this debate need not 
be exemined fully here, for the question et issue is not the 
overell retionele end justification of "neutrelly—cheired 
discussion-, but its possible usefulness es e meens of combatting 
ekresie. Whet effect is the teecher's attempted neutrality likely 
to have in this respect? 
On the positive side, the absence of any instructional 
influence (other then et the procedural level) should lead to more 
honest end openly acknowledged reactions to, end Eppreisels of, 
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morel questions on the pert of the children. The desire to sey 
whet the teecher is thought to went to hear, to conform to whet 
are thought to be his expectations, or in other words to use morel 
concepts descriptively end "sociologically" should be reduced if 
the teacher consistently refuses to declare his own views, although 
there will clearly be practical difficulties in hiding those views 
end in reconciling his neutral role during the discussion with 
his unavoidably non—neutral role outside the discussion; for 
exemple, children who have just witnessed the teecher stopping e 
fight or reprimanding e bully in the playground will be in no 
doubt es to his views on violence (in certain contexts, et least), 
however neutral e stance he menages to adopt in the classroom 
discussion next Period. 
On the negative side, neutrally—chaired discussion 
shares the necessarily "propositional" feetures of other "verbal" 
methods already discussed end the consequent motivational problems 
of "non—immediacy". also the discussion will often be concerned 
with hypothetical situations end will thus be open to the some 
objections es (e). 
Lore specifically, the teacher's neutrality will deprive 
the children of exposure to the prescriptive end persuasive use of 
morel language, though this process is probably more influential 
with young children who are building up their fremework of morel 
concepts then with adolescents, with whom this method is normally 
used. However, if e group felled to grasp the possible morel 
dimensions end interpretation of e particular problem, it would 
be difficult for the teacher to convey these without using pre—
scriptive language in e way forbidden by his neutral role — though .  
he is, of course, free to "introduce" materiel to the group which 
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stands for e perticuler, prescriptive point of view. 
A more serious objection is suggested again by certein 
"non—immediate" features of the method. If e teecher persistently 
refrains from declaring his own morel beliefs end conclusions 
while encouraging the members of the group to declare theirs, 
the impression may be given that discussion of morel issues is 
yet another school activity which does not really impinge upon 
the adult world. Just es the games master might send e group of 
boys off on e cross—country run end then himself retire to the 
chenging—room for e cigarette, so might the neutral teecher in 
e discussion eppeer to urge the expression of views end ergu—
ments, end the weighing of evidence to form conclusions, yet not 
to bother to perticipete in any of these activities himself. 
Seen in this light, morel discussion would seem to be en intel—
lectual exercise remote from the precticel world end the reel 
concerns of adults. Such en interpretation is unlikely to ease 
the motivetionel problems of non—immediacy, central to ekresie, 
end could even widen the gep between morel judgment end action 
for some children. 
(c) Leederless Discussion 
The third discussion method will be labelled "leaderless", 
for here the teacher's influence is (in theory et least) com—
pletely obliterated, even et the procedural level. The group 
itself, of which the teecher mey be e member but with no 
privileged status, determines the subject of the discussion end 
the methods of procedure. No constreints, rules or prescriptions 
ere provided by any external euthority (though some may be agreed 
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upon and accepted within the group), and it is the teacher's 
teak to abdicate from his normal role of directing, guiding end 
supporting, by throwing responsibility for the conduct of the 
session on to the group itself. 
The aim end rationale of this method is supplied not 
by the content of whet is discussed (over which the teacher can 
have no control if he is genuinely to relinquish his directive 
powers), but by the increased understanding end awareness of 
group behaviour which are claimed to result. Participation in 
this kind of group activity end observation of one's own and 
other people's reactions and contributions will, it is hoped, 
provide greeter insight into the motivations, emotions and other 
psychological influences which affect group dynamics. (To 
classify this as a purely "verbal" method is perhaps misleading, 
as the behaviour of such groups will not be limited to verbal 
behaviour necessarily, as will be shown shortly, but it is con—
venient to consider this method alongside other "discussion" 
methods.) 
The theoretical framework within which this approach 
is set has originated from recent work on group dynamics and in 
particular on "T group" theory, stemming initially from the 
Tavistock Institute of Human Relations.35 Attempted applications 
of these theories to a specifically educational context have been 
made by, for example, Richardson36 with students on a teacher—
training course, and Grainger37 with children of secondary school 
age. The letter provides a full description of how the "leaderless 
discussion" method of moral education might be used with children, 
and while he at one point claims that the teacher in such discussion 
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"is not trying to improve the children morally", he sees the aim 
of the method er giving them "the chance of becoming more skilled 
in understanding their own ections es individuals and es e group."38 
"The dedlered aim of the Bullring (the name given to the croup) 
is that the children should study their own behaviour es it 
occurs, and it is the teacher's tesk to help them do this."39 
In view of Greinger's disclaimer about "morel improve— 
ment", it might be argued that this form of discussion should not 
be viewed es e method of morel education et ell. However, it is 
not difficult to conceive it es such, and Indeed, despite 
Greinger's apparent doubts, he is still prepared to give his 
book the sub—title, "A Classroom Experiment in liorel Educe tion". 
The educetionel justification of "studying beheviour" End "under— 
standing ections" must rest Partly et least upon the assumption 
that such study and understanding facilitates rather then hinders 
morel development; such methods would surely not be described 
end advocated with the enthusiasm which Greibger shows if he 
believed that they tended to produce callous, egocentric or 
manipulative individuals. For these reasons, then, it is necessary 
to consider "leaderless discussion" es e possible method of morel 
educe tion end of combatting ekresie. 
The mein contribution which this method might make 
towards the combatting of ekresie derives from the honesty factor, 
for it could be claimed that to observe, study end come to under— 
stand group beheviour will increase insight into one's own and 
other people's vents end motives. By recognising end nicking 
explicit whet one really wants end whet factors weigh most heavily 
with one within e group situation, one should be able to apprise 
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one's reection to thet situetion more honestly, end perheps 
trensfer this skill of appraisal to other situations. The child 
will in this wey openly acknowledge not only the justificatory 
reasons why he ought to do y, but elso the explenetory reasons 
why he in feet wents to do x more then y. This mey not 'teed 
him ectuelly to modify his wants end so to do whet he believes 
he ought to do (though it mey), but he will et least not be 
relying on the excuse thet it is some malfunctioning faculty 
(i.e. e week will) which is cousin; him to act es he does. 
Several objections, however, can be levelled egeinst 
these enti—ekresiec cleims. Firstly, description end explenetion 
ere age in easily confused here. Pccounts of whet is happening 
in "leederless discussion" ere inevitably interpretative end 
theoretical, end the interpretetions and theories themselves 
ere frequently speculetive end debeteble. This tends to pre—
judge eny objective eveluetion of the method's usefulness. 
Grainger, for example, describes F session in which enter "much 
desultory questioning" one child made end launched e peper dart, 
which led to the rest of the group also throwing derts end 
pellets et eech other.°  He comments on this incident: 
It 
... I tried to convey ... thet I felt thet the peper—throwing 
represented interaction — derts were thrown from one side of 
the circle to the other — end that elso people were testing 
out whet was possible in the Bullring by throwing derts et 
one enother end et me."41  
But this is of course not to describe whet heppened in 
the group but to attempt en explenetion of it, end other, less 
theory—laden explenetions are equelly possible — perheps the 
children were interested in eerodynemics rather then group 
dynemics, or were just bored after the "desultory questioning". 
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It is then very difficult to present e purely descriptive, 
account of "leaderless discussion", independent of theoretical 
interpretation, which suggests any obvious edventeges es en anti—
ekresiec method. 
Secondly, the non—directedness of "leaderless dis—
cussion" means that there is no certainty that morel language 
will be used or morel questions discussed; end even if they ere, 
the teacher will have no control over how the language is used 
end the questions discussed. If he is genuinely to ebdicete 
from his instructional, euthoritetive role, he will be in e 
serious dilemma, qua morel educa tor, if he hears morel concepts 
being misused end morel arguments misunderstood. As an equel 
member of the group, he is entitled to meke his own comments end 
contributions, but any attempt to correct, instruct or direct 
authoritatively will encourage the group to rely upon him to 
provide leadership end structure, thus defecting the object of 
the exercise. Grainger illustrates, perheps unknowingly, the 
incompatibility of "leaderless discussion" with exposure to the 
teacher's use of prescriptive moral language, when describing 
visit paid by enother teacher to the group: 
"(He) criticised the children openly for behaving childishly 
by saying, 'I should have thought that en intelligent form 
like yours could have done better then this. I'm surprised 
et you!' The children greeted this remerk with e mixture 
of annoyance end exasperation, because, within the context 
of the Bullring, it was irrelevent."42  
Perheps the comment wes "irrelevant" to Greinger's 
conception of the group's function, but the use of concepts like 
"childish", "intelligent", "better" and "surprised" is not 
irrelevant to the essimiletion of e prescriptive, linguistic 
framework end the development of morel attitudes, which have been 
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shown to heve close connections, vie the lenguege fector, with 
the problem of ekresie. 
Thirdly, in so fer es "leaderless discussion" may con—
sider end form conclusions ebout hypothetical (morel) situetions, 
it will be open to the objections which were reheersed in (e). 
This first pelf of the typology hes distinguished 
verious "verbel" methods of morel education, end hes attempted 
to show that any one such method hes serious weeknesses if con—
ceived of es en edequete technique in itself for combetting 
ekresie. On the other bend, eech of the methods exemined hes 
elso revealed some possible enti—erasiec Otrengths in the light 
of the explenetory fectors suggested in Ohepter V; these strengths 
will be returned to in the final section (4). 
The "verbel" methods described form e continuum rether 
then e set of cleerly sepereble activities. In some cases it 
would be difficult to classify e perticuler "verbel" epproech, 
es prectised by e teecher, neetly under one of the heedings 
sugr_s.ested, end in others e combinetion of methods will be used 
which blurs the dividing lines. Nevertheless the clessificetion 
is useful in demerceting the varieties of procedure end content 
which e teecher cen use "verbally" for the purposes of morel 
education. 
Similarly with the "precticel" methods next to be 
exemined, there will in practice often be en overlep between end 
combinetion of the methods used. In eddition, lenguege will 
neerly elweys be used in connection with "precticel" methods, 
which meens that elmost any of the "precticel" methods mey elso 
incorporete elmost any of the "verbal" ones, thus yielding e 
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formidable complexity of possible combinations. For the sake of 
simplicity, however, "practical" methods will be examined indi—
vidually end, es far es possible, independently of "verbal" ones 
in the following section, leaving the question of the most 
promising combinations until the final section. 
B. "Practical" Methods 
These will be taken to refer to activities in which the 
child is either the agent or the recipient end which ere intended 
to influence his morel thinking, beliefs end behaviour. Although 
these activities will usually involve the use of language, es 
mentioned above, they can be distinguished from "verbal" methods 
in that it is the practical, non—verbal activity which characterises 
the method end is thought to constitute its effectiveness end 
justification es e means of morel education. Four categories of 
activity will be examined, to be labelled: (i) rewarding and 
punishing, (ii) example—following, (iii) role play end dreme, 
(iv) disciplined activities (to be sub—divided into "sporting", 
"co—operative", "communal" end "individual" activities). 
(i) Rewarding end Punishing 
These methods cause the child to experience pleasant 
or unpleasant consequences es e result of e Particular action in 
order that certain types of behaviour may be encouraged or dis—
couraged in future. Two distinct forms of reward end punishment 
can be identified — the "external" and the "internal". The 
former refers to the performance of actions by e person in 
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authority, which the child is intended either to enjoy or to 
dislike (e.g. showing approval, smiling, giving e present or 
promising a treat on the one hand, and scowling, shouting, smacking 
or witholding affection on the other). The latter refers to the 
creation of a state of mind in the child which is intended to 
ensure that he will feel pleased and satisfied when behaving 
"rightly", end unhappy end guilty when behevihg "wrongly"; the 
authority figure in this case does not have to be physically 
present for the reward or punishment to be experienced, end the 
explanatory notion of "conscience" is often used to designate 
this internalised source of authority (see Chapter III). 
The main strengths of reward and punishment as a means 
of combatting akrasia derive from their close association with wants. 
The akresiac, it has been argued, wants to do what he in fact does 
more then what he believes he ought to do. Rewards and punish—
ments, however, introduce a further motivational factor into the 
situation, for if they are to be effective and recognisable as 
rewards and punishments for the child, he must want to gain the 
reward and went to avoid the punishment, and these further wants may 
modify or outweigh other wants which he has. Thus, the typical 
ekrasiec situation of sincerely believing that one ought to do y, 
yet in fact doing x because one wants to do x more than y, may be 
modified by the additional consideration of a prospective reward 
or punishment which the agent wants to gain or avoid more than he 
wants to do x. So a boy may sincerely believe, for example, that he 
ought to see his little sister safely home from school, want (more) 
to go off end play football with his friends, yet want (more still) 
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conscience. 
dents can be modified in this wey es e result both of 
"external" end of "internel" rewerds end punishments, es in the 
above example. In the letter case, although the action y may 
appear motivationally unattractive in itself, the prospective 
glow of satisfaction et heving done y, or the prospective guilt—
feelings et heving done x, may lead the agent to feel that he 
wants to do y rather then x. Indeed the "internel" type could 
well be more effective in combatting akresie than the "externer 
for if the internalised euthority of "conscience" is sufficiently 
established end predictable, the agent cen be certain that doing 
whet he believes he ought to do will be rewarded, end doing other—
wise will be punished, whereas with en "external" euthority there 
is always the chance of escaping his notice end thereby avoiding 
punishment or missing out on the reward. This is perhaps the 
reason why Kohlberg found students et his "upper" levels of moral 
development to be much more likely then those et "lower" levels 
to ect in accordance with their morel judgments,43 for the 
senctions operative et the "upper" levels (e.g. "I couldn't live 
with myself if I did thet") ere unavoidable in a way in which 
those associated with the "lower" Levels (e.g. "I'll get e good 
hiding for doing thet if my father finds out") ere not. 
It could be argued, then, that e systematic programme 
of rewerds end punishments could be devised to combat ekresie 
starting with the simple modifice tion of young children's wants 
by applying external senctions which would gredually become 
internalised in the form of en authoritetive end authoritarian 
conscience, thus producing consistently virtuous, non—ekrasiec 
behaviour. 
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Three types of objection, however, can be brought 
egeinst this ergument. Firstly, it can be questioned whether 
rewerds end punishments, though eble to modify beheviour, cen get 
to grips with the problem of ekresie es such. To combat akresie 
it is not sufficient to get the agent merely to do whet he 
believes he ought to do; he must also do it beceuse he believes 
he ought. If I, in e potentially ekresiee situetion, believe 
that I ought to leeve the perty in order to drive the beby—sitter 
home by e reesoneble hour, yet went to stey on beceuse the food, 
drink end company ere so e ttrective, my beheviour mey be modified 
by my being dragged or cajoled to the car by my wife; but my 
ekresie is unaffected, because I have not left because I felt I 
ought to. Similarly, the child who thinks he ought to teke his 
sister home from school, but does not went to, is not brought 
through the use of rewerds end punishments to act es he feels he 
ought beceuse he feels he ought, but beceuse he wants to gein the 
reward or avoid the punishment. Furthermore, there is no reeson 
why the epplicetion of en externel sanction should meke the ection 
itself more ettrective or desirable; indeed, the feet that en 
edditionel incentive hes to be provided in order to encourage the 
ection draws attention to its intrinsic unpleasantness. 
Elven with some "internal" rewerds end punishments 
similer difficulties mey erise„ for if it is only the effective 
senctions of "conscience", rather then retionel conviction, that 
stend between the egent end ekresie, he will do whet he believes 
he ought to do not beceuse he believes he ought, but beceuse he 
wants to gein satisfaction end avoid anxiety. Indeed, when 
"conscience" is opereting et the "irretionel" level (see Chapter 
III), the possibility of justificatory reasons existing 
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independently of conscience's sanctions is not even recognised, 
with the result that "I believe I ought to do y" becomes the 
equivalent of "I will feel guilty if I don't do y," (es in Here's 
"psychologicel oughts"). With "retionel" conscience, however, 
this objection does not so clearly epply, for conscience in this 
sense (es described in Chapter III) refers to e judgmentel pro— 
cess closely akin to morel reesoning. The person who defers to 
his "retionel conscience" then is doing whet he believes he ought 
beceuse the sincerity of his belief meens thet be knows he will 
be "punished by his conscience" (i.e. blame himself) if he feils 
to est es he believes he ought. Even in this cese, however, e 
distinction could be drewn between the person who does y purely 
end simply beceuse he sincerely believes he ought end the person 
who does y because of the unpleesent consequences of ecting 
otherwise which he foresees he would suffer es e result of  
sincerely believing thet he ought to do y. In short, then, 
rewerds end punishments, whether "externel" or "internel", can 
meke e child went to behave in such e way es to gein the former 
end avoid the letter, but cannot meke him went to do whet he 
believes he ought to do purely end directly beceuse he believes 
he ought. 
A second, releted objection concerns the limitetions of 
rewards. end punishments with respect to their generality end 
trensferebility. "Ought"—judgments imply the becking of justi— 
fice tory reesons which in turn eppeel to principles of e generalised 
nature end wide renge of epplicebility, but rewerds end punish— 
ments ere tied to specific instances of perticuler forms of 
beheviour. The child who is punished for not seeing his sister 
safely home mey, when e similer occasion arises again, teke his 
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sister home because he went: to avoid further punishment, but 
punishment clone cennot Produce more generelised, principled 
petterns of beheviour like acting unselfishly or caring for 
others in greeter need then oneself. For e child to see perti—
culer instances es felling under the generel principle of 
unselfishness end being justified by it, some form of verbel 
preeching, instruction or discussion will be required, end while 
these may of course be combined with techniques of reward end 
punishment it will not be these techniques but the verbal methods 
which help the child to see thet justificatory reasons end 
principles of e similar kind lie behind actions like sharing 
sweets, sharing treets, sharing household chores, end sharing 
perentel affection. Rewerds end punishments without verbal 
explenetion end tee ching are likely to produce erbitrary, even 
inconsistent beheviour, es it is precticelly (end perhaps 
logically) impossible to specify Ell possible instances of 
selfishness end unselfishness, Epplyine the eppropriete senction 
in eech cese. "Internal" rewards end punishments will also share 
these fee tures of non—generality end non—trensferebility if the 
internelisetion Process hes Egein not been accompanied by en 
element of verbel explanation end explicit retionelisetion: 
"irretioncl" conscience may, for instence, punish its owner for 
being lete for e meeting with his boss but not for being slow in 
returning his neighbour's lawnmower, even though e similar eraount 
of inconvenience is incurred in eech cese, end e child mey feel 
guilty ebout being rude to e teacher but not to e strenger. In 
so fer, then, es ekresie involves the ecceptence but non—
implementation of justificctory reasons end generalised Principles, 
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rewerds end punishments by_themselves, lecking es they do the 
necessery gencrelity of epplicetion and transfer, can contorlbute 
little towards combetting it for they cen only introduce an 
edditionel, highly specific motivational factor, end ere unable 
to teeth children to eccruire end apply morel reasoning end morel 
principles. The senctions essocieted with"t-etionerconscience, 
however, Ere not open to this objection, es they ere grounded in 
the justificatory reesons end generelised principles which the 
agent hes elreedy eccepted (see Cheater III). 
Thirdly end lastly, the methodology of rewerds end 
punishments cen egein eerily confound description with explanation. 
i?,s mentioned ebove l even the terms "reward" end "punishment" 
themselves ere explenetory in the sense -net they go beyond e 
fectuel description of events (e.g. "smiling", "smacking", etc.) 
to suggest en interpretetion of such events es being intended to 
ceuse the recipient pleasure or pain which is in turn thought 
likely to influence his future beheviour. The notions of 
"internelisetion" end of "conscience" ere to en even greeter 
extent theory—laden end consequently confusing if included in en 
epperently descriptive account; if it is cleimed that en 
effective anti—ekresiec method would be to build up e strong 
conscience by meens of e system of rewerds and punishments which 
become internelimed, the notions of "conscience" and of 
"internelisetion" ere being used not to describe the method but 
to explein by reference to e particular theory why doing certein 
things to children feeds them to believe in certein weys, end this 
theoreticel explenetion cen be questioned. Rewerding end 
punishing ere not descriptively equivalent to building up e 
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conscience by internelisetion, es the criminal recidivist demon—
stretes; children too mey scorn rewards, resent punishments, 
end adopt petterns of behaviour directly opposed to those which 
the rewerds end punishments ere intended to produce. In seeking 
meens of combatting ekresie, therefore, it is more useful to 
ettempt to delineate et e descriptive level the logical End 
psychologicel considerations which may effect whether or not en 
egent cots upon his beliefs than to ceuse the problem epperently 
to disappear by introducing explenetory, theory—laden constructs 
under 2 descriptive guise. 
In short, then, rewerds end punishments ere cleerly of 
motivational importance in influencing children to act in one way 
rather then another through the medium of their wents, but they 
ere equally cleerly en inedequete meens in themselves of com—
bettirw ekresie. The rewerds end punishments of most anti—
ekresiec velue seem to be those associated with "retionel" con—
science. 
(ii) Exemple—following  
The second "precticel" method — thet of "example—
following" — will be considered more briefly, es it has much in 
common with rewarding end punishing es e possible meens of com—
batting ekresie. The rationele of this method is that the child 
comes to behave morally not by being told to do so or by being 
rewarded or punished, but by "identifying" with somebody who 
exemplifies morel qualities, including "strength of will". The 
child's edmiretion end respect for this person (to be referred 
to es the "exemplar") is such thet he, consciously or uncon—
sciously, models himself upon him end tries to follow his example. 
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rorality is on this view thought to be "caught rather then taught", 
end to be best learnt on an apprenticeship basis. 
The main anti—akresiec strength of this method lies, 
as in (i), in the area of motivation and wants. If a child is 
so impressed by his exemplar that he wants to become as much like 
him as possible in all respects (including his morel behaviour), 
there will be little difficulty in getting the child to act 
morally if his exemplar acts morally, even if the moral action 
itself has motivationally unattractive features. 
But this argument invites objections to example—
following as en enti—ekresiec method, for how exactly is the 
exemplar to demonstrate his "strength of will" to the child? A 
child can no doubt pick up in this way certain attitudes, mannerisms 
and types of behaviour, and so learn, for instance, to give up his 
seat to old ladies on buses, to be kind to animals, and to put his 
hand to his mouth when coughing, but how can he learn purely by 
example—following to act upon whet he believes to be right? The 
exemplar's overt behaviour alone would not be sufficient; he 
would also have to tell the child what he believed to be right and 
lily he believed it to be right, before the child could start to 
appreciate what it was to act upon one's beliefs; but the method 
is then better described as some form of verbal teaching than as 
example—following. Any beliefs which might be said to be picked 
up as e result of example—following (e.g. by hearing the exemplar 
express the view that one ought always to give up one's seat to 
old ladies in buses) will in en important sense be not the child's 
own beliefs but a reflection of those of his exemplar which he 
has adopted because he wants to be like him, end not because of 
the content of the beliefs themselves. As these are not the 
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child's own beliefs, he is not in the same position es his 
exemplar in acting upon them, and consequently cannot be seid to 
heve learned by example to act upon his beliefs. 
Exemple—following therefore resembles rewerd end Punish—
ment in being uneble to meke children went to do whet they believe 
they ought to do because they so believe; e further resemblance 
arises from the use of explenetory rather then descriptive termi—
nology, for -identification" is es theory—laden E. concept es 
"internelisetion" end open to the same objections. feinally, the 
inedequecies of e purely verbel form of exemple—following heve 
elreedy been described in A, (i), in connection with the telling 
of stories ebout seints end heroes. Like rewerd and punishment, 
therefore, exernple—following cen in itself contribute little to 
the combettine of ekresie, though its motivetionel effect in 
modifying children's wents mey be useful if combined with other 
methods. 
(iii) Role—ploy end DrEme 
third possible "precticel" method ie to involve 
children in dremetic ectivity in which they can edopt the role 
of another person end attempt to enect e situation within that 
role. The morelly educative aim of such activities is twofold: 
firstly, to put children into others' shoes in order net they 
mey "identify" with others end develop greeter understending of 
their feelings end wents, end secondly to encourage them to con—
sider morel questions end dilemmes from venous viewpoints. 
"Role ploy is en excellent wey of encoureging emotional FS well 
es retionel leerning in school," claims the Schools Council Lorel 
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Education Project,44 and recommends the method especially for 
its "In Other People's Shoes" unit. 
Ps en anti—ekrestec method, however, it can be dealt 
with briefly, es it hes close perellels with certain of the 
"verbal." methods alreedy• discussed, end reveals similar strengths 
end weaknesses. In perticuler it resembles "leaderless discussion" 
in thet the participants, if they ere really to teke on the role 
of enother person, must be free to explore thet role es they wish 
end to "lose" themselves in it without fear of didactic, euthori—
tetive intervention from the teacher. 
While it is possible that role play, like "leederless 
discussion", may encourage e more eccurete end open ecknowledge—
ment of whet oneself end others really went end feel in various 
situations, end so help to combat ekresie vie the dishonesty 
factor, the method is open to similar objections to those which 
were brought egeinst "leederless discussion":- 
1. Description end explenetion ere egein confused, 
particularly in the notion of "identification". Children who 
ere trying to ect es they think enother person would ect ere not 
necessarily "identifying" with thet person in the sense of 
developing sympethetic understanding of him; perhaps they ere 
simply trying to give e reelistic, convincing performance without 
increesing their empathic insight et ell. acting e pert or 
playing e role is not descriptively equivalent to "identifying" 
with the character portrayed. 
2. There is no reason why role—play end drama should 
help to develop morel ettitudes end qualities. Children mey be 
ettrected by the less desireble aspects of the role they edopt 
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(e.g. Hamlet's procrastination rather then his sensitivity), 
end carry these over into their own behaviour. 
3. However good the child becomes et edopting another 
role, the situation enacted must remain e hypotheticel one. To 
take another example from Lifeline, if dreme end role—play are 
used, es suggested, in connection with the "Whet would you have 
done'?" unit, e child who plays the role of inne Frank in the 
"1-rrest!" incident45  cannot undergo the situetionel experiences 
of e Jewish girl hiding from the Germans in 1944, for these will 
involve emotional_ reactions which it is both logically end psycho—
logically impossible for en Snglish schoolgirl teking pert in e 
dreme tic exercise in 1977 to experience "secondhand". The limi—
tations of hypotheticel morel situations discussed in A, (ii), 
therefore elso apply to this "practical" method. 
Role play end dreme does not then reveal any particularly 
distinctive or original features es e possible method of com—
betting ekresie, unlike the fourth cetegory to be examined. 
(iv) Disciplined Ictivities  
This final cetegory includes under its general heeding 
en assortment of methods upon which teachers have (thinkingly or 
unthinkingly) tended to piece much reliance, pertly perhaps because 
they can be quite easily incorporated es e structured, integral 
element within the curriculum end general wey of life of e 
school. It is e common assumption that certain activities ere 
more likely then others to develop moral qualities such es 
reliability, determine -Lion, courage, strength of will, of resolve 
End of cherecter. Arnold—Drown, whose account of Gordonstoun 
end other similar educetionel institutions will be referred to 
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several times in this section, summerises this view es follows:— 
"This forms the crux of cherecter training; one must be led 
or compelled through experience if one leeks the will to 
forge ahead on one's own. Character cen be permanently 
effected within e matter of seconds ... If thence happenings, 
greet end smell, cen influence cherecter, then selected 
experience can do the seine, but in selected weys."46  
Games end other physically texing activities have 
treditionelly been thought to provide this kind of "selected 
experience", end their inclusion on school curricula hes often 
been justified on morel grounds es well es on aesthetic or 
heelth—giving ones. Lore recently, the renge of educe tionel 
activities believed to promote morel qualities hes been broadened 
to include both physical pumnits of e non—competitive type (e.g. 
rock—climbing, camping, sailing, etc.) end also projects designed 
to bring pupils into contest with other members of the community 
through perticipetion in some form of social service. 
Four types of "disciplined activity", to be labelled 
e) "sporting", b) -co—operative", 0 "communal" end d) 
will be distinguished end exemined in some deteil. The four 
heve much in common es possible anti—akresiec methods, but will 
be considered separately es they else reveel some different 
strengths end weaknesses. 
a) Sporting activities  
i)s noted above, Participation in sports end semes is 
commonly essumed to aid "cherecter—building". ("Chere ter—
building" will here be used FS e convenient term to refer to the 
acquisition of the morel qualities mentioned above, despite its 
obvious explenetory overtones.) Not all sports and eemes, 
however, are equally valued in this respect, end the differing 
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degrees of morel worth that ere attributed to different games 
illustrate those fee tures which ere held to be particularly 
morally educative. Cricket end rugger provide good examples of 
allegedly "cherecter—building" games, in contrast to, say, 
snooker (prowess et which is often essocieted with morel dis—
repute end e "misspent youth") or chess (which carries e neutral 
morel velue with perhaps e suspicion of cold intellectualism, 
opportunism end mercilessness). This contrast suggests .thet the 
distinctively "cherecter—building" features of sporting activities 
ere thought to derive from:— 
_ 1. The emount of physical exertion end risk involved. 
2. Opportunities to plan end practise end perform physical 
manoeuvres which require application, determination end some 
degree of physical courage. 
3. Opportunities for co—operation with other members of e teem, 
working towards e common goal. 
The mein enti—ekresiec strength of sportin activities 
lies in the erees of motivation end habituation. By perticipeting 
in sports end games which demend effort, determination end courage 
if they ere to be played well, e child may come to gEin setis—
feption from playing well end consequently went to continue to 
exercise the qualities which enable him to do so. These wants 
will be further strengthened by the corporate endeavour of his 
teem end the epprovel and encouragement coming from individual 
members of it. Hebits such es never giving up till the lest 
whistle, tackling low, end getting behind the line of the bell 
will become esteblished, and the more generalised qualities end 
traits essocieted with such habits may be incorporated within 
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the child's "character". 
This traditional justification can however be questioned 
on et least two grounds. Firstly, the motiveting end habituating 
factor, if it exists, will arise not from the actual physical 
activity of gemes—pleying but from the social end morel ethos 
within which the genres ere played, end this ethos is created 
verbally rather then physically (e.g. by exhortetionsto "pley up", 
"get stuck in", "keep at it", etc. end by teaching and discussion 
about tectics end playing es e teem). The mere act of playing 
genre is unlikely in itself to effect e child's "character" — 
particularly if the child in question happens to detest genres. 
Indeed the claim that games—playing is e sound method of com—
batting ekresie appeers distinctly incongruous when it is reelised 
that games themselves provide ideal opportunities for, end clessic 
examples of, ekresiec behaviour. It is es easy to know thet one 
ought to pley e streight bet, yet in the heet of the moment take 
e cross—betted swipe et the ball, es it is to know that one ought 
to keep one's temper in en ergument, yet in the beet of the 
moment lose it. also, such ekresiec lepses do not only occur in 
children who ere learning to pley e game but even in seesoned 
performers who have hed years of Practice end experience in these 
allegedly "cherecter—building" ectivities; en excellent exemple 
of ekresie WFS provided by Englend's Test betsmen on the lest 
Lustralien tour, who no doubt believed thet they ought, 
 not to beck 
ewey from the Ihistrelien fest bowlers, yet in fect consistently 
did so (presumably because they wanted to avoid e fractured skull 
more then they wanted to edhere to the canons of betsmenship), and 
were consequently criticised for their weekmess end leek of morel 
fibre. 
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Secondly, even if qualities associated with "strength 
of will" could be acquired on the games field, can they be trans—
ferred and applied more generally to non—sporting, morel 
rituetion? Just es temporal non—immediacy raiser doubts about 
the anti—ekresiec efficacy of methods relyinr on some form of 
verbal teaching and learning which it is hoped will be imple—
mented in practice et e later date, so does it also suggest 
uncertainty es to whether e boy's leernino to face up to fest 
bowling this term will make him more 	 to own up to e 
punishable offence next term. Even experienced sportsmen, es in 
the previous objection, do not seem to lend perticuler support 
to the transferability theory, for international r,Tmes—players 
ere not especially renowned for their self—control either off or 
on the field of play. 
Sporting activities therefore have e possible enti—
ekresiec value in terms of motivation end habituation, but cennot 
be assumed to develop the morel qualities which have been 
traditionally claimed for them. 
b) Co—operative  
These beer some similarity to "sporting" activities, 
end share some of the strengths end weaknesses mentioned in e). 
The mein differentia, however, between "sporting" and "co—
operative" activities lies in the letter's non—competitiveness 
and emphasis upon mutual reliance. In both hazardous pursuits 
like rock—climbing end less spectacular ones like camping, 
"co—operative" activities ere characterised not by conflict, 
aggression end the intention of beating the other side (es in 
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most sports end games), but rattler by collective effort end 
mutuel dependence in the pursuit of e shared goal or the enjoy—
ment of e common experience. While this co—operative element 
mey often enter into "sporting" ectivities  also in the form of 
"teem spirit", this is e contingent feature for it is quite 
possible to pley "for oneself" both in individualistic games 
like golf end tennis end even (selfishly) in teem games; but 
one cannot climb rock feces or sing around temp fires on one's 
own or "for oneself". 
The motivetion/hebituetion argument in e) is streng— 
thened when ectivities possess this "co—operetive" feature. By 
penticipe tine in such ectivities, e child is likely to develop 
attitudes end hebits which meke him went to be thought reliable, 
to play his pert within the group, end to consider others. This 
iney in turn help to lessen the remoteness of other people's 
interests compered with his own, which wes claimed in the dis— 
cussion of "immediecy" in Chapter V to be e factor logically 
related to morel ekresie. 
further enti—ekresiec merit of "co—operetive" ecti—
vities could be that they lead to increased self—knowledge. By 
being faced with challenges, tests and the responsibility for the 
safety end comfort of others, it could be argued that the child 
discovers e lot about his own feers, wants, abilities end limi—
tetions. "Outward Bound" schools, for example, claim to "present 
eech boy with e' set of conditions end give him, possibly for the 
first time, the opportunity to discover himself. These conditions, 
self—discipline, teem—work, adventure, physicel hardship end some 
risk, ere rerely met with except in time of wer."47 If "self—
discovery" does in feet result from "co—operetive" ectivities, it 
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might help to combat ekresia by producing e more honest appraisal 
end open recognition of one's wants end motives, es hes been 
argued earlier. 
The enti—ekresiec claims of "co—operative" ectivities, 
however, ere open to similar objections concerning transfer—
ability es were "sporting" ectivities. The determinetion end 
resolution displayed on the end of e rope may have no more Gerry—
over to every—day morel situations than that shown at the wicket 
or in the scrum. Nor will that determinetion necessarily be 
motivated by fectors which are characteristically anti—ekresiec; 
the child who shows determinetion in rock—climbing may went to 
impress the rest of the group, save face, or not be thought the 
"odd one out" — motives which could well Teed him in e situation 
of morel conflict to do whet he believed he ought not to do. 
Furthermore, to claim that "co—operative" ectivities involve 
"self—discovery" is again not to describe whet happens in such 
ectivities but to suggest en optimistic interpretation of whet 
might happen; the link between participation in physical., "co—
operative" ectivities end the development of "self—knowledge" is 
contingent and tenuous — dedicated boy scouts, Morris dancers 
and C.C.F. members ere not typically thought to be exemplars of 
self—e we reness. 
c) Commune]. .ictivities  
These differ from the previous two categories in that 
they contain no sporting or competitive element, nor even in many 
cases e physically strenuous one. They are characterised not so 
much by e concentration of effort end attention upon en activity 
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confined to the group of which the child is e member, but rather 
by interaction between the child end his group on the one hand 
end other members of the community on the other — for example, 
in projects involving visiting end rendering precticel assistance 
to elderly or disabled people, or the building end supervising of 
En adventure playground for young children. 
The anti—ekresiec strengths of this method will encompass 
those claimed for "co—operative" activities (re. motivation and 
hebituetion, and self—knowledge), but in eddition the opportunities 
for contact with and service to other individuals and groups with 
whom the child is unfemilier mey be thought to hove further 
edventeges. While "co—operative" activities may perhaps lessen 
the remoteness of other people's interests within the child's 
perticuler group, "communal" activities may extend this process 
to include consideration of the interests of those whom the child 
end his group would normelly know little about, end whom they 
might not otherwise regerd es equal "persons" et ell. This could 
in turn lead to e general minimising of the effect of the immediacy 
factor, es the child comes to appreciate that he can sympathise 
end "identify" with e wide variety of people end not just with 
those of his own ege, femily, class or beckground, whom be normelly 
vents to help and consider. Thus, helping old People to keep 
their gardens in trim might encourage children not only to identify 
more easily with old people's wants end feers but also more 
generally to broaden their concept of "person" to include members 
of other groups (e.g. centenkerous, elderly schoolteachers) whose 
interests had previously seemed too remote, unfemilier end 
unfethomeble to be considered. 
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Nein, however, the mein doubts centre eround the 
question of trensferebility. Children who ere brought into con— 
tact with old people in this wey 
	
develop sympathy and under— 
stending which motivate them to went to treat these old people 
es they believe they ought (e.g. not diseppointing them by missing 
the reguler visiting dey), but this is no reeson to essume that 
this non—ekresiec behaviour should extend to their deelings with 
other groups for whom they hove less sympathy end understending. 
Furthermore, "communal" ectivities provide yet another example of 
optimistic interpretation rather then mere description, for 
contect with old people (or eny other group) by no means entails 
"identificetion" with them, in the sense of increased sympethet-k 
insight. Such contect mey equelly well result in Tutuel dislike, 
mieunderstending, suspicion end feer, levying the child with en 
even more remote conception of the other's interests end even less 
desire to consider them then before the contect occurred; this 
is perticulerly likely to happen if the contect is assumed to be 
in itself morally educative end is not supplemented by verbal 
teeching or discussion. 
d) Individual a ctivities  
This final group of ectivities does not fell precisely 
within any of the above categories, but is often essocieted with 
the notion of "cherecter—building". The activities consist of 
routine exercises or duties, often physically taxing, irksome or 
difficult in neture, to be performed regulerly end individuelly. 
good example is provided by the ectivities prescribed by the 
Gordonstoun treining plen: 
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"The paper was ruled into columns, each column a day of 
the week, each line marked on the left with such phrases 
es: Teeth brushed, Rope climbed, Skipping, Press—ups, 
Cold Shower — and so on."48  
The Gordonstoun plan had a double justification, each 
of which might be considered as enti—ekresiac. Firstly, it 
"helped each boy to become self—reliant, it helped him to acquire 
regular habits, to note when irregularity was creeping in ..."49  
and secondly, by trusting each child to fill in his own chart 
unchecked each day: 
"... youngsters were trained to be honest with themselves; 
they are as unlikely to develop honesty by chance as they 
are unlikely to win the high jump, or a scholarship, by 
chance. To fill in the chart each evening forced a boy to 
face facts and to face the truth ... to fight the temptation 
to make excuses or to hide the truth from himself."5°  
These justifications in terms of habituation end self—
awareness do not however evade the now familiar objections con—
cerning transferability and optimistic interpretation, which need 
not be further elaborated. Arnold—Brown, while advocating the 
Gordonstoun system, himself suggests objections on the latter 
score: 
"The question may be asked: Whet is to prevent a boy becoming 
not merely careless but callous to truth and untruth? If 
there is no check to ensure that a boy takes the trouble to 
think when filling in the chart, may not the system drive 
dishonesty deep into the soul? Does the training plan 
produce virtuous prigs, worried failures end cynics, as has 
been suggested?"51  
"Disciplined activities", therefore, of the various 
types discussed under a) — d) have much in common with regard to 
their strengths end weaknesses as methods of combatting ekresia. 
Their main value lies in their power to modify children's wants 
through the media of habit—formation and social expectations, 
but unjustified assumptions are often made about the degree of 
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trensferebility end the range of epplicetion of whet is leerned 
from such activities, end optimistic interpretations ere often 
substituted for descriptions of whet ectuelly heppens in them. 
This typology of "our ways of teaching morality" hes 
tended to confirm the hypothesis thet no one method is likely to 
be edequete in itself es e meens of combatting ekresie. The 
complexity of the factors involved in ek.resie means that any 
single method, while perheps making e useful contribution et one 
level, is bound to be seriously deficient et another. The 
following, finel section will therefore proceed on the besis 
that e combinetion of methods is needed, end will attempt to 
synthesise some of the positive feetures that have emerged from 
this section. It must be re—emphasised, however, that even the 
most promising End fruitful cornbinetions of methods cennot be 
expected to Prevent Fkrasie, if the freedom of the morel eeent 
is to be preserved; the most thet they will be eble to achieve 
is to increase the likelihood of young people (es morel agents) 
ecting es they believe they ought. 
4. How can ekresie test be Combatted? 
It wes ergued in Section 2 thet close logicel relation—
ships exist between (i) conceptions of morality, (ii) conceptions 
of morel educetion, (iii) explenetions of ekresie, and (iv) methods 
of morel educetion, particulerly designed to combat ekresie. Some 
of these relationships hove been further illustrated in the 
typology of methods presented in Section 3. tiny suggested anti—
EAresiec methods, then, must fell within e wider, explanatory, 
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ethical fremework, end the nerticuler framework which hes been 
constructed within this study Provides the perticuler theoretical 
basic from which criticisms end eveluetions of the various methods 
were launched in the previous section, end also from which the 
more constructive nroposels within this section will be derived. 
The strategy of this section will be not simply to 
repeat the merits of perticuler methods, as noted in Section 3, 
but to epproech the question of how best to combat ekrasia from 
e different direction, by examining the precticel, methodological 
implications of the three central fee tures of ekresie described 
in Chapter V. This will hove the effect of broadening the 
dimensions of this concluding section, of further illustrating 
the logical relationships which were exemined in Section 2, of 
thereby linking the argument developed in previous chepters with 
this concluding section, end of enebling the merits of various 
methods described in Section 3 to be re—exemined from enother 
viewpoint. Some methodological implications of the dishonesty, 
lenguege end immediecy fectors will therefore be exemined end 
linked with the enti—etresiec merits of various methods elreedy 
noted (A), to be followed by some conclusions of e more generel 
nature (B). 
A— kethodological implications of the three fectors  
(i) The Dishonesty Fector 
One central feature of both morel end prudential 
ekresie, it was argued in Chepter V, is e failure on the pert of 
the egent to acknowledge, to himself or to others, those counter— 
vailing fectors which et the time outweigh for him the justificatory 
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reasons backing his "ought"—judgment. His overall appraisal of 
the situation is for verious reasons not fully spelled—out end 
his failure to act es he believes he ought is attributed to the 
causal influence of "week—will" rather then to his actual wents. 
It could be objected et the outset thFt, even if teaching 
methods could be devised to encourage children to make more honest 
eppreisels of their we/Its, this would not necessarily help to 
combat ekresie. The likelihood of e child doing or not doing 
what he believed he ought to do would, on this view, be unchanged; 
he would simply have e fuller understanding end e more open 
acceptance of his reasons for acting es he did. However, while 
it is true that the honesty factor does not have the same sort Of 
direct causal connection with ekresie that the other two factors 
do, e more honest appraisal of one's wents may achieve more then 
merely legislating the concept of "week—will" out of existence by 
e theoretical re—interpretation of the problem. CoOme to 
acknowledge whet one really wents is e necessary pre—condition 
of any re—examination end conscious modificetion of those writs, 
end the akresiec may fail et the letter stage because he hes felled 
et the former. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that any 
methods which help children to understand end acknowledge their 
wants end motives could also be influential in encouraging e more 
balanced, controlled end considered appraisal end possibly e con—
sequent modificetion of those wents end motives, which could in 
turn have e marked effect upon the incidence of ekresie. Socrates' 
claims for self—knowledge were shown in Chapter II to be extra—
vegent, but that is not to say that increased self—knowledge may 
not be essential if the likelihood of ekresie is to be reduced. 
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The ekresiec's failure to ecknowledge the motivational 
fectors which in feet weigh most heavily with him, it was argued 
in Chapter V, may fell into one of two categories: he may be 
psychologically uneble to acknowledge these fectors, or he may, 
es Fingerette puts 	 be in the position of "the self—deceiver 
(who) commits himself to avoid spelling—out his commitment ... 
(end) hes decisive reasons for his commitment not to spell this 
engagement out."52 The methodological implications of these two 
possibilities must be considered separetely. 
The first category is of less philosophical and edu—
cational interest then the second. The child who, for psycho—
logical reasons, is uneble to ecknowledge either to himself or 
another the factors which Fctuelly ere weighing most heavily 
with him may, on the one hand, be suffering from some patho—
logical condition requiring "treatment" of e psychiatric kind. 
Or on the other hand it might be argued that all young children 
are subject to this inability, simply becEuse they have not yet 
developed the self—awareness end degree of detachment necessary 
to be able to identify objectively whet their wants end motives 
really ere; maturational fectors may well be more important than 
educational ones in the young child's gradual discerding of his 
egocentric cerspective. Psychological inability, then, whether 
of e pathological or maturational kind, offers morel education 
little scope; its only possible contribution would seem to lie 
in the area of linguistic development, where verbal methods of 
various kinds may help to provide young children with e vocabulary 
end conceptual framework by means of which they may be able to 
start to identify, differentiate and so spell—out their own wants, 
wishes, motives and emotions. 
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The second category is educetionelly far more suggestive. 
P child may be quite cepeble of spelling—out whet he really wants 
most end whet really weighs most heavily with him in e particular 
situation, but, as was suggested in Chapter V, because of the 
morel dimensions of that situation end the morel expectetions 
surrounding it, be unwilling to declare, to himself or to others, 
his reel priorities — i.e. the greeter importence tbet he etteches 
to non—morel considerations. The schoolboy using the Latin crib, 
for example, wes not psychologically unable to edmit that he 
ettEched greater importence to meinteining his record of good 
work then to evoiding cheating Fnd deception, but the morel con—
text within which his dilemma erose led him to formulate his 
judgment of it in the incomplete but morally respecteble form — 
"I believe thet I ought not to use the crib"; his subsequent 
feilure to act upon this belief in turn ellows the introduction 
of the notion of "weakness", which by its suggestion of e ceusel' 
explenetion invites less morel censure then en open edmission of 
his non—moral priorities. 
A number of the methods discussed in Section 3 were 
thought to have possible value es means of developing self—
ewereness — in particular, discussion, role—ploy end dreme, End 
co—operative end individual disciplined activities. The possible 
strengths of these methods end their connection with the honesty 
fector will not be repeated here, but e few general observetions 
will be mede in the hope that some pointers may emerge to provide 
some guidance in the murky Free of "self—knowledge". 
e) Didactic verbel methods ere unlikely to echieve much, 
though. with older children there may be value in teeching psycho— 
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logical end sociologicel theories of motivation. 	 wide gulf 
could still exist, however, between e theoretical understending 
of this kind end en open acknowledgment of personal writs and 
motives. 
b) Group discussion also hes only e limited velue, 
for it will take piece within the context of group norms end 
expectations which will influence whet individual members of the 
group feel to constitute en acceptable and respectable set of 
priorities. Furthermore, the teacher's participation in the 
discussion, either es leader or es en allegedly non—privileged 
member, is very likely to carry with it, et least in the pupils' 
minds, some associations of authority end prescription which may 
militate egeinst the individual's acknowledgment of his wents end 
motives even to himself, let clone publicly to the group end the 
tea cher. 
c) It appears to follow from b) that any verbal, enti—
ekresiec methods must aim primarily et creeting en atmosphere 
which is es free es possible from conventional constraints and in 
which children do not feel vulnerable to morel censure, if 
intellectual dishonesty is to be avoided. An important factor 
here could be the degree of mutual consideration end sympathetic 
understending within the group; a child will be more ready to 
admit that he really wents to let off steam et e football match 
rather then visit his invalid grandmother (which he believes he 
ought, to do) if he realises that others can find themselves in 
similar predicaments, can experience simile's feelings, end can 
sympathise with his feelings. If c non—censorious atmosphere of 
this kind cen be created, there will be more chance of e child 
acknowledging, examining end appraising whet he really wents, 
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end less danger of him merely saying whet he thinks he is 
expected to MI". "Leaderless" discussion could be e particularly 
useful method in this respect, provided that its limitetions 
noted in Section 3 ere borne in mind. 
d) 11 non—censorious atmosphere is incompatible with 
prescriptive preaching end exhortation, and perheps with some 
forms of instruction also. Self—deception of the kind that is 
central to ekresie can occur only when prescriptions end Pro—
hibitions ere influentiel in sheping the ekresiec's "ought"—
judgment, though not sufficiently influentiel to secure action 
in conformity with that judgment. Paradoxically, however, 
exposing children to the prescriptive function of lenguare hes 
also been proposed es e means of 22212Eillaa ekresie. This will 
be further examined in sub—section (ii) below, but the peredox 
can perheps be partially resolved et this point by the suggestion 
that ineffective prescription is worse then no prescription et 
all. Just es e teecher loses more authority by continuing to 
issue instructions which ere not followed than by lowering his 
demends to e more realistic level, so may the creation of en 
over—censorious atmosphere produce not compliance but merely e 
desire to avoid censure, pertly es e result of the kind of 
intellectual dishonesty which hes been described. It will be 
important, then, for the child not to set his morel sights, or 
have them set for him, too high, for unrealistic demends, whether 
self—imposed or externally imposed, can only result in failure, 
discouragement, end either cynicism or e guilt—ridden retreat to 
self—deception. Benson's remarks in this connection Ere of 
interest to the teecher end parent es well es to the morel 
philosopher: 
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"I should welcome the recognition that the suppression of 
desires is sometimes just not worth the sweet and one would 
to better to adopt a principle which is easier to live with. 
Writers on ethics still tend to speak as though the task of 
the will is to beet the Passions into submission in the 
interests of morality. There is also the task of exploring 
one's powers in order to discover whet principles one can 
realistically commit oneself to. Weakness of will is some—
times whet, in our zeal for self—castigation, we cell the 
inevitable result of morel hubris."53 
e) .As far as "practical"` methods are concerned, actual 
experience will be of more use then simulation in developing 
self—awareness. Simulations are necessarily hypothetical end 
thereby open to the objections raised against the use of hypo—
thetical moral situations as an anti—akresiec device; this will 
be further discussed in connection with the immediacy factor in 
sub—section (iii) below. "Disciplined activities", then, should 
be able to contribute more then role—play end drama in this 
respect. .A child will come to know his own strengths end weak—
nesses, his fears and desires, his prejudices and sympathies, by 
experiencing them in actual situations of the types described 
under sporting, co—operative, communal and individual activities; 
he will not gain this direct knowledge and experience by attempting 
to "put himself" into an imeginery situation or, more difficult 
still, into another person's shoes in that situation. Simulated 
experience will produce simulated reactions end judgments, which 
are more likely to express whet the child feels he is expected to 
say and do than whet he would really want to do in that situation 
(which is in any case difficult to predict hypothetically, as 
argued earlier). 
The honesty factor, then, when considered alongside 
the typology of moral education methods, reveals e number of 
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suggestive implications for the combatting of akresie. Several 
of these will be developed further in the following sub—sections 
(ii) end (iii), for the three factors ere interconnected et 
various points, es wes shown in Chepter V. 
(ii) The Lenguege Factor 
 
Various expects of lenguege were shown in Chepter V to 
contribute significantly to explanations of ekresie. The morel 
ekresiec can interpret situations end the elternetive courses of 
action they offer in morel terms, but this morel interpretation 
is seen for various reasons es less ettrective motive tionelly 
then e non—morel interpretation, end consequently the normative 
pressure of morel language does not Effect his final decision or 
ection. It wes also Ergued that the prescriptive end persuasive 
functions of morel lenguege were influential in the development 
of values end attitudes. 
Two mein, interrelated questions arise from this 
enelysis with reference to anti—ekresiec methods of morel education. 
Firstly, how should children be exposed to the prescriptive end 
persuasive functions of morel language, end secondly why does 
the morel language which children learn not elweys "bite" upon 
their behaviour? 
The first question 'again reises the paradox mentioned 
in the previous section. Prescriptive language and the morel 
expectations it conveys can militate egeinst the open acknow— 
ledgment of one's actual wents end motives, yet it also seems to 
play en essential pert in the formation of personal values. A 
child, for example, could hardly come to believe thet steeling 
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was wrong without leerning to essociete the concept of steeling 
(es distinct from borrowing, buying, being given, etc.) with 
expressions of disepprovel, end without experiencing or hearing 
of situations described to him es exemplifying "steeling", in 
which efforts ere made to redress the wrong in some way (e.g. by 
cetching end punishing the thief, getting the money beck, pre—
venting further thefts, etc.); yet, on the other bend, the morel . 
teboo which he learns by these means to attach to the concept of 
steeling could well inhibit him from recognising, examining and 
thereby perhaps modifying his desire on e particular occasion to 
take for himself something thet does not belong to him. 
Some ettempt was made to resolve this apparent paradox 
in the previous section by noting that morel prescriptions can 
be more or less realistic, end that over—censorious expectations 
can lead merely to Benson's "self—castigation". The way in which 
morel prescriptions ere formulated and presented to children, 
however, is probably en even more important factor. Simply to 
expose the child to prescriptive morel language is clearly not 
sufficient to ensure his adoption of end compliance with the 
velues so prescribed; this point yes. noted in the objections to 
exhortetion end preaching in Section 3 end need not be laboured 
further. Some link between the prescriptions and the child's 
ekisting wants, dispositions end motives must be established if 
he is to adopt the velues implicit in the moral language to which 
he is being exposed. 
Such links could take verious forms. 
	
n obvious source 
of motivetion in the earlier stages of development will be the 
desire to gein the epprovel or avoid the disepprovel of the 
prescriber, either because of e positive liking or respect for him 
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es e person, or beceuse of the rewards end punishments which he 
oen bestow. Leter on, use cen be mede of the edolescent's 
cepecity for compession end sociel ewereness; es most morel 
concepts relete in some wey to the interests of others, eny 
activities which help children to develop inter—personel under—
standing, concern end empethy (e.g. "communel" or "co—operative" 
activities) should tend to nerrow the possible gap between justi—
ficetory end motivetionel considerations in morel decision—meking 
end moral ection. 	 linguistic framework. of morel concepts can 
thus be built up which crystallises the child's eveluetive atti—
tudes end which he can use'to- interpret situations that he meets. 
This framework should help both to produce consistency of judgment 
end, if the eppropriete motivetionel links ere established, to 
renerate hebituel forms of beheviour which will provide a further 
defence against ekresie. 
The echievement of this stete of morel equilibrium, 
however, is by no meens assured by the mere process of linguistic 
development, end the second, related suestion must now be esked: 
why does the morel lenmae.which children leern not always "bite" 
upon their beheviour? 
Pert of the answer hes already been suggested, i.e. tlz 
feilure to este'olish end develop motivational links with whet is 
prescribed. Other possibilities were discussed when the lenguege 
fector wes exemined in Chepter V, notebly:— 
	
e) 	 e feilure to concentrete sufficiently upon the morel 
internretetion of e situetion beceuse of the strength 
of countervailing fectors; 
	
end b) 	 e feilure to present the morel interpretation to oneself 
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ettrectively enough, either because one wants it to 
have e reduced motivetionEl effect, or because the 
perticuler morel interpretation which is edopted does 
not in fact hive much motivetionel appeal. 
Educational examples of these possibilities were also given in 
Chapter V. 
The methodological implications here are reesonebly 
cleer. r fremework of morel language, it was argued in Chapter V, 
hes to be imposed upon e situetion before morel principles cen be 
seen to be applicable to it, but morel concepts ere not directly 
identifiable, self—evident elements in our experience of 
s'i.tuetions. If follows, then, that there will be considerable 
scope for streightforwerd teaching end discussion about the inter—
pretation of situetions in terms of morel concepts end principles. 
With young children, the aim will be to teach thet there is e 
non—obvious, morel interpretation of e situetion (e.g. that 
picking apples off e tree can constitute "steeling", if the tree 
is in somebody else's gerden end no permission hes been given to 
teke the fruit). With older children, elternative morel inter—
pretetions cen be discussed end the possible conflict of principles 
demonstrated (e.g. that cheating in e test could be interpreted 
es deceiving the teecher, trying to gain en unfeir edventege over 
one's clessmates, or trying to setisfy the aspirations of proud 
perents). Exploring such questions verbally should et least help 
children to see situetions in terms of morel concepts end prin—
ciples, and to compere elternetive interpretations. 
These methods do not, however, necessarily solve the 
motivetionel problem of how to make the morel interpretation of 
e situetion ettrective enough to outweigh non—morel consideretions, 
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or in other words how to convey the seriousness end authority of 
e morel judgment. A child who seriously believes that he ought 
to do y (in the sense elaborated throughout this study), yet who 
for situetionel, non—morel reasons wants to do x more, must some—
how be brought to recognise that his "ought'Ljudgment, though not 
compatible with his immediate wants, is backed by considerations 
which he regards es justificetory end therefore binding upon him 
es e morel agent. Whet methods ere most likely to be helpful 
here? 
Teeching the form of morel thinking, es described in 
A (ii), in such e way thet children will went to "get it right" 
end not meke procedural or logical mistakes could help them to 
feel the force of justificetory reasons more strongly. Also en 
exeminetion of the phenomenology of conscience might show children 
that Feting egeinst whet they sincerely believe they ought to do 
must bring with it some form of retribution, such es anxiety, 
worry, emberressment, remorse of self—reproach. Perheps exemple, 
though, cen hove the greatest effect, for by observing the con—
sistent behaviour of en edult who acts in eccordence with his 
principles despite the influence of situetionel, countervailing 
factors, children may leern more then by direct teaching. "EkemPle—
following" es en anti—ekresiec method is not without its drawbacks, 
es described in B, (ii), but these can be overcome to some extent 
if the exemplar makes clear whet his morel beliefs ere, why he 
holds them, end how he applies them in e perticuler situetion, 
especially if the exempler's aim is not to convince his followers 
of the validity of his beliefs but of the importance that he 
attaches to ecting upon them because he accepts them es valid. 
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This method will probably be more eppliceble outside than inside 
the classroom, although E teacher can effectively demonstrate 
how he acts uoon his beliefs in the way thPt he treats his Pupils 
end organises his class; parents and other adult: who have less 
formal contact with children, however, will have more opportunities 
of toting es anti—ekresiec exemplars. One further methodological 
implicetion for the schoolteacher is that "neutrally—chaired 
discussion" by definition rules out the example—following method; 
if e teacher consistently refuses to declere his own beliefs 
(other then that he believes he ought not to declere his beliefs 
in such discussions), he can provide no example of whet it is to 
act upon one's beliefs. 
The two main methodological questions arising from a 
consideretion of the language fector, therefore, suggest that e 
veriety of approaches will be needed to combat this aspect of 
Ekresia. Interestingly, not ell of these approaches fall within 
the "verbal." cetegory of the typology, and the interrelationship 
of the "verbel" end the "practical" will be discussed further in 
the concluding general remarks. 
(iii) The Immediacy Factor 
This fector was shown in Chapter V to have various 
types of connection with various types of FA.rFsie, which can be 
survoPrised es follows: 
e) Prudentiel FIcTESiF is cherecterised by e preference for 
'resent, immediate considerations over future, remote ones. 
In F conflict between present and future vents the steles ere 
tipped in favour of the former, because of the psychological 
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anti 1ogicel difficulties of "identifying" with one's 
"future self". 
b) Some, but not Ell, ceses of morel akresia reveel e similar 
Preference for the immediate over the remote in either e 
temporel or e geogrephicEl sense. 
c) Ilore generally, the justificetory reesons end principles 
which the morel ekrEsiec acknowledges but foils to Ect upon 
leek the immediacy, specificity end first—ha ndness of the 
countervailing fectors which Ere en immediately identifieble 
element in the situation confronting the agent, end which 
consequently et the time of his decision. end/or action loom 
the largest. 
d) tlhile the prudential ekresiac fails to "identify" with his 
"future self", the morel ekresiec typically foils to"identify" 
with the interests of others, which leek. the first—bend 
immediacy of his own interests. 
Some of the implicetions of the ebove points for the 
development of en enti—ekresiac methodology belie elreedy been 
noted in (i) and (it). The problem of getting children to identify 
with others end to develop insight into end concern for their 
interests, wants end Points of view he elreedy been discussed 
et e number of points within this chapter, es heve methods of 
increesing the motivetionel potency of justificetory reesons end 
principles. 
Other methodologicel epproeches, however, ere elso 
suggested by the immediacy factor which have not yet been fully 
explored. The conflict between present end future consideretiois, 
for exemple, which occurs in Prudential end, to e lesser extent, 
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in morel ekresie, suggests that instruction end discussion con—
cerned with the Prediction of consequences mey be helpful in 
focussing children's attention upon future possibilities end 
probebilities and thus reducing to some degree the epperent 
remoteness of such considerations; the ebility to predict is 
elso e necessary element in retionel decision—making, for 
decisions concern actions to be token in the future for reasons 
which relate in part to -Qr obeble future consequences. 
Some educetionel materiels hove been specifically 
designed to develop the skills end habits essocieted with pre—
diction (e.g. the Lifeline unit on "Consequences" which "puts 
the emphasis on improving boys' and girls' ebility to predict 
the possible and probeble consequences of ections.")54 The mein 
difficulty in such work, if intended es enti—ekresiec, will be 
to avoid the impression of "mere theorising" end to convey the 
idea that some future stetes of effeirs can be predicted end will 
in time become Present stetes of effeirs. One useful technique 
might therefore be to work beckwerds from present events to 
elucidate their aetiology end to determine the extent to which 
they were in feet predictable. Psychologicel factors would hove 
to be token into account in the use of such methods for clearly 
their effectiveness will depend upon the child having acquired, 
et leest et e rudimentary level, the concepts of time, of cause 
end of effect. 
The choice of materiels to be used in such methods 
reises further issues which relate more generally to the immediacy 
factor and which centre around the hollowed educe tionel edege, 
"Stert from the known and ' 
 to the unknown". Does the 
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immediecy fector suggest thet eny perticuler type of issue or 
situation, if discussed by children, is most likely to increase 
the impact of temporally or geogrephicelly remote consideretions? 
It would seem to be e reesoneble assumption thet, 
initially Ft leest, the more femilier the situetion discussed is 
to the children, the eerier will it be for them to meke pre—
dictions or decisions ebout it, or suggest prior ceuses of it, 
end the tighter will eppeer the connections between whet they do 
now end whet the effect of their actions end decisions will be 
in the future. Discussion with e young child ebout whet is likely 
to happen if he forgets to feed his pet rabbit, or with older 
children ebout the possible results of meking do with e beg of 
chips insteed of e proper school lunch, is more likely to bring 
borne the relevance of future consideretions to present decisions 
end actions then is e discussion of the effects of en Oxfem pro—
ject in Bengledesh. The problem of identificetion is similarly 
eased if reference is mede to femilier situetions which the child 
hes ectuelly experienced. Not only is it more difficult to 
eppreciete the effects of subscribing to Oxfem then of forgoing 
school lunches; it is also more difficult to identify with e 
,terving child in Bengledesh (beceuse of the leek of any Eppropriete 
personel experience) then with e school friend who hes e weight 
problem. 1. s Hume noted, "We sympethise more with persons con—
tiguous to us, then with persons remote from us; with our 
acqueintences then with stren/aers; with our countrymen then with 
foreigners."55 The best starting—points, then, would eppeer to 
be situetions with which the child is directly femilier, with 
which he can sympetheticelly identify, end where he cen reedily 
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be mede to feel thet the future consequences of present actions 
end decisions 'Better. 
Even discussion of familiar situations, however, must 
necessarily be hypothetical end non—immediate in e e much es the 
child is et that point engeged in the discussion end not in the 
ectuel situetion under discussion. Ps was argued in Section 3, 
A, (ii), the motivational effect of situational factors cannot 
be fully experienced "second—hand", and consequently -oredictions 
or decisions made about hypothetical situations, however familiar, 
will have e different 1010E-1 sta tus from those me de in the 
situation itself. 
It follows, then, that "precticel" methods will have 
en imnortent contribution to make in connection with the immediEicy 
factor, for the only wey to avoid the hypothetical feetures 
inherent in discussions ,sbout consequences is to provide children 
with direct experience of reel situations which require pre— 
dictions or decisions to be made. A number of the "precticel" 
methods noted in the typolory could be of use in this respect. 
Role—Play Epproximetes more closely to actual, situational 
experience then does mere discussion, but for the reasons riven 
in Section 3, B, (iii) , is still necessarily hypothetical. All 
of the "disciplined ectivities" could provide direct experience 
of situations requiring prediction or decision; "sporting" end 
"co—operative" activities offer the widest scope, for competitive 
games lite rugger end co—operative, physical projects like rock— 
climbing, if undertaken seriously end intelligently, ere virtually 
constituted by e succession of predictions end decisions which 
determine the direction end pettern of the activity. 
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"Individual" activities offer enother approach to the 
immediacy problem, perticulerly in connection with geographical 
remoteness. Eilgram's work, referred to in Chapter V, suggests 
(es does common sense) that in some situations of morel dilemma 
end temptation the countervailing factors end justificetory reesons 
terry weight with the agent in proportion to their relative 
geogrephicel immediacy; so, in the example discussed in Section 1 
of this chapter, the young child who is tempted to climb on to e 
stool to reach e tin of sweets, though believing he ought not to 
do so, is more likely to opt for the immediate attractions of 
the sweets if his mother (representing the justificetory reesons 
for not climbing on to the stool) is out of the house, then if 
she is near et hend. 
Geographical remoteness of this kind, can be countered 
by the development of quelities like "trustworthiness" end 
"reliability", which imply some form of internalised control upon 
the child's beheviour. Thus, in the example of the Gordonstoun 
treining plan elreedy Quoted, "en essential feature ley in the 
fact that eedh boy wes trusted to fill in the chart conscientiously 
each evening, (and) there was no check. to ensure that correct 
answers were recorded."
56 
This kind of treining will clearly be 
gredual. business. The teacher or parent who is timing to 
develop "trustworthiness" in his children end to reduce the need 
for him to be physically Present et all times in order to ensure 
the influence of justificetory reasons will not achieve much by 
absenting himself for hours end just hoping for the best; he will 
be more likely to encourage the quelities that he wants to develop 
in the children by setting realistic yet increasingly demanding 
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tasks for which the children recognise that there are justi— 
ficatory reasons, but where the geogrephicel remoteness of the 
adult's reinforcement allows them to feel the pull of counter— 
veiling factors. I:flowing children in school increasing responsi— 
bility for merking some of their own work would be another means 
of hebituating them to become less dependent upon direct super— 
vision when implementing r justificatory principle (i.e. it's 
best to mark honestly because help cennot be given unless individual 
difficulties ere admitted.) 
Another "precticel" approach to the development of 
"self—control" in children is suggested by e further aspect of 
the immediecy factor. Empiricel studies indicate that there is 
e connection between being eble to resist temptation and being 
able to deley the gretificetion of one's desires end impulses 
(e.g. by choosing e deleyed, larger reward rather then a smaller, 
immediete one.)57 Although these empirical findings, which 
reflect some of the logical points elreedy made in connection 
with the immediacy fector, do not necesserily meen thet Pkresie 
is pertly ceused by heving e particuler conception of time and oaf 
the future, there is et leest en indication that methods aiming 
to extend such conceptions in children might help them to act 
upon their beliefs in certain circumstances. Rewerds end punish— 
ments seem the most obviously useful method in this respect. Not 
giving young children immediately everything that they went, 
rewarding them for writing end being petient, and punishing them 
for self—centred impatience ere ell possible weys of helping them 
to deley the gretificetion of their immediete desires. 
At e more general level, end with children of school 
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age, e contribution to "delayed rre tif ice tion" may be mode by the 
study of "non—morel" curriculum subjects. Leerning e subject like 
Science or Leths or History or La tin requires self—discipline end 
pe tience; problems hove to be pondered, evidence considered, 
fects end fe eters weixhed, end objections end ?nome lies te ken 
a ccount of, for rushed enswers and hurried conclusions ere unlikely 
to be sound ones. Intellectuel values end principles resemble 
morel ones in being of ten et verience with the agent's immedie te 
wants end impulses, end consequently learning to ebide by the 
principles end rules of procedure embodied in the discipline of 
e subject mey not be unconnected with leerning to ?bide by morel 
principles. 
"Pre ctice 1" end "verbel" methods of dealing, with the 
immediacy fe ctor in ekresiec beheviour Till need to be used in 
combine tion if they ?re to echieve eny success. The role tionshio 
between "precticel" end "verbel" methods will be further con—
sidered in the more generel conclusions to follow, but the point 
to note here is thet activities like oleyinc cricket, rock—climbing, 
end merkin, one's own work will not in themselves necessarily 
incree se the motive tionel. influence of justif ice tory considere tions 
which ere tempor?lly, @eor.rephicelly or ionic? lly "non—immediate". 
Instruction end discussion ebout how these considerations may be 
seen ES jus tifice tory end ebout the difficulties creeted by the 
non—iromedie cy" will else be needed to orepere for end to follow 
the ectuel situe tionel experience. This in turn re ices many of 
the issues elreedy discussed in connection with the honesty end 
lenguege factors — e further indication thet the three factors 
must be seen es closely interrelated, both in their theoretical, 
explene tory role end in their precticel, methodolo,cqcel implicetions. 
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B. Some General Conclusions  
i!nti—ekresiec methods have now been explored from two 
different directions. In Section 3 e typology of "ways of teaching 
morality" was presented, in which each method was separately 
scrutinised for its anti—ekresiec strengths end weaknesses, while 
in this Section the three logical "factors" of ekresie, suggested 
end described in Chapter V, heve been examined for their methodo—
logical implications. These two approaches have yielded sub—
stantial results, which have however of necessity taken the form 
of concentrated, uni—dimensionel appraisals of individual methods. 
It remains, therefore, briefly to drew e few more eenerelised and 
synthesised conclusions from the specific points which have been 
mede. 
(i) The multi—factorial nature of Ekresie end the con—
sequent need for e combination of methods to combat it hes been 
emphasised throughout this chapter. .ZAresie results from e 
particular reletionship between judgment end action, end the most 
successful combinations of anti—ekresiec methods will need to 
pay attention to both sides of that reletionship. The distinction 
between "verbel" end "precticel" methods, though less sharp in 
practice then the categories of the typology might suvest, 
reflects to some extent the judgmental end behavioural aspects 
of ekresie. But just es ekresie cannot be interpreted simply es 
e case of either "misjudgment" or "misbehaviour", so can it not 
be combatted by either e predominantly "verbel" or e predominantly 
"precticel" approach. Constant interaction is needed between 
precticel experience on the one bend and linguistic commentaries 
upon that experience on the other. 
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(ii) The ekresiec feils to ect upon his beliefs thet 
certain reasons end principles are justificetory. But es was 
noted in Chapter II, although the logical essence of ekresie may 
be thought of es e failure to trenslete one's principles into 
eotion, it does not necessarily follow that morel learning end 
development conform psychologically end chronologically to a 
"two—stage" model (i.e. of first acquiring principles end then 
nutting them into practice by applying them to perticuler 
situations.) 
Ls I have argued elsewhere,58 the model of "principle—
epplicetion" though reflecting e possible logicel priority of 
principles over situations is less applicable to the psycho—
logicel priorities involved in children's morel learning. 
far ES morel development is concerned, it could well be that 
principles can only be derived end learnt from perticuler cases 
end situetions, which ere thus in e sense "prior" to the prin—
ciples. It is difficult to see how e child could arrive et end 
eccept e justificetory principle without having first experienced 
situetions to which thet principle could be applied. 
It is also arguable whether general principles have even 
e deer—cut logicel priority over perticuler cases, es Hirst 
claims for exemple.59 Logical interdependence may be e more 
helpful notion then logicel priority in this respect, for morel 
principles end morel situetions acquire their meeninc, end qualify 
es "morel" by virtue of their mutuel relationship. The principle 
of truth—telling, for instance, cen only be understood as e morel 
principle by reference to actual situetions in which e decision 
hes to be me-de either to tell the truth or to lie, end conversely 
such situations can only be understood es morel situetions if it 
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is recognised that morel principles ere relevent to them. 1-=ctuel 
situetionel experience, then, end the applying of principles ere 
best seen es logically interdependent elements in morel judgment 
end action. 
Children, therefore, cen only learn justifice tory 
Principles in the context of direct, situetionel experience, in 
which explanation is given of how the perticuler principle is 
relevent. The principle of respect for others' property, for 
example, cen be learnt bye child only es e result of experiences 
such es losing one's school cep, being tempted to teke someone 
else's cep to replace it, being punished for tekinn it, etc. which 
ere supplemented by verbal teaching end linguistic commentaries 
showinn how these experiences are releted to justificetory prin—
ciples. 
This interdependence of principles end experience adds 
further weight to the ergument in (i) in fevour of constant inter—
action between "verbal" end "practical" methods of combatting 
ekresie. Situetional experience of problems end dilemmas, end 
perticipetion in activities, which cen be previously or sub—
sequently discussed, examined, interpreted, explained, criticised 
end evelueted through the medium of morel lenguege will et least 
teke some eccount of the complex logical end psychological features 
of ekresia. 
(iii) Bedeuse the ekresiec wants to do whet he does 
more then whet he believes he ought to do, anti—ekresiec methods 
must pay perticuler ettention to the development end modificetion 
of children's wants. The typology of methods in Section 3 
355. 
suggested that e sequential programme might be devised in this 
connection which would closely follow Kohlberg's eccount of 
motivetionel levels. Thus, rewerds End Punishments would be 
used with young children to encourere them to went to do whet 
they might otherwise not went to do; et the next stage more use 
would be made of the child's desire for adult end peer—group 
approval, his tendency to follow examples, end 	 increasing 
ability to "identify" end empathise with others; end finally 
the attitudes end beliefs so acquired might be systematised into 
e fremework of more ebstrect, justifying Principles, incor-porated 
in en autonomous, "rational" conscience. Hebit—formation of 
some kind would be the eim et each stage, and extrinsic forms of 
motivation would give way to intrinsic ones es the child came to 
went to do whet he believed he ought to do beceuse he so believed 
rether then beceuse of external sanctions. 
Such e programme recalls end gives some content to 
/=_ristotle's dictum concerning the role of habituation in morel 
learning: "... it is e matter of reel importance whether our 
early education confirms us in one set of habits or enotber,"60 — 
end elso to Bradley's eccount: 
"The child is taught to will e content which is universal 
end good, end he learns to identify his will with it, so 
that he feels pleasure when he feels himself in accord with 
it, uneasiness or pain when his will is contrery thereto, 
end he feels that it is contrary. This is the beginning 
of personal morality 
ilctine es a result of en acquired hebit, or even 
principle, suggests e certain leek of reflection end deliberetion 
et the time of the ection,62 which could constitute en edventege 
rether then e disadvantage in potentially ekresiec situations. 
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The longer e child (or en adult) thinks about the pros end cons 
of acting es he believes he ought in e particular situation, the 
more he may dwell upon the attractions of the countervailing 
factors end the more heavily they may weigh with him. Habits, 
then, can serve e useful anti—ekresiec purpose in cutting short 
deliberation end initiating ection before the ellure of counter— 
inclinations becomes too greet, while principles can do e similar 
job by providing e summery morel justification for E. course of 
ection which cen be implemented before non—morel considerations 
Pose any greet threet of temptation. 
(iv) noral educetion hes been interpreted deliberately 
widely in this Chapter es any activity or process which is 
implicitly or explicitly directed towards influencing young 
people's morel thinking, beliefs end behaviour. One result of 
this hes been that the methods discussed have not been restricted 
to school activities, nor to structured, teaching programmes. 
The question remains, however, whether the best context for anti— 
ekresiac methods is likely to be found in timetabled "morel 
educetion" lessons, or in the general life end organisation of the 
school, or in non—school activities and experiences. Each of the 
three contexts seems eble to contribute something of velue. 
"Loral educetion" lessons in school ere probably the 
best way of dealing systemeticely end thoroughly with fee tures of 
morel discourse end the methodology of morel reasoning. The fact 
thet school time is elloceted to teaching end discussion about 
morel questions should elso emphesise their seriousness end com—
plexity. One denger of this approach, however, is that it mey 
imply thet "morelity" is "done" et certain times of the week, like 
history or geography, end if this impression is given, ekresie 
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mey even be encouraged es e result of increesing the epperent 
remoteness of "whet we telk ebout in Loral Educetion" from "whet 
heppens in reel life". Less formelly structured school acti—
vities end experiences reduce this risk, though et the cost of 
providing e less comprehensive, explicit treetment of morel 
questions. Games, clubs, societies, projects, rituels, traditions 
end the every dey interpersonal transactions which .go to make up 
the life end ethos of e school provide opportunities for every 
kind of enti—ekresiec method, end whet is teught end leernt by 
these meens stends e good chance of becoming internalised in the 
form of hebits, for these trensections ere not "mere tele but 
constitute e lerge pert of schoolchildren's deily life. For 
meny children, however, "reel life" starts et the school getes, 
end if enti—ekrasiec methods ere to heve eny effect on children's 
beheviour out of school, they will obviously need some reinforce—
ment in out—of—school situetions, perticulerly in the home. 
Probebly more important, though, than whether tnti—
ekresiec methods ere used formelly or informelly, or in or out 
of school, is whether or not they form e consistent pettern of 
sociel leerning and experience, the continuity of which encoureges 
identificetion, exemple—following end hebit—formetion. This 
point will be developed further in (v). 
(v) Two epperently conflicting views of morelity, the 
"competitive" end the "conformist", were sketched in Chepter II. 
The account of morel judgment end action in generel, end of 
ekresie in perticuler, which wes then presented bed more in common 
with the "competitive" model, which it wes argued reflected 
verious logicel features of morelity which in turn allowed for 
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the logical possibility of akresie. 
:out although most morel concepts derive their logicel 
point from the presupposition thet the morel life is difficult 
to leed, it does not follow thet one learns psycholoricellz to 
lead this life through e process of constent struggle. Diffi—
cult skills ere not accuired, nor difficult testis echieved, by 
letting one's mind dwell et the outset on the magnitude of the 
Problems end obstacles, or by setting oneself objectives which 
one will in ell probebility fell to attain. Success is more 
likely to result if one concentrates first upon the easier com—
ponents of the skills to be eccuired, practises these until they 
become "second neture", end builds upon them to echieve further, 
more difficult, but still realistic goals. One does not learn 
how to climb the south—west fece of 2verest by trying to climb 
the south—west face of Dverest. 
Similarly, one does not leern to combat ekresie by 
being feced initially with E stark conflict between obligation 
and incline tion, end by trying, in Benson's words, "to beet the 
passions into submission in the interests of morelity". Children 
leern the initial requirements of morelity by learning to behave 
in weys which pleese others whom they wish to please and which 
consequently pleese themselves; they esquire habits because they 
went to acquire them, not because they have struggled to subdue 
their wents in fevour of something which they do not went. floral 
leerning, then, (which includes learninr to do what one believes 
one ought to do) resembles in its psycholoricel feetures the 
"conformist" rether then the "competitive" model, Particularly 
in the early stereo when young children ere unable to eppreciete 
the impersonel nature of justificatory reasons and principles, 
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whose logical features help to produce the characteristically 
"morel" conflict between duty end desire. Young children become 
ewere of morel demends through the personel mediation of adult 
prescriptions, end they leern to conform to (et leest some of) 
these demands beceuse of benefits and setisfEctions which accrue 
to them es e result; they become morel beings by gradually con—
forming to social expectetions rether then by fighting constant 
End lonely betties against temptetion end inclination. 
If morel leerning end development, therefore, reflects 
the "conformist" model in these respects, e final end important 
generel implication for anti—ekresiec methods will follow. To 
be effective, such methods will have to be viewed and practised 
not es e perticuler set of educe tionel techniques designed to 
achieve e specific, limited goal within "morel education", but 
rether es en integrel end constitutive element in the sociel 
traditions within which the child is growing up. Habits are 
formed, examples followed, end identifications mode most eesily 
within e sociel form of life which allows continuity end con—
sistency of experience end elso predictability of expectations. 
Perticipetion in e variety of sociel institutions, then, such es 
school, the youth club, the sports club, the church, Cubs End 
Brownies, Scouts end Guides etc. will provide opportunities for 
"verbel" exhortation end preaching, instruction end discussion 
to interest with "precticel" experience of rewords end punish— 
ments, exemple—following end "disciplined" activities, es 
described in Section 3, for such institutions ere cherecterised 
by perticuler procedures, velues end goals which ere communicated 
to new members and reinforced for existing members by this inter— 
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ection of the "verbal" end the "practical". If the child is 
made to feel e reel member of such social institutions, and if 
within that institutional context adults deliberately expose him 
to the kind of linguistic end situational experience which hes 
been discussed in this chapter, little more can be done to 
"strengthen his will". 
This chepter hes ettempted to relate the eccount of 
ekresie, developed in Chapters II — V, to the issue of morel 
education. It wes argued in Section 1 that children es well as 
adults can be ekresiec, end thet part of the function of morel 
education must therefore be to help children to act upon their 
beliefs. In Section 2 it was shown how epproeches to morel 
education in generel end to combatting ekresie in perticuler 
must necessarily reflect particular views of the neture of 
morelity end of the explanation of ekresie. The account of 
morelity end of ekresie given in Chapters II — V was then used 
in Section 3 es e basis for evelutting on logical grounds the 
likely strengths end weaknesses of verious "ways of teeching 
morelity" es methods of combatting ekresie. Finelly in Section 4 
some suggestions, both specific end generel, about enti—ekresiec 
methods have been made, drewn from the previous section end also 
from the logical feetures centrel to the account of ekresie which 
hes been presented in this study. 
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